Matter of New York and Jamaica Railroad. WILLIAM J. COGS WELL, for motion. SCRUGHAM, Justice. Upon a motion to confirm the report of the commissioners, the court cannot consider the objections stated in the affidavit of Mr. Wilson, nor any of his exceptions to such report, except that which states that neither the report nor any of the proceedings which precede it, properly designate the lands proposed to be taken. All the other objections and exceptions must be considéred on appeal from the report after confirmation, as provided by section 18 of the act under which these proceedings are taken. Section 14 of the act requires that the petition shall contain a description of the real estate which the company seeks to acquire, and the owner now objects that neither the petition nor the map filed in the office of the clerk of Kings county, to which it refers, shows what extent of land was to be taken, nor anything more than a line showing the direction of the proposed railway. If this is true, the objection should have been taken on the presentation of the petition on the motion for the appointment of commissioners. The report of which confirmation is sought, in addition to the description used in the petition, gives the quantity of the land to be taken and a diagram showing its boundaries, and length and width throughout its whole extent; I consider this a sufficient description. The report must be confirmed, and an order entered, pursuant to the 17th section of the act. Slater Bank agt. Sturdy. SUPREME COURT. THE SLATER BANK agt. JAMES H. STURDY and others. Where a foreign corporation file security for costs on commencing their action, there is no further authority to require further or new security in case of the future insolvency of the first. New York Special Term, August, 1861. THIS was a motion to compel the plaintiff to file a second bond for costs, the obligors on the bond filed under the statute requiring foreign corporations to file security for costs having become insolvent. BENJ. COZZENS, for motion. C. A. & W. B. CARPENTER, opposed. LEONARD, Justice. The condition as to security for costs under which the statute permits a foreign corporation to sue in the courts of this state, was complied with by the plaintiff. There is no provision authorizing the courts to require new security in case the obligors on an undertaking fail, as there is in case of an appeal from a judgment, or in the case of an action where a foreign corporation or a nonresident is plaintiff. When the security has been once given the statute has been complied with. The plaintiff or appellant has then become entitled to the benefit of his appeal, or to prosecute his action. There is no further authority to require further or new security. The motion is denied, with costs of opposing, to abide the event. Mills agt. Mills. SUPREME COURT. WILLIAM T. MILLS agt. DAVID S. MILLS and WM. DOLSEN. Where it appears that the plaintiff is fully protected by his possession of the premises, and by the filing of a notice of lis pendens against any alienation or disposition of the property, no injunction for the prevention thereof is necessary. And especially will the application for an injunction be denied, where, under the circumstances, the plaintiff's right to ultimate relief is too doubtful to entitle him to a preliminary injunction. Kings Special Term, March, 1860. LOTT, Justice. The equity of the complaint is fully denied by the answers of the defendants. It thereby appears that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief or rights under the agreement between him and the defendant Mills, as the act of the legislature, which was in the contemplation of the parties thereto, was never, in fact, obtained, and that the law which was enacted was not only more onerous in its provisions, but not assented to by them. Assuming, however, it to be otherwise, yet the performance of—or even offer by the plaintiff to perform-his part of the agreement is denied by the answers; and if it be conceded that the affidavits on the part of the plaintiff presented on the motion were admissible, yet I think they, instead of denying the defendants' allegations, show that no action on the part of the plaintiff, towards the performance of his agreement, was taken till nearly a year after the law of June 29, 1853, was passed, and that a tender, in fact, was not made till in April, 1855. Under such circumstances, the plaintiff's right to ultimate relief, is too doubtful to entitle him to a preliminary injunction. He is fully protected by his possession, and by the filing of a notice of lis pendens against any alienation or disposition of the property, and no injunction for the prevention thereof is necessary. And Donohue agt. Hicks. as to the alleged execution and delivery of the deed in escrow, it is shown that the delivery thereof was on terms and conditions not embraced within the agreement, and that the plaintiff, upon a tender thereof, refused to accept the same upon those terms, and that it was thereupon cancelled,-which I understand to mean that it was to all intents and purposes destroyed, and rendered ineffectual and inoperative for any purpose. I may add that the defendant Dolsen denies all notice of the agreement, and of any claim or right, on the part of the plaintiff, to the premises, and sets up a bona fide consideration for the deed to him. There is, therefore, no ground for interfering with him as a party taking title with notice. The agreement gave no right of possession to the plaintiff, and the allegation that he took possession under it, or with the consent of the defendant Mills, in part execution of the agreement is denied by him. Upon the whole, therefore, there is no sufficient foundation for an injunction upon the facts as they are now presented. The motion for injunction denied, and order to show cause, &c., vacated; $10 costs of the motion to abide the event of the action. The original answers and affidavits must be filed on the entry of the order. NEW YORK COMMON PLEAS. DONOHUE agt. HICKS. Until the time (ten days) or its extension expires, to file the case after settlement, it cannot be noticed for argument. Extending the time to file a case is equivalent to extending the time to print. Where the respondent served his notice of motion to strike the cause from the calendar, and for judgment, within the ten days which the appellant had to file his held irregular. case, Donohue agt. Hicks. General Term, August, 1861. Before DALY, BRADY and HILTON, Judges. MOTION to set aside an order striking the cause from the calendar and judgment by default. By the court, BRADY, J. The case was settled by the referee on the 31st March, 1861, and the defendant had ten days within which to file the same from that date. The ten days would have expired with the 9th April following. The object of allowing the ten days is to enable the appellant to prepare a copy of the case as settled, from which to print. The rules of the court make no provision for the time within which a case must be printed after it is settled, or within what time after such settlement a notice of argument may be served. It may often happen that a general term will åssemble within eleven days after the settlement of the case; and if so it could not be expected that the case would be filed and printed and copies served eight days prior to the commencement of the term, as would seem to be contemplated by rules thirty-seven and forty-three. This would be an allowance of three days only for this duty. I think, until the time expires to file the case, it cannot be noticed for argument, and that, in this case, the time to file the case having been extended until the 19th April, the notice of argument for the April term, and which commenced on the 16th day of April, did not impose upon the appellant the duty of serving copies of the case eight days before the first day of the term. Extending the time to file is equivalent to extending the time to print. The respondent served his notice of motion to strike the cause from the calendar and for judgment on the 9th April, the day on which the appellant's time to file the case would have expired had it not been extended by order. Such a service cannot be regular. It cannot be that an appellant, during the running of that ten days, can be subjected to any such motion. The appellant should have appeared on |