Christian education, can be ignorant of morality. The chief points of it, and the more important speculations connected with them, I shall briefly illustrate, and endeavour to arrange in a scientific form and this is all, perhaps, that can reasonably be expected, considering the shortness of the time, and the great number of subjects that fall within my province.

471. The word moral signifies, of, or belonging to, manners. Manners are human actions, or, rather, human habits acquired by action. But all human actions and habits are not of that sort which we call moral. Manual dexterity, bodily activity, and the exertions of memory and genius, are not, in themselves, either moral or immoral; for it is not from circumstances of this kind that we form an estimate of the human character, as dignified by the performance of duty, or debased by the neglect of it. An ingenious mechanic, a strong and active man, a person of lively fancy, or tenacious memory, may be the object of our esteem, disapprobation, or contempt, according as he applies his talents to a good, a bad, or an insignificant purpose. But moral goodness implies a regard to duty, and is always the object of esteem and approbation.

472. The common use of language requires, that a distinction be made between morals and manners the former depend upon internal dispoşitions, the latter on outward and visible accom

plishments. A man's manners may be pleasing, whose morals are bad: such a man shews what is good in him, and conceals what is evil. They who in their manners are agreeable, and who also exert themselves in doing good, that is, in promoting happiness, are of good morals as well as of good manners. And to do good, or, at least, to wish to do good, and be ready to do it when opportunity offers, is in every person's power, and every person's duty; whereas, to have manual dexterity, a sound state of mind and body, great genius, great memory, or elegant manners, is not every man's duty, because not in every man's power. Those actions and habits, therefore, are properly called moral, or immoral, which are in the power of the agent, and which he knows to have an influence, favourable or unfavourable, on human happiness.

473. Some duties are incumbent on all men without exception, because tending to promote good in general. Other duties are incumbent on us in consequence of our connection with particular societies; because they tend to promote the good of those societies. To enumerate all the forms of society with which we may be connected, is impossible but there are two, which may be considered as the most important, and with which every one of us either is, or may be, connected; and those are, a family, and a state or government. Hence moral philosophy may be divided into three

parts. The first, which I call ethics, treats of the morality of actions, as arising from the disposition of the agent, and as tending to promote good in general. The second, called economics, regulates human conduct, so as to make it promote the good of that family of which one may be à member. The third, which may, without impropriety, be termed politics, explains the nature of political or civil society, and the duties and rights of men with respect to it. A more minute, as well as more comprehensive, distribution of this science might be given: but, considering the limits within which our academical rules oblige me to confine myself, this may, perhaps, be thought sufficient,

MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

PART FIRST.

474.

4

HERE

OF ETHICS.

ERE we are to consider human actions as good or bad, according to the motives, principles, intentions, or dispositions, from which they proceed; and, according as they tend to promote good in general, or the contrary. In prosecuting this subject, I shall inquire, first, into the nature and foundation of man's moral goodness, that is, of human virtue; and, secondly, into the nature and foundation of particular virtues, or duties. The former may be called speculative ethics, and the latter practical ethics. Observe here, that the words virtue and duty have often, but not always, the same signification. He is a man of virtue who does his duty; he is a vicious man who neglects it: and modesty, humility, piety, benevolence, may be called either virtues, or duties. But, when called virtues, we consider

them as performed, or acquired; when called duties, we consider them as what it is incumbent on us to perform, or acquire. Accordingly, we call a good man, not a man of duty, but a man of virtue; because we mean a person who has actually done what he ought to do, or who has acquired those habits, or dispositions, which he ought to acquire but a regard to duty, and a regard to virtue, are phrases nearly synonymous.

CHAPTER I.

OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE.

475. THIS word, in its most general acceptation, denotes power, or ability. As applied to man, and characterised by the epithet moral (to distinguish it from other sorts of virtue, which will be specified afterwards), it signifies some quality, disposition, or habit, which fits a man for answering his end, that is, for living as he ought to live, and being what he ought to be; or, more explicitly, for living as the author of his nature intended that he should live, and being what the author of his nature intended that he should be