denote the attributes, qualities, and operations, of things and persons. They form a very numerous class, and were by the ancient grammarians called inuaτa, verba, whatever may be said or affirmed concerning persons or things. Thus of a man it may be said, that he is good, that he speaks, or that he is walking. Attributives are of three sorts, adjectives, verbs, and participles. An adjective, or epithet, denotes a quality, and nothing more; as good, bad, black, white. Verbs and participles denote qualities too, but with the addition of something else, as will appear by and by.

61. It is strange, that in all the common grammars the adjective should be considered as a noun. It is no more a noun than it is a verb. Nay, verbs and adjectives are of nearer affinity than nouns and adjectives. For the verb and adjective agree in this, that both express qualities or attributes whereas the noun is the name of the thing to which qualities or attributes belong. And therefore the term adjective-noun is as improper as if we were to say participle-noun, or verb-noun.

62. In many languages it is a rule, that the adjective must agree with its noun in gender, number, and case and where adjectives have gender, number, and case, the rule is reasonable and natural. But it is not so in all languages. English adjectives have neither gender nor number; but, like indeclinable Latin adjectives (as frugi, centum, nequam), are invariably the same. We say, a good

man, a good woman, a good thing; good men good women, good things; without making any change in the adjective: and in this syntax we feel no inconvenience. And the same thing is true of English participles.

63. One variation, however, those English adjectives require, which in their signification admit of the distinctions of more and less. This paper is white, and snow is white, but snow is whiter than this paper. Solon was wise, Socrates wiser, Solomon the wisest of men. The degrees are innumerable in which different things may possess the same quality: it is impossible to say with precision, how much wiser Solomon was than Socrates, or by how many degrees snow is whiter than this paper. But in human art there is no infinity; and, therefore, we cannot in language have degrees of comparison to express all possible varieties of more and less.

64. Two degrees of comparison, the comparative and superlative, are all that seem to be necessary; and, for expressing these, different nations may have different contrivances: what is called the positive degree is the simple form of the adjective, and expresses neither degree nor comparison. Participles admit not of the variation we speak of: when they seem to assume it, as when we say doctus, doctior, doctissimus, they cease to be participles, and become adjectives. Some adverbs admit of this variety, as diu, diutius, diutiş,

sime. Verbs too may express degrees of comparison, but do it by means of auxiliary adverbs; as, magis amat, vehementissime amat.

65. The comparative degree denotes superiority, and implies a comparison of one, or more, persons, or things, with another, or with others, that is, or are, set in opposition; Solomon was wiser than Socrates; the Athenians were more learned than the Thebans; he is more intelligent than all his teachers. There are two superlatives; one implying comparison, and each denoting eminence or superiority. We use the former when we say, Solomon was the wisest of men;' where Solomon is compared to a species of beings of whom he is said to be one. We use the latter, when we say, Solomon was a very wise, or a most wise man. In these last sentences, comparison, though remotely insinuated, is not, as in the former example, expressly asserted.

66. OF VERBS. Man is endowed, not only with senses to perceive, and memory to retain, but also with judgment, whereby we compare things and thoughts together, so as to make affirmations concerning them. When we say, Solomon wise, we affirm nothing, and the words are not a senBut when we say, Solomon is wise, we utter a complete sentence, expressing a judgment and an affirmation, founded on a comparison of a certain man Solomon, with a certain quality wise: The judgment of the mind is here expressed by

tence.

the affirmative word is; and this word is a verb. A verb, therefore, seems to be a word expressing • affirmation, and necessary to form a complete

sentence or proposition.'

67. Here observe, that every proposition affirms or denies something; as, snow is white, riches are not permanent. Observe further, that the thing concerning which we affirm or deny is called the subject of the proposition, namely, snow in the one example, and riches in the other; that what is affirmed or denied concerning the subject is called the predicate of the proposition, namely, white in the one example, and permanent in the other; and that the words whereby we affirm or deny, are called the copula of the proposition, namely, is in the one example, and are not in the other. It was said, that every proposition either affirms or denies. Now denial implies affirmation; to deny that a thing is, is to affirm that it is not. In every sentence or proposition, therefore, there is affirmation, and a verb is that which expresses it. Consequently, a verb is necessary in every sentence, • and every verb expresses affirmation.'

68. Some affirmations have no dependence on time, with respect to their truth or falsehood. That God is good, that two and two are four, and that malevolence is not to be commended, always was, will, and must be, true. For expressing these, and the like affirmations, those verbs alone are necessary, which the Latins call substantive

and the Greeks more properly verbs of existence; ás sum, fio, existo, éμi, yiroμai, &c. But innumerable affirmations are necessarily connected with time: I may affirm, that a thing was done, is done, or will be done. In verbs, therefore, there must be a contrivance for expressing time. Moreover, affirmations have a necessary connection with a person or with persons: I, thou, he, may affirm; we, ye, or they may affirm. In a verb, therefore, 'affirmation is expressed, together with time, number, and person.'

69. Further: our thoughts shift with great rapidity; and it is natural for us to wish to speak as fast as we think. No wonder then, that we should often, where it can be done conveniently, express two or three thoughts by one word; and particularly, that we should by one word express both the attribute, and the affirmation which connects that attribute, with some person or thing. In this way, and partly for this reason, we say scribo, I write, instead of ego sum scribens, I am writing. And thus our idea of a verb is completed. And we may now define it, 'A word necessary in every ⚫ sentence, and signifying affirmation with respect to some attribute, together with the designation ❝ of time, number, and person.' Thus scribo, I am writing, is a complete sentence, and comprehends these four things; fi I, the person, and one person; secondly, am the affirmation; thirdly,