fications of our nature; for no man ever yet became respectable by attaching himself to them. They often bring disgust and even pain along with them; they please not upon reflection; and they tend to disqualify us for the nobler delights of science and virtue. They depend not on ourselves, but on other things and persons; they are attainable in certain circumstances only; and we lose all taste for them in adversity. To them therefore the character of man's chief good is not applicable.

503. Secondly, The pleasures of imagination and science have great dignity; the pursuit of them is honourable, though it may run to excess; and they are consistent both with moral and with sensual gratification, and in an eminent degree friendly to the former. They are not momentary; they please upon reflection; and they grow more exquisite by being frequent. But they do not alleviate the calamities of life: and so far are they from being accommodated to all times and places, that by all the uninstructed, that is, by the greater part of the human race, they are absolutely unattainable. Consequently, the character of man's chief good does not belong to them.

504. Thirdly, The delights that arise from the right exercise of our moral powers, and from the approbation of conscience, are of all gratifications the most dignified: the more a man attaches himself to them, the more respectable he becomes, and it is not possible for him to carry such attach

VOL. I.

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ment to excess with disgust, or with pain, they are never attended: they give a relish for other pleasures, by preserving the mind cheerful, and the body in health: they are not inconsistent with any innocent gratification, that is, they are consistent with all pleasures except those which bring pain and misery: they please intensely on reflection; are a perpetual source of comfort in adversity; become more exquisite the more we are accustomed to them; are within the reach of every man, high and low, learned and ignorant; are suited to all times and places: and, so long as we retain our rationality, it is not in the power of malice or of fortune to deprive us of them. To virtue, therefore, which is the right exercise of our moral powers, the character of man's chief good does belong; which will appear still more evident when we consider, that the hope of future felicity is the chief consolation of the present life, and that the virtuous alone can reasonably entertain that hope. As, on the other hand, vice, in the most prosperous condition, is subject to the pangs of a guilty conscience, and to the dreadful anticipation of future punishment; which are sufficient to destroy all earthly happiness.

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505. I am far from adopting, in its literal sense, that maxim of the poet, Virtue alone is happi'ness below.' For though I say, with the Peripatetics, that virtue is the chief good, I do not say, with the Stoics, that it is the only good. That a

virtuous man in health and prosperity may be happier than a man of equal virtue beset with adversity and disease, I see no reason to doubt; and if so, health and prosperity are good, and disease and adversity evil.-Besides, if destitute of the hope of immortality, the mind of a good man (especially if he were a man of sensibility and penetration) would not be happy in this world, but would, on the contrary, be a prey to perplexity and anguish. Such a man would be perpetually shocked with the confusion which would then appear in the universe, and of which he could foresee no end. The world to him would seem to be governed by a being, whose power was indeed great, but whose justice and goodness were not equally conspicuous. It is the belief of a future state of retribution that satisfies the rational mind of the infinite rectitude of the Divine government; and it is this persuasion only, that can make the virtuous happy in the present life. And as we could not, without revelation, entertain a wellgrounded hope of future reward, it is only the virtue of the true Christain that can obtain the happiness we now speak of.

506. Virtue being the chief good of individuals, it is hardly necessary to add, that it must be the chief good of society. For of individuals society is made up, and that is the happiest society in which there is most private happiness. We cannot conceive a community, or a nation, to be pro

sperous, if the people who compose it are miserable. Kingdoms in every age have been flourishing and happy no longer than they maintained their virtue.

507. And now it appears, that virtue is founded in our constitution, and agreeable to our whole nature, of which indeed it is the perfection; that it must therefore be conformable to the will of him who is the author of our nature; and that it is the only means of making mankind truly happy. Vice, consequently, is contrary to our whole nature, and tends to debase and destroy; it is contrary to the will of God, and contrary to our own interest. I conclude the chapter with the following description, every part of which will be found to have been enforced and illustrated by the foregoing reasonings. Moral virtue is a disposition of the 'mind, voluntary and active, agreeable in itself, and praiseworthy, incumbent on all men, and tending to improve our, whole nature, and promote our happiness both here and hereafter.' So much for the general nature of virtue. I shall proceed to the practical part of Ethics, when I have made a few miscellaneous observations.

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CHAPTER II.

MISCELLANEOUS

THE SUBJECT CONTINUED.

OBSERVATIONS.

508. THE word Virtue, like many other abstract terms, has great latitude of signification. Often it denotes power or agency; as when we speak of the virtues of a plant or mineral. Sometimes it means that which makes a thing good or agreeable: thus perspicuity, simplicity, correctness, and harmony, have been called the virtues of a good style. The Romans by the word virtus frequently signified valour and public spirit, because they held these qualities in peculiar esteem. The same term is used to signify any quality, or perfection of qualities, which fits a thing for an swering its end; and, in this sense, has been applied not only to the moral, but also to the intellectual, and even to the corporeal part of our constitution. Hence human virtues have been distinguished into Corporeal, as health, strength, swiftness, &c. Intellectual, as genius, learning, wit, humour, eloquence, &e. and, Moral, as temperance, justice, benevolence, piety, &c.

509. Every rational being must see, that these last are quite different from corporeal and intellec