operate on the basis of tuna caught by tuna vessels in the Pacific which are brought to our island mainly through the Panama Canal. Obviously, we would be concerned with any treaty which did not guarantee the safe passage of American vessels and other vessels in terms of trade with Puerto Rico.

However, in light of the provisions of article IV, with respect to the second treaty and of course the provisions that the United States will continue to operate the canal until the year 2000, we certainly feel that our interests are adequately protected under the terms of the proposed treaty.

Senator SARBANES. Of course that last point I think is an important one because the continued and assured neutrality of the canal is very important to the interests of a great number of nations. You have given one example of how it affects Puerto Rico. Any number of countries, particularly in Latin America have a very keen interest in the maintenance of the canal.

Would it be your view that American action in order to maintain the neutrality of the canal would command the support of the various countries who have an interest in the neutrality?

Mr. CORRADA. Definitely so. Senator. It is my view, for instance, that if under the terms of the existing treaty a situation arose where the United States had to take action which action was not viewed to be in harmony with the decisions of the Government of Panama, it is very difficult to see that such action might have full support of the rest of the nations of Latin America; whereas under the terms of these treaties, if ratified, the actions of the United States definitely would have such support. Of course, with respect to Puerto Rico, the actions of our Government, the Government of the United States, would have our support but indeed we would feel much better if such support is on the basis of a fair and equitable relationship as established under the terms of the treaties rather than by sheer use of power, so to speak-crude power.

May I also say that in terms of actions that in the future might be necessary, hopefully not, to guarantee the neutrality of the canal, Puerto Rico might become a significant element strategically, and, of course, the understanding of our people that United States action in the area is not only legally right but also morally justified, would definitely help in having the overwhelming support of our people in Puerto Rico.

Senator SARBANES. We appreciate your coming today and presenting this testimony, responding to our questions and for your patience in waiting a good part of the day in order to have that opportunity. I want to thank you very much.

Mr. CORRADA. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE FLOOD

Senator SARBANES. Representative Flood is unable to appear in person at this time but we do have his statement and accompanying documents which we will include in the record at this point.

[Congressman Flood's prepared statement. The accompanying documents appear in the appendix.]

PANAMA CANAL-THE PROBLEM AND THE REASONED SOLUTION

(By Hon. Daniel J. Flood, a Representative from Pennsylvania)

Mr. Chairman, as a student of Panama Canal history and problems, I long ago recognized them as inexhaustible subjects. My interest was first aroused in early youth when former President Theodore Roosevelt used to be an occasional house guest at my grandfather's home in Hazleton, Pennsylvania. During those years, I listened many hours to that great American leader while he discussed the difficulties he had to face in launching what was then, and still is, one of the most stupendous industrial enterprises in history. He naturally became my youthful ideal and inspired an interest on my part in the Canal question that has increased over the years. It has been a privilege, indeed, since being a Member of the Congress, to have been an instrument in the protection of the most strategic waterway of the Americas as a vital asset of the United States for interoceanic commerce and national defense.

Instead of making a long and detailed statement, I ask that the following documents be appended to my testimony:

Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of 1901 with Great Britain and the April 22, 1977 letter of the Raja of Patiala to the Prime Minister of India.

My statement before the House of Representatives Subcommittee on InterAmerican Affairs, September 22, 1971.

My address on "New Panama Canal Treaty Report: Fallacies Clarified and Constructive Program Proposed." Congressional Record, September 9, 1976, pp. H9657-60.

H. Res. 92, 95th Congress.

H. R. 1587, 95th Congress.

Dr. Karl Brandt et al. "Panama Canal Sovereignty and Modernization : Memorial to the Congress," 1975.

Press release of environmental organizations of September 6, 1977 and their telegram to the President of September 6, 1977.

Panama Canal Pilot Association urges Major Modernization as Solution of Panama Canal Problems. Congressional Record, November 15, 1973, p. H10091. Mario Lazo. "Panama Canal Giveaway: A Latin American's View." Washington, D.C.: Council for Inter-American Security, 1977.

Letter to the President by four former Chiefs of Naval Operations of June 8, 1977, and its forwarding endorsement by four Senators of June 15, 1977.

In my studies of Isthmian canal policy questions, I have had the benefit of extensive consultations with the best informed authorities that I could find. They included experienced engineers and geologists, Panama Canal pilots and other navigators, marine biologists, lawyers, historians, and distinguished officers of the Armed Forces with high command experience.

Though canal problems are immensely complicated, when reduced to their essentials they are relatively brief and simple. The two central ones are: (1) the question of U.S. sovereignty over the Canal Zone; and (2) the increase of transit capacity coupled with operational improvements.

From a study of extensive evidence, it is clear that one of the prime reasons for the tremendous success of the United States in the construction of the Panama Canal and its subsequent efficient maintenance, operation, sanitation, protection and defense, with tolls that are "just and equitable," during two World Wars, the Korean and Viet Nam Wars, and the Cuban missile crisis, was the exclusive sovereign control of the Canal Zone by the United States.

When the present Panama Canal questions are evaluated from their most significant angles-engineering, marine, operational, economic, legal, environmental, defense and diplomatic-the only commonsense solutions are: (1) retention by the United States of its undiluted sovereign control over the Canal Zone; and (2) the major modernization of the existing canal under the well known, extensively documented and strongly supported Terminal Lake-Third Locks solution. This proposal, which was developed in the Panama Canal organization as a result of World War II experience, was submitted to higher authority through official channels and won the approval of President Franklin D. Roosevelt as a post war project.

Such major modernization, on which more than $171,000,000 have already been expended, would improve the maintenance and operation of the Canal enormously, bring huge benefits to Panama, serve interoceanic commerce by increasing canal capacity and its operational efficiency for larger vessels, including larger tankers with Alaskan oil, and serve to increase employment in the United States as well as in Panama. Moreover, it is covered by existing treaty provisions, which authorize "expansion and new construction," and thus does not require the negotiation of a new canal treaty. (Congressional Record July 24, 1939, p. 9834.) In addition, the Terminal Lake-Third Locks solution is recognized by experienced navigators, including Panama Canal pilots, as providing the best operational canal practicable of achievement and, I may add, at least cost.

In connection with costs, one of the main reasons for the insistence by the Unitel States upon exclusive sovereign control over the Canal Zone was to protect the huge investment involved in the construction and fortification of the canal as well as the costs of its later improvements.

As a member of the Subcommittee on Defense, House Committee on Appropriations. I believe that I reflect the view of a majority of the House of Representatives as well as the people of the United States when saying that both will demand adherence to that historic U.S. canal policy.

In contrast to the modernization of the existing Canal, the much publicized proposal for a so-called "sea level" canal, which is actually one of tidal lock design, would be operationally inferior to the existing canal as well as economically extravagant. Nevertheless, it makes a strong appeal to the inexperienced and others who think they may benefit from such a vast project. It periodically reappears as a "hardy perennial" no matter how often the impossibility of realizing any such scheme within realistic limits of cost and time may be demonstrated. Historically, the advocacy of a "sea-level” design has been based on the alleged vulnerability of the lake and lock type.

In 1905-06, during the "battle of the levels," its supporters used the danger of "naval gunfire" as their major justification.

In 1938-39, prior to World War II, they stressed the hazards of "enemy bombing."

In 1945-48, its proponents held that "vulnerability to the atomic bomb" and other new weapon dangers "dictated" the construction of a "sea level" canal for reasons of "security and national defense."

In 1964, its advocates argued that "two sticks of dynamite" could destroy the present canal.

In 1970, they contended that the alleged "vulnerability" of the existing canal to "many forms of attack" required a tidal lock design.

In 1974-75, its supporters stressed that the dangers of "guerrilla warfare" and even "earthquakes" required construction of the "sea level" type.

The only new points in support of the "sea-level" proposal have been the use of different hobgoblins. Such advocacy is primarily based on the fallacious assumption that it is possible to construct a canal of "indestructible proportions."

The advent of nuclear weapons has negated all such assumptions, for any navigation project, regardless of type, is vulnerable to destruction by such weapons and no amount of sophistry can alter this fact. The true criteria for decision as to type are not passive defense measures embodied in canal design but "ease and safety of navigation" and this test leaves no doubt as to what type is required at Panama.

The 1947 Report under Public Law 280, 79th Congress, recommended only a "sea-level" project in the Canal Zone near the existing canal. It failed to receive Executive approval and was transmitted by President Truman to the Congress without comment or recommendation, and the Congress took no action thereon.

When the 1960 report of an independent inquiry under the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries was submitted, it opposed the construction of a "sea-level" project in the Canal Zone, as previously recommended in 1947, because of the possibility of massive slides involving a "long interruption to traffic" (H. Rept. No. 1960, 86th Congress, p. 5).

In 1970, the report under Public Law 88-609, 88th Congress, as amended, recommended only a "sea-level" project in the Republic of Panama about 10 miles west of the existing canal.

The 1947 and 1970 "sea level" canal reports, costing about $6,000,000 and $23,000,000, respectively, were not the products of independent broadly based

commissions subject to Senate confirmation, but of Executive appointed consultants to justify the predetermined decisions of a small professional and industrial group.

The maintenance, operation, sanitation and protection of the Panama Canal and its indispensable protective frame of the Canal Zone are technical problems of great complexity, requiring not only a depth of expert knowledge and experience but also the strong logistical support of a great and powerful nation. The solution of these problems, including that of major modernization, does not consist of surrendering U.S. sovereignty over the Canal Zone and, ultimately, the Canal itself to a small, weak, technologically primitive, and unstable country but the assumption by the United States of its responsibilities as the great power leader of the Free World.

As was previously indicated, the reasoned solution is twofold: (1) reaffirmation by the Congress of full U.S. sovereign control over the Canal Zone; and (2) the major modernization of the existing canal under existing treaty provisions. Measures to implement these objectives are now before the Congress and should be promptly approved.

As to the much propagandized assertion that all of the Latin American countries desire the United States to surrender its sovereign control over the Panama Canal and Canal Zone to Panama, this is plain poppycock. I know of no better summary of Latin American feeling than that by the late Dr. Mario Lazo, a distinguished Cuban lawyer and author. In his 1977 posthumously published article, when commenting on the proposed surrender, he stated: "The almost universal reaction among the educated people of Latin America who are not politicians to a promulgated Kissinger-Bunker giveaway treaty would be, at first, incredulity, then sadness and eventually ridicule and even contempt for the once greatly respected nation that had shown itself no longer to have the will to maintain its responsibilities." (Mario Lazo, Op. Cit., p. 10).

The situation on the Isthmus is not a mere local conflict between Panama and the United States but a focal issue in the U.S.S.R. campaign for world domination by gaining control of strategic waterways. The strength of the U.S. Navy has been reduced from some 1,000 vessels a decade ago to about 460 ships today. Thus, the canal is a more vital element now for U.S. seapower than for many years. We can surrender its soverign control only at our peril for with the loss of sovereignty all other aspects would become irrelevant. Such giveaway would quickly transform the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico into Red Lakes. As to current efforts to polarize proponents of surrender of the Canal Zone and their opponents as liberals and conservatives, respectively, this is a monumental deception. The Canal question transcends all partisan considerations and must be resolved on the highest plane of national interest for it is a crucial issue in the current global situation, involving the security not only of the United States but also of the entire Free World.

In these connections, I would stress the following:

The proposed new canal treaties ignore the obligations of the United States under the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty.

They disregard the rights under that treaty of the successor states of the former British Empire and other important canal users that provide a substantial portion of Panama Canal traffic.

They represent an abject surrender to threats of violence if the treaties are not ratified.

Their ratification will extend U.S.S.R. power in the strategic Caribbean-Gulf of Mexico areas and impair the influence of the United States not only in this area but also throughout the world, especially among canal user nations.

There is ample authority to deal with local problems within the framework of existing treaties without any new ones.

The present treaties are workable. The proposed treaties would saddle the United States with grave responsibility without adequate authority, which would be an entirely impossible situation and would not work.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, the program that I recommend, which is derived from experience and is historically based, is simple:

1. Rejection of the pending treaties in their entirety;

2. Reaffirmation by the Congress of the historic U.S. policy for perpetual undiluted U.S. sovereign control over the Canal Zone;

3. Enactment of measures for the major modernization of the existing canal under existing treaty provisions.

4 Authorization for a Delegate in the Congress from the Canal Zone.

5. Reactivation of the pre-World War II U.S. Navy's Special Service Squadron with home base in the Canal Zone.

As recognized by many Latin Americans, this program will be best for the United States, best for world commerce, best for Panama and best for other nations of Latin America that use the Canal.

Senator SARBANES. The committee will stand adjourned until 9:30 tomorrow morning when we will resume further hearings on the Panama Canal Treaty, hearing from the other Members of the Congress who have asked for the opportunity to speak.

[Whereupon, at 4:35 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.]