Argument for Respondents. 198 U. S. Rep. 593; S. C., 59 S. W. Rep. 493; Kirtley v. Holmes, (Ky.) 107 Fed. Rep. 1, 9; Johnson v. Roger's Receiver, (Ky.) 43 S. W. Rep. 234; Weedon v. Association, (Ky.) 59 S. W. Rep. 758. This seems to be the general rule. Howorth v. Augle, 162 N. Y. 179; Howorth v. Lombard, 175 Massachusetts, 570; Howorth v. Elwanger, 86 Fed. Rep. 54; Sands v. Greeley, 88 Fed. Rep. 130; Burr v. Smith, 113 Fed. Rep. 858; Lewis v. Naval Stores, 119 Fed. Rep. 396, 397; Metzner v. Bauer, 98 Indiana, 425; Boulware v. Davis, 90 Alabama, 207; Cooke v. Orange, 48 Connecticut, 401; Planters' Bank v. Bank, 2 La. Ann. 430; Comstock v. Frederickson, 51 Minnesota, 350; Hurd v. Elizabeth, 41 N. J. Law, 1; Sobernheimer v. Wheeler, 45 N. J. Eq. 614; Runk v. St. John, 29 Borh. 585; Barclay v. Quicksilver Min. Co., 6 Lans. 25; Pugh v. Hurtt, 52 How. Pr. 22; Dyer v. Power, 60 Hun, 583; Merchants' Bank v. McLeod, 38 Ohio St. 174; Porter v. Stoughton Mill Co., 91 Wisconsin, 174; Wyman v. Kimberly Clark Co., 93 Wisconsin, 554. Nothing in the public policy or decisions of Vermont precludes a foreign receiver from suing in the courts of that State, under the circumstances of this case. No creditor in Vermont has intervened to prevent the prosecution of this suit. The Harris estate alone objects to this suit being maintained. The right to recover on the one hand property of a corporation or its proceeds which have been misappropriated by officers and directors, or on the other hand damages for its misappropriation, is in the corporation. Porter v. Sabin, 149 U. S. 473; Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U. S. 450; Davenport v. Dows, 18 Wall. 626; Van Weel v. Winston, 115 U. S. 228. Mr. Brainard Tolles, with whom Mr. Julien T. Davies was on the brief, for respondents as to the right of receiver to maintain action: The order of the Circuit Court for the District of Kentucky was not effective to authorize the receiver to maintain a suit in the name of the mining company, in the Circuit Court for the District of Vermont. The receiver was a mere instrument 198 U. S. Argument for Respondents. of the court which appointed him, for the exercise of its ordinary jurisdiction in equity. No assignment or transfer of its property to the receiver was ever made by the mining company and no authority was ever given to the receiver to file this bill in the name of the mining company. The receiver has no statutory title to the property of the corporation, nor any statutory right to sue in its name. The only justification of his action in making use of the name of the corporation for the purpose of this suit is found in the order of the Circuit Court. There were both stockholders and directors of this corporation in the District of Kentucky at the time that order was made, no proceedings were instituted in said District, in pursuance of said order. But in the District of Vermont a bill was filed in the name of the mining company, not authenticated by its seal nor verified or signed by any of its officers. To sign the name of another, without his consent, to a bill of complaint or to an appeal bond, is an act which requires affirmative justification. When the act is done in the District of Vermont, and the object of the act is to get possession of property having a situs in said District, and the official character of the receiver and the Circuit Court for the District of Kentucky had no power to authorize such act for such a purpose outside of the District. The order was one which could have been acted on only within the District. As to comity this court is not constrained, by judicial precedent, or by any settled course of practice in this country, to adopt the English rule. Booth v. Clark, 17 How. 322. In the Federal courts it has never been doubted that Booth v. Clark, supra, was conclusive against the right of receivers to sue in the courts of the United States, outside the State or District in which they were appointed. Brigham v. Luddington, 12 Blatchf. 237; Kittel v. Augusta &c. R. Co., 78 Fed. Rep. 855; Hazard v. Durant, 19 Fed. Rep. 471; Philadelphia &c. Iron Co. v. Daube, 71 Fed. Rep. 583; Wigton v. Bosler, 102 Fed. Rep. 70. Argument for Respondents. 198 U.S. The only Federal case to the contrary, Hale v. Hardon, 95 Fed. Rep. 747, was overruled in Hale v. Allinson, 188 U. S. 56, and Hilliker v. Hale, 117 Fed. Rep. 224 (certiorari refused, 188 U. S. 739). Constrained by the authority of Booth v. Clark, supra, the courts of the United States have built up a system of procedure for dealing with the affairs of insolvent corporations, which rests upon firmer ground than that of comity, and which avoids the practical objections pointed out in Booth v. Clark, while securing to foreign creditors reasonable facilities for the collection of their debts. The system which has thus been evolved has the spirit of comity, but is made effective through the exercise by each court of its own jurisdiction, rather than by the abdication of jurisdiction on the part of any court in favor of another. Parsons v. Charter Oak Life Ins. Co., 31 Fed. Rep. 305; Mercantile Trust Co. v. Kanawha &c. R. Co., 39 Fed. Rep. 337; Platt v. Philadelphia & R. R. Co., 54 Fed. Rep. 569; Central Trust Co. v. East Tennessee &c. R. Co., 69 Fed. Rep. 658; Ames v. Union Pacific R. Co., 60 Fed. Rep. 966; Bayne v. Brewer Pottery Co., 82 Fed. Rep. 391; Sands v. E. S. Greeley & Co., 88 Fed. Rep. 130; Reynolds v. Stockton, 140 U. S. 254; In re Brant, 96 Fed. Rep. 257; Shinney v. North American Savings &c. Co., 97 Fed. Rep. 9; Coltrane v. Templeton, 106 Fed. Rep. 370; Lewis v. American Naval Stores Co., 119 Fed. Rep. 391; Conklin v. U. S. Shipbuilding Co., 123 Fed. Rep. 913. These decisions show a system of procedure which, while perhaps not complete or incapable of improvement, is far superior to that which this court was urged to adopt in Booth v. Clark. It is a system now universally understood. It works smoothly in practice. It effectively protects the rights of possible creditors in each jurisdiction where assets are found, by compelling the foreign receiver to give reasonable security and to submit himself to the orders of the local court before removing assets which may be needed to meet the claims of domestic creditors. It provides a convenient forum in which such creditors may prove their claims. It enables the receiver appointed by a foreign court, without delay or publicity or unreasonable expense, to qualify himself to collect or impound assets properly forming part of the estate under administration. It avoids unseemly conflicts of judicial authority. It provides a central tribunal for the determination of those questions of general policy which must be decided with reference to a great system of railways of a great business undertaking, while leaving to local tribunals full power over questions of a local nature. The courts of the several States and the legal profession throughout the United States are gradually conforming their practice to the standard thus established. As to the claim that the right of the court appointing the receiver to authorize him to sue in the name of a party is absolute, and does not rest on comity, the court can no more invest the receiver with the name, identity and citizenship of a party for the purpose of suit in a foreign jurisdiction than it can confer on him a defendant's complexion, reputation, chirography or good health. In re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 310. MR. JUSTICE DAY, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court. The theory of the complainant's case seems to be that the transfers of the stock of the defendant and other directors and stockholders, paid for out of the proceeds of the bonds, in view of the allegations of the bill as to the condition of the company and the purposes in view by the defendant and associates, amounted to a breach of duty upon the part of the defendant and other directors, and a conversion to their own use of the property of the company, for which they should be held to account in an action brought by the company through its receiver, under the order of the Circuit Court of Kentucky. The particulars of the suit in which the receiver was appointed are not very fully set forth, but enough appears to show that he was appointed in a suit to adjudicate and enforce liens and subject the property to the payment of the claims of creditors. In the brief of the learned counsel for complainant, it is styled a "general creditors' and foreclosure suit." It does not appear that by order of the court or otherwise there has been any conveyance of the property and assets of the company to the receiver, nor has the corporation been dissolved, and the receiver made its successor, entitled to its property and assets. The minute books of the company in evidence do not show any authority by the corporation for the filing of this bill in the name of the Great Western Mining and Manufacturing Company or otherwise, although meetings were held after the appointment of the receiver. Nor is our attention called to any statute vesting the title of the corporation in the receiver. So far, then, as the receiver is concerned, his right to prosecute the action must depend upon his powers as such officer of the court and the order of the court, set forth in the statement of facts, authorizing him to bring suit against the stockholders and directors for the purpose of realizing the assets, either in his own name or that of the corporation, as may be proper. This condition of the record brings up for consideration at the threshold of this case the question of the extent of the power of the receiver to maintain this action under the order of the court, either in his own name or that of the company. As to the power of the court to authorize the receiver to sue, we think the case is ruled by Booth v. Clark, 17 How. 322, 338, in which case the authority of the court to authorize a receiver appointed in one jurisdiction to sue in a foreign jurisdiction was the subject of very full consideration. In that case it was held that a receiver is an officer of the court which appoints him, and, in the absence of some conveyance or statute vesting the property of the debtor in him, he can not sue in courts of a foreign jurisdiction upon the order of the court which appointed him, to recover the property of the debtor. While that case was decided in 1854, its authority has been frequently recognized in this court, and as late as Hale v. Allinson, |