Wingo vs. Brown. Bobo, for appellant, cited Herbemont vs. Sharp, 2 McC. 264; State vs. Yongue, 6 Rich. 323; Etters vs. Wilson, 12 Rich. 145; Lawrence vs. Baubien, 2 Bail. 623; Moore vs. Aiken, 2 Mill, 403. No counsel appeared for appellee. The opinion of the Court was delivered by DUNKIN, C. J. As early as Thayer vs. Sheriff of Charleston District, 2 Bay, 164, the Court, in speaking of Sheriffs' sales, uses this language: "These sales are made by operation of law in which the will and consent of the defendant are never consulted. They are forced upon them; and it is their right, whatever that may be, more or less, that is sold by the Sheriff, who is a public officer of justice. There is no warranty in law, either express or implied, raised on any of the parties concerned in such a sale; neither on the part of the former owner, the defendant, nor the Sheriff, who is the mere organ of the law for transferring the right of the defendant. Caveat emptor, under those circumstances, is the best possible rule that can be laid down or adopted. Every one that goes to a Sheriff's sale ought to take care and examine into the title of the defendant before he attempts to bid." In Davis vs. Murray, 2 Const. Rep. 143, the Court (through Mr. Justice Cheves) recognizes this case as settling the law of South Carolina that "Sheriffs' sales are coupled with no implied warrantees." If actual fraud has been practised at the sale by the defendant in the execution, it would constitute a good defence in an action to recover the difference between the two sales, as was decided in Minter vs. Dent, 3 Hill, 205; but in the plea there is no averment of fraud on the part of the defendant in the execution. See also Leger vs. Doyle, 11 Rich. 109-118. These proceedings were instituted under the Act of 1839, p. 38, requiring the Sheriff to resell at the risk of the defaulting Columbia, November, 1866. purchaser. The plea, substantially, is, that the defendant in the execution, James M. Rhodes, had no title to the land, because, although he was the purchaser at the sale by the Ordinary and had complied with the terms of sale, the Ordinary had failed or omitted to execute a conveyance to him. This may be so, and would show that growing out of that transaction James M. Rhodes' title was equitable and not legal. But this does not prove that James M. Rhodes may not have had a title aliunde. He may have been one of the heirs of the intestate, as whose property the land was sold by the Ordinary, or may have had an interest in some other way. This is an inquiry which the defendant, the purchaser under the execution, should have prosecuted before he made his bid. It is not suggested that there was any fraud, and without that he cannot in this form impeach the title or invalidate the sale. The rule is caveat emptor. Whether, under the state of facts set forth in the plea, the defendant may not be entitled to relief in another forum, we do not undertake to say, nor to do more than determine that the demurrer was properly sustained, and that the appeal is dismissed. WARDLAW and INGLIS, J. J., concurred. Appeal dismissed. Haviland, Lindsley & Co. vs. Wolff. HAVILAND, LINDSLEY & Co. vs. VICTOR WOLFF. Insolvent Debtors and Prison Bounds Acts-New Trial-Suggestion-Verdict. Applicant for the benefit of the Prison Bounds Act tried on a general charge of fraud, with specifications thereunder, and verdict for defendant. New trial refused, though the evidence might have been sufficient to sustain a charge of undue preference. The general charges under the Act of 1788 are (1) false schedule, (2) fraudulent sale, conveyance or assignment, and (3) undue preference within three months. These general charges and the specifications under each should be clearly made in the suggestion, and the verdict should answer each charge and specification, that it is true or untrue. BEFORE THE CLERK OF THE COURT, CHARLESTON, MAY 29, 1866. The defendant being in the custody of the Sheriff under a bail writ at the suit of the plaintiffs, on the 10th May, 1866, filed a schedule and applied for the benefit of the Prison Bounds Act. The plaintiffs resisted his discharge and filed a suggestion, which, as reported by the Commissioner of Special Bail, contained a general charge of fraud, with specifications thereunder as follows: "Specification 1st. Cash in possession at time of filing schedule not included. "Specification 2d. To defraud his creditors, defendant, within three months before his arrest, voluntarily assigned his whole estate to Edward Stevenhagen. "Specification 3d. That the said Wolff, having little or no capital, represented himself as a man of means-say $7,000and obtained credit for a large amount of goods-upwards of twelve hundred dollars-which goods he put in his store, in Columbia, December, 1866. King street. He then took an account of stock and his whole estate, and for the purpose of hindering and preventing the said plaintiffs from being paid, within three months of his confinement fraudulently assigned the same to Edward Stevenhagen." The defendant was the only witness examined. He testified in substance, that he came to Charleston in April, 1865. In October of that year he contracted with the plaintiffs in New York the debt sued for, amounting to about $1,300. He was a store-keeper, and was indebted to others. Owed when he went to New York about $5,300. Stevenhagen married his sister. Soon after he came to Charleston became indebted to him for merchandise. In January, 1866, gave him a confession of judgment for $4,018.75. Owed him then about $4,000. In March, 1866, gave him another confession of judgment for $3,021.68. A few days after the second confession turned over to Stevenhagen his store and stock in trade. The Commissioner submitted the case to the jury, who found a verdict of not guilty on the general charge and on each of the specifications. The plaintiffs appealed, and now moved this Court for a new trial, on the grounds: 1. That the said Victor Wolff, having taken stock and ascertained the value of his whole estate, his transferring the same to Edward Stevenhagen, to the exclusion of the plaintiffs, within three months before his arrest, was such an undue preference as should have prevented his being discharged by the jury. 2. That the said Victor Wolff, knowing he was insolvent, did, voluntarily, within three months of his arrest by the plaintiffs at their suit, assign to Edward Stevenhagen the whole of his estate, which was an intentional and fraudulent Haviland, Lindsley & Co. vs. Wolff. hindering of the plaintiffs from being paid, and should have prevented his discharge by the jury. 10 Rich. 238; Rice, 367; 2 Spear, 237. Phillips, for appellants. Buist, contra. The opinion of the Court was delivered by WARDLAW, J. From the report made in this case by the Commissioner of Special Bail, we suppose that the suggestion contained only a general charge of fraud and three specifications, which are set forth in the report, and that the only witness examined was the defendant. Nothing has been said at the bar to correct this supposition, if it is erroneous. If the specifications alleged only a fraudulent assignment, the verdict for the defendant is well supported by evidence that Stevenhagen, the assignee, was a bona fide creditor. Crayton & Sloan vs. Dickerson, 3 McC. 438; Bulwinkle vs. Grube, 5 Rich. 286. The specifications nowhere speak of Stevenhagen as a creditor, and do not contain the word preference. It appears from the report that, on the argument before the Commissioner of Special Bail, acts of the defendant were said by the plaintiffs' attorney to constitute undue and fraudulent preference; but that to this the answer was made in behalf of the defendant, that those acts did not amount to a fraudulent assignment, and that the specifications alleged fraudulent assignment and not undue preference. It may be that if a charge of undue preference had been made with proper specifications, that charge might have been sustained; 1 Hill, 291; 2 Hill, 418; 10 Rich. 238; but it may be also that in that case other evidence in defence |