sales in the pits are not pretended, but, as we have said, are meant and supposed to be binding. A set-off is in legal effect a delivery. We speak only of the contracts made in the pits, because in them the members are principals. The subsidiary rights of their employers where the members buy as brokers we think it unnecessary to discuss.

In the view which we take, the proportion of the dealings in the pit which are settled in this way throws no light on the question of the proportion of serious dealings for legitimate business purposes to those which fairly can be classed as wagers or pretended contracts. No more does the fact that the contracts thus disposed of call for many times the total receipts of grain in Chicago. The fact that they can be and are setoff sufficiently explains the possibility, which is no more wonderful than the enormous disproportion between the currency of the country and contracts for the payment of money, many of which in like manner are set off in clearing houses. without any one dreaming that they are not paid, and for the rest of which the same money suffices in succession, the less being needed the more rapid the circulation is.

But suppose that the Board of Trade does keep a place where pretended and unlawful buying and selling are permitted, which as yet the Supreme Court of Illinois, we believe, has been careful not to intimate, it does not follow that it should not be protected in this suit. The question whether it should be involves several elements which we shall take up in turn.

In the first place, apart from special objections, the plaintiff's collection of quotations is entitled to the protection of the law. It stands like a trade secret. The plaintiff has the right to keep the work which it has done, or paid for doing, to itself. The fact that others might do similar work, if they might, does not authorize them to steal the plaintiff's. Compare Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U. S. 239, 249, 250. The plaintiff does not lose its rights by communicating the result to persons, even if many, in confidential relations

to itself, under a contract not to make it public, and strangers to the trust will be restrained from getting at the knowledge. by inducing a breach of trust and using knowledge obtained by such a breach. Exchange Telegraph Co. v. Gregory & Co., [1896] 1 Q. B. D. 147; F. W. Dodge Co. v. Construction Information Co., 183 Massachusetts, 62; Board of Trade v. C. B. Thomson Commission Co., 103 Fed. Rep. 902; Board of Trade v. Hadden-Krull Co., 109 Fed. Rep. 705; National Tel. News Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 119 Fed. Rep. 294; Illinois Commission Co. v. Cleveland Tel. Co., 119 Fed. Rep. 301. "The publications insisted on in some of the arguments were publications in breach of contract, and do not affect the plaintiff's rights. Time is of the essence in matters like this, and it fairly may be said that, if the contracts with the plaintiff are kept, the information will not become public property until the plaintiff has gained its reward. A priority of a few minutes probably is enough.

If then the plaintiff's collection of information is otherwise entitled to protection, it does not cease to be so, even if it is information concerning illegal acts. The statistics of crime are property to the same extent as any other statistics, even if collected by a criminal who furnishes some of the data. The Supreme Court of Illinois has recognized in the fullest terms the value and necessity of the knowledge which the plaintiffs control. It must have known, even if it did not have the evidence before it, as to which we cannot tell from the report, what was the course of dealing on the exchange. Yet it was so far from suggesting that the plaintiff's work was unmeritorious that it held it clothed with a public use. New York & Chicago Grain & Stock Exchange v. Board of Trade, 127 Illinois, 153.

The defendants lay hold of the declaration in the case last cited and say, with doubtful consistency, that this information is of such importance that it is clothed with a public use, and that, therefore, they are entitled to get and use it. In the case referred to it was held that the plaintiff, which had been re

ceiving the continuous quotations, was entitled still to receive them on paying for them and submitting to all reasonable requirements in relation to the same. Perhaps the right of the plaintiff would have been more obvious if it had demanded an opportunity on reasonable conditions of collecting the information for itself, especially if the legislature had seen fit to provide by law for its doing so. But it is not necessary to consider whether we are bound by that decision, or, if not, should follow it, since in these cases the claim is not qualified by submission to reasonable rules or an offer of payment. It is a claim of independent rights and a denial that the plaintiff has any right at all. The Supreme Court of Illinois gave no sanction to such a claim as that.

Finally it is urged that the contracts with the telegraph companies violate the act of July 2, 1890, c. 647, 26 Stat. 209. The short answer is that the contracts are not relied on as a cause of action. They are stated simply to show that the only communication of its collected facts by the plaintiff is a confidential communication, and does not destroy the plaintiff's rights. But so far as these contracts limit the communication of what the plaintiff might have refrained from communicating to any one, there is no monopoly or attempt at monopoly, and no contract in restraint of trade, either under the statute or at common law. Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186 U. S. 70; Fowle v. Park, 131 U. S. 88; Elliman v. Carrington, [1901] 2 Ch. 275. It is argued that the true purpose is to exclude all persons who do not deal through members of the Board of Trade. Whether there is anything in the law to hinder these regulations being made with that intent we shall not consider, as we do not regard such a general scheme as shown by the contracts or proved. A scheme to exclude bucket shops is shown and proclaimed, no doubt-and the defendants, with their contention as to the plaintiff, call this an attempt at a monopoly in bucket shops. But it is simply a restraint on the acquisition for illegal purposes of the fruits of the plaintiff's work. Central Stock & Grain Exchange v.

198 U. S.

Argument for the United States.

Board of Trade, 196 Illinois, 396. We are of opinion that the plaintiff is entitled to an injunction as prayed.

Decree in No. 224 reversed. Decree in No. 280 affirmed.

MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, MR. JUSTICE BREWER and MR. JUSTICE DAY dissent.

UNITED STATES v. JU TOY.

CERTIFICATE FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT.

No. 535. Argued April 3, 1905.-Decided May 8, 1905.

Even though the Fifth Amendment does apply to one seeking entrance to this country, and to deny him admission may deprive him of liberty, due process of law does not necessarily require a judicial trial and Congress may entrust the decision of his right to enter to an executive officer. Under the Chinese exclusion, and the immigration, laws, where a person of Chinese descent asks admission to the United States, claiming that he is a native born citizen thereof, and the lawfully designated officers find that he is not, and upon appeal that finding is approved by the Secretary of Commerce and Labor, and it does not appear that there was any abuse of discretion, such finding and action of the executive officers should be treated by the courts as having been made by a competent tribunal, with due process of law, and as final and conclusive; and in habeas corpus proceedings, commenced thereafter, and based solely on the ground of the applicant's alleged citizenship, the court should dismiss the writ and not direct new and further evidence as to the question of citizenship. A person whose right to enter the United States is questioned under the immigration laws is to be regarded as if he had stopped at the limit of its jurisdiction, although physically he may be within its boundaries.

THE facts are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Assistant Attorney General McReynolds for the United States:

Congress by constitutional enactments has entrusted to executive officers as a special tribunal determination of all

Argument for the United States.

198 U. S.

questions of fact-including a claim of citizenship-relating to the right of Chinese to enter the United States; and a bare allegation of citizenship is not enough to support a petition for habeas corpus by one denied admission.

United States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U. S. 161, settled that a Chinaman seeking admission into the United States because of alleged birth therein must in the first instance submit his claim to the determination of immigration officers. Such officers have a right to decide upon all questions of fact, including that of citizenship. The applicant may not ignore them and appeal directly to the courts for determination of his rights. A writ of habeas corpus should not be granted until he has prosecuted an appeal to the Secretary of Commerce and Labor as provided by the statute. After the Secretary has, upon appeal, affirmed the action of immigration officers excluding a Chinaman a petition for habeas corpus should not be entertained unless the court is satisfied petitioner can make out a prima facie case; a mere allegation of citizenship is not enough.

Whether after final rejection by the Secretary, there ought to be a further trial upon habeas corpus upon a petition showing reasonable cause was not decided.

In behalf of Sing Tuck it was earnestly insisted that a claim of citizenship is a judicial question, determination of which is granted exclusively to the courts by Art. 3, § 2, of the Constitution, and Congress has no power to entrust it to executive officers; moreover, to require an applicant for admission to submit such a claim to an immigration officer violates the prohibition of the Fifth Amendment that no person shall be deprived of his liberty without due process of law. See also Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U. S. 538, 546; Chin Bok Kan v. United States, 186 U. S. 193, 200; Japanese Emigrant Case, 189 U. S. 86, 97. As to due process of law not always requiring a proceeding before a court and power of Congress to delegate matters to executive officers see Murray v. Hoboken Co., 18 How. 272, 280; Springer v. United States, 102 U. S. 586, 594;

Hilton v.

Merritt, 110