of ground." It seems to us that this is altogether too narrow an interpretation to place upon the provisions of the statute permitting a lien to be claimed upon the land upon which the building improvement, well, or structure is to be constructed. Section 1185 of the Code of Civil Procedure in providing for the extent of such lien allows, not only the immediate land occupied by the structure itself, but also "a convenient space about the same, or so much as may be required for the convenient use and occupation thereof." The structure upon which the plaintiff performed the work for which he claims his lien was a well, having, when completed, a capacity of at least 2,000 gallons of water a minute. It was to be an irrigating well, and according to the uncontradicted evidence of Mr. Vaughan would have sufficed for the irrigation of at least one, if not both, of the sections of land upon which it was to be located. In determining what would be a convenient space for the use and occupation of an irrigating well consideration must be given to the reasonable and beneficial use of the waters of the well, since the well is useless without the use and application of its waters upon sufficient land to render an adequate return for the cost of its creation and use. The question is not so much as to the amount of land required for the area to be occupied by the well and its appliances, but rather as to the amount of land to be improved or benefited by the creation and use of the well. This is quite clearly set forth in the case of Berentz v. Belmont Oil Mining Co., 148 Cal. 577 [113 Am. St. Rep. 308, 84 Pac. 47], and also in the case of Hamilton v. Delhi Mining Co., 118 Cal. 148 [50 Pac. 378], wherein the supreme court says: "The general theory upon which liens to laborers, mechanics and materialmen are given is that by the labor or use of the material the property has been enhanced in value." A good illustration of the application of the rule is to be found in Mendoza v. Central Forest Co., 37 Cal. App. 289 [174 Pac. 359], in which a lien was sought to be imposed for work in preparing a tract of land for an irrigation system consisting of ditches, drains, embankments, and the like. The entire tract of land was sought to be affected by the lien. The court says: "The farm development here contemplated was a finished piece of work composed of integral parts, some of which the statute expressly designates as structures, and

when completed consisted of ditches, drains, embankments, roads, so correlated as to form one harmonious entity designed to accomplish a particular object and constituting a permanent and valuable improvement to the land and necessary to its highest and most profitable uses." The supreme court of the United States has given a like application of the principle in the case of Springer Land Assn. v. Ford, 168 U. S. 513 [42 L. Ed. 562, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 170, see, also, Rose's U. S. Notes], involving much the same state of facts and wherein the court said: "The truth is that what area of land is subject to lien in a given case largely depends on the character of the improvement. The extent of ground proper and necessary to the enjoyment of the building, a wall or a fence would not be the same as that required for or pertaining to an irrigation system, but the principle of determination is the same. This ditch was to expend its waters on this tract and could not be used or operated without it. Each was dependent on the other and both were bound together in the accomplishment of a common purpose. The lien must apply to the entire tract or be confined to the right of way through which it took its course, and to narrow it down to the latter would be to disregard the very terms of the statute." In determining the amount of land to be subjected to the lien of the plaintiff in the instant case the trial court should take into account the fact that the mechanic's lien law is to be liberally construed with a view to effecting its purpose. The legislature expressly so declared in the statute amending section 1183 of the Code of Civil Procedure into its present form (Stats. 1911, pp. 13131320); and the courts of both this and other jurisdictions have consistently followed the rule of construction thus laid down. (Mendoza v. Central Forest Co., supra; Lindsay v. Gunning, 59 Conn. 296 [11 L. R. A. 553, 22 Atl. 310]; Montandon v. Deas, 14 Ala. 33 [48 Am. Dec. 84]; Filston Farm Co. v. Henderson, 106 Md. 335 [67 Atl. 228]; Hess Flume Co. v. La Junta etc. Land Co., 63 Colo. 236 [166 Pac. 246].) The foregoing views are for the direction of the trial court upon a retrial of this cause.

Judgment reversed.

Tyler, P. J., and St. Sure, J., concurred.

A petition to have the cause heard in the supreme court, after judgment in the district court of appeal, was denied by the supreme court on April 12, 1923.

All the Justices concurred.

[Civ. No. 4084. Second Appellate District, Division One.—February 13, 1923.]

MARGARET G. HONEY, Respondent, v. EDWIN A. HONEY, Appellant.

[1] DIVORCE-OFFENSE OF HUSBAND-ALLOWANCE TO WIFE-NATURE or. The allowance which is authorized to be made upon the granting of a divorce to a wife for the offense of a husband is something different from alimony proper, which term refers to support which the husband is required to render in fulfillment of the marital obligation during the continuance of the marriage. [2] ID. PAYMENT OF GROSS SUM-LIEN ON HUSBAND'S PROPERTY.— In an action for divorce where the court, as an incident to its judgment, makes provision for the future support of the wife, the judgment may require the payment of a sum in gross, and provide, as security for the payment thereof, that a lien be enforced against the separate property of the husband.

[3] ID. ABILITY OF HUSBAND-PLEADING UNNECESSARY AVERMENT. In an action for divorce it is not necessary to justify a judgment requiring the husband to pay a gross sum for the future support of the wife, that the complaint should state the husband's abil ity to pay, as the power to make the judgment is incidental to

the action.

[4] ID. PROPER ALLOWANCE OF GROSS SUM TO WIFE.-In this action for divorce, the complaint, findings, and evidence were sufficient to support the incidental judgment requiring the husband to pay to the wife a gross sum for her future support; and, considering the value of husband's property and the nature of the cruelty charged against him, the allowance was not so disproportionate to the reasonable demands of the case as to shock judicial con

science.

2. Allowance of gross sum as alimony, note, 1 Ann. Cas. 224. Lien of decree for alimony on realty, notes, 9 Ann. Cas. 90; 18 Ann. Cas. 565; Ann. Cas. 1914D, 888.

[5] ID.-HUSBAND'S CRUELTY-REASON FOR MARRIAGE STATEMENT OF WIFE.-In an action by a wife for divorce on the ground of cruelty, the court properly sustained an objection to a question asked both of the plaintiff and another witness as to whether the former had not stated prior to her marriage with the defendant that she intended to marry him in order to have herself and children supported, and that she would clean him out and when the children got to be older would leave him.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County. Z. B. West, Judge. Affirmed.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

D. G. Wettlin and B. E. Tarver for Appellant.

Walter Eden and A. E. Koepsel for Respondent.

JAMES, J.-Defendant has appealed from a decree of the superior court awarding to the plaintiff a divorce and the gross sum of $7,800 for future support.

The parties were married in August, 1919, and separated one year and eight months thereafter. At the time of the marriage defendant was sixty-five years of age and the plaintiff about thirty-one. Both parties had been previously married and plaintiff had two young children whom she brought with her to the home provided by the defendant. In her complaint she charged various acts of cruelty, consisting in part of words and epithets used toward her by defendant in a continuous course, culminating in a physical attack upon her, which occurred in May of 1921, after which she ceased to live with her husband. There was ample evidence to sustain the charge that the defendant did violently assault the plaintiff on the date last mentioned, and that his attack was without justification, and that she suffered severe bruises and injuries as a result thereof, the effects of which, especially that from an injury to one of her cars, continued down to the time of the trial.

No serious contention is made that the findings of the court on the divorce issue proper are not fully sustained by the evidence. The main argument of appellant is addressed to the point that neither the pleadings, findings, nor evidence justified the trial judge in making the award of the gross sum for the support of the wife. In the complaint

there were enumerated the various possessions of defendant in real and personal property. The defendant made no denial to those allegations. While the plaintiff for the most part declared in her complaint that the market value of the property was unknown to her, counsel for appellant in their brief admit that there was evidence sufficient to establish a total valuation of $42,375. The trial judge in his findings determined that plaintiff had no means of support and that defendant had "a large amount of property," and specifically described the various parcels of land, mortgages, and corporate stocks, as the complaint set them forth. Included in this list of property was a mortgage for $7,800 and one for $3,000.

[1] The supreme court has determined that the allowance which is authorized to be made upon the granting of a divorce to a wife for the offense of a husband (sec. 139, Civ. Code) is something different from "alimony" proper, which term refers to support which the husband is required to render in fulfillment of the marriage obligation during the continuance of the marriage. "Alimony" may be exacted pendente lite and before the marriage bonds are severed. (Sec. 137, Civ. Code.) The authority for the making of the former allowance is of course purely statutory. It is in one sense regarded as a penalty imposed upon the husband: "It proceeds upon the theory that the husband entered upon an obligation which, among other things, bound him to support the wife during the period of their joint lives, and gave to her a right to share in the fruits and accumulations of his skill; that by his own wrong he has forced her to sever the relation which enabled her to enforce this obligation, and for the wrong which thus deprived her of the benefit of the obligation, he must make her compensation. The court is to fix the measure of that compensation by 'having regard to the circumstances of the parties respectively'; those circumstances furnishing the best means for determining the extent of her loss. . . . This allowance may be entirely independent of the property then in esse." (Ex parte Spencer, 83 Cal. 460 [17 Am. St. Rep. 266, 23 Pac. 395], cited in Hogarty v. Hogarty, 188 Cal. 625 [206 Pac. 79].) [2] Our supreme court has definitely determined also that in an action for divorce where the court, as an incident to its judgment makes provision for the future