INTERSTATE COMMERCE.

State regulation as to liquors shipped from other States held not an interference
-Wilson Act-Police power of State.

The malt liquor inspection law of Missouri provides for the inspection of
malt liquors manufactured within the State and also for those manu-
factured without and held for sale and consumption within the State.
The Supreme Court of the State sustained the law deciding among other
things that the act does not affect liquors shipped into the State and
held there for reshipment without the State, that it does not discrimi-
nate in favor of beer manufactured in the State, and that it is not a
revenue, but an inspection law. The constitutionality of the law was
attacked by a manufacturer of malt liquors without the State as an
interference with interstate commerce, and also on the ground that as
the amount of the inspection charge far exceeds the expense of in-
spection it is a revenue, and not an inspection law and therefore does
not fall under permissive provisions of the Wilson Act. Held, a state
statute which operates upon beer and malt liquors shipped from other
States after their arrival and while held for sale and consumption
within the State, is not an interference with interstate commerce in
view of the provisions of the Wilson Act. The regulation of the sale
of liquor is essentially a police power of the State and a provision in a
state law, tending to determine the purity of malt liquors sold in the
State, is an exercise of the same power. The purpose of the Wilson
Act is to make liquor, after its arrival in a State, a domestic product,
and to confer power on the States to deal with it accordingly. The
police power is, hence, to be measured by the right of the State to con-
trol or regulate domestic products and this creates a state and not a
Federal question as respects the commerce clause of the Constitution;
and this court cannot review the determination of the state court that
the statute involved in this case was not a revenue but an inspection
measure. A state regulation, valid under the Wilson Act, as to liquors
shipped from another State after delivery at destination is not an
interference with interstate commerce because it affects traffic in,
and deters shipments of, the article into that State. The rule that
state inspection laws, which do not provide adequate inspection and
impose a burden beyond the cost of inspection, are repugnant to the
commerce clause of the Constitution does not apply to liquors after
they have ceased to be articles of interstate commerce under the pro-
visions of the Wilson Act. Pabst Brewing Co. v. Crenshaw, 17.

See TAXATION, 3.

INTOXICATING LIQUORS.

See INTERSTATE COMMERCE.

INVENTION.

See JURISDICTION, D;

PATENT FOR INVENTION.

1. Assertion of title under patent from United States insufficient, where juris-
diction of Circuit Court rested solely on diverse citizenship.

In an action of ejectment plaintiff pitched his claim solely on a patent from
the United States; defendant removed the action to the Circuit Court
on the ground of diverse citizenship and obtained a verdict and judg-
ment on the plea of prescription after nonsuit on plea of res judicata;
the judgment was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. Held, that
the judgment was final and the writ of error must be dismissed. The
jurisdiction of the Circuit Court rested solely on diverse citizenship, the
assertion of title under patent from the United States presented no
question in itself conferring jurisdiction, and plaintiff's petition did not
assert, in legal and logical form, if at all, the existence of any real con-
troversy as to the effect or construction of the Constitution or of any
law or treaty of the United States constituting an independent ground
of jurisdiction. Bonin v. Gulf Company, 115.

2. Direct review of Circuit Court judgment.

This court has jurisdiction of a writ of error, upon a judgment dismissing
the suit for want of jurisdiction, when it appears in due form that the
ground of the judgment was want of service on defendant and that the
plaintiff denied the validity of the removal of the case from a state court.
Remington v. Central Pacific R. R. Co., 95.

3. Direct appeal from Circuit Court under section 5 of act of March 3, 1891.
The authorities, holding that the right of appeal to this court from the

Circuit Court, under § 5 of the act of March 3, 1891, is limited to cases
where the jurisdiction of the Federal court as a Federal court is put in
issue and that questions of jurisdiction applicable alike to the state and
the Federal courts are not within its scope, apply to questions arising
after a valid service has been made and not to the question of whether
jurisdiction has or has not been acquired by proper service. Board
of Trade v. Hammond Elevator Co., 424.

4. This court can review by appeal under § 5 a judgment of the Circuit Court
dismissing the bill on the sole ground that jurisdiction had never been
acquired over the defendant, a foreign corporation, for lack of proper
service of process. Board of Trade v. Hammond Elevator Co., 424;
Kendall v. Automatic Loom Co., 477.

1

5. Direct review of District and Circuit Courts.

Since the passage of the act of March 3, 1891, this court has no jurisdiction

to review judgments or decrees of the District and Circuit Courts, di-
rectly by appeal or writ of error, in cases not falling within § 5 of that
act. Ex parte Glaser, 171.

6. Final judgment; what constitutes.

Where the judgment of the highest court of a State, in reversing a judg-
ment against defendant, does not direct the court below to dismiss the
petition but remands the cause for further proceedings, in harmony
with the opinion, it is not a final judgment in such a sense as to sus-
tain a writ of error from this court. Schlosser v. Hemphill, 173.

7. Jurisdiction under section 709, Rev. Stat.-When Federal question does
not arise by reason of violation of Federal statute.

Plaintiff in error contended as defendant in the state court, which overruled
the plea, that his notes were void because given in pursuance of a
contract which involved the violation of §§ 3390, 3393, 3397, Rev.
Stat., providing for the collection of revenue on manufactured tobacco.
Held, that as an individual can derive no personal right under those
sections to enforce repudiation of his notes, even though they might be
illegal and void as against public policy, the defense did not amount to
the setting up by, and decision against, the maker of the notes of a
right, privilege or immunity under a statute of the United States,
within the meaning of § 709, Rev. Stat., and the writ of error was
dismissed. Allen v. Arguimbau, 149.

8. Mandamus not granted where lack of jurisdiction of case.

In cases over which this court possesses neither original nor appellate juris-
diction it cannot grant mandamus. Ex parte Glaser, 171.

9. Propositions based upon conjecture and not raised below not considered on
appeal.

This court will not investigate or decide a proposition which was not raised
in the court below and is based upon conjecture, even though the facts
suggested might have existed. Thompson v. Darden, 310.

10. Review of judgment of District Court for Porto Rico in criminal cases.
Under 8 34, 35 of the Foraker act of 1900, 31 Stat. 85, this court can

review judgments of the District Court of the United States for Porto
Rico in criminal cases where the accused claimed and, as alleged, was
denied a right under an act of Congress and under the Revised Statutes
of the United States. Rodriguez v. United States, 156.

11. Want of jurisdiction to review judgment of state court refusing to restrain
collection of unauthorized tax.
There is no foundation for the jurisdiction of this court to review the judg-
ment of the highest court of a State refusing to restrain the collection
of a tax the imposition of which is not authorized by any law of the

State. (Barney v. City of New York, 193 U. S. 430.) Savannah,
Thunderbolt &c. Ry. v. Savannah, 392.

12. Writ of error to state court denying rights of locator of mineral claim under
sections 3224, 2326, Rev. Stat.

Where the necessary effect of the ruling of the state court is to deny to a
locator of a mineral claim the protection of the relocation provisions of
§ 2324, Rev. Stat., if that section justified the claim based upon it, or if
the record shows that the trial court considered that the plaintiff
specially claimed and was denied rights under § 2326, Rev. Stat.,
authorizing an adverse of an application for a patent to mineral lands,
a Federal question is involved and the motion to dismiss the writ of
error will be denied.
Lavagnino v. Uhlig, 443.

13. Writ of error to state court dismissed where judgment below not shown
to be based on Federal question—Certificate of Chief Justice of state court
insufficient.
Where the judgment of the state court rests on two grounds, one involving
a Federal question and the other not, and it does not appear on which
of the two the judgment was based and the ground, independent of a
Federal question, is sufficient in itself to sustain it, this court will not
take jurisdiction. The certificate of the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of the State on the allowance of the writ of error that the judg-
ment denied a title, right or immunity specially set up under the statutes
of the United States, cannot in itself confer jurisdiction on this court.
Allen v. Arguimbau, 149.

Finality of decision.

See CONTRACTS;

INTERSTATE COMMERCE;
PILOTAGE, 2.

B. OF CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS.

Where the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court has been invoked on the ground
of diverse citizenship and plaintiff asserts two causes of action, only one
of which involves a right under the Constitution, and the Circuit Court
of Appeals decides against him on that cause of action and in his favor
on the other, the judgment of that court is final and defendant cannot
make the alleged constitutional question on which he has succeeded
the basis of jurisdiction for an appeal to this court. Empire Company
v. Hanley, 292.

See BANKRUPTCY, 1.

C. OF CIRCUIT COURTS

1. Averment of diverse citizenship in pleadings—Mode of raising question—
Residence and citizenship not synonymous—Absence not affecting citizen-
ship.

An averment in the bill of the diverse citizenship of the parties is sufficient to
make a prima facie case of jurisdiction so far as it depends on citizen-

ship. While under the act of 1789, an issue as to the fact of citizenship
can only be made by plea of abatement, when the pleadings properly
aver citizenship, it is the duty of the court, under the act of March 3,
1875, which is still in force, to dismiss the suit at any time when its
want of jurisdiction appears. A motion to dismiss the cause, based
upon proofs taken by the master, is an appropriate mode in which to
raise the question of jurisdiction. Residence and citizenship are wholly
different things within the meaning of the Constitution and the laws
defining and regulating the jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts of the
United States; and a mere averment of residence in a State is not an
averment of citizenship in that State for the purpose of jurisdiction.
One who has been for many years a citizen of a State is still a citizen
thereof, although residing temporarily in another State but without
any purpose of abandoning citizenship in the former. Steigleder v.
McQuesten, 141.

2. When held to rest on ground of case arising under Constitution where in-
voked on ground of diverse citizenship.
Where the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court is invoked on the ground of
diverse citizenship, it will not be held to rest also on the ground that the
suit arose under the Constitution of the United States, unless it really
and substantially involves a dispute or controversy as to the effect or
construction of the Constitution upon the determination of which the
result depends, and which appears on the record by a statement in legal
and logical form such as good pleading requires and where the case is
not brought within this rule the decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals
is final. Empire Company v. Hanley, 292.

See CORPORATIONS;
Ante, A 1.

OF DISTRICT COURT. See Bankruptcy, 1.

D. OF COURT OF CLAIMS.

Under act of March 3, 1887-Royalties for use of invention not recoverable in
Court of Claims.

In order to give the Court of Claims jurisdiction under the act of March 3,
1887, the demand sued on must be founded on a convention between
the parties—a coming together of minds-and contracts or obligations
implied by law from torts do not meet this condition. (Russell v.
United States, 182 U. S. 516, 530.) An employé of the Bureau of
Printing and Engraving, who at his own cost and in his own time
perfected and patented a device for registering impressions in connec-
tion with printing presses, which with his knowledge and consent was
used for many years by the Bureau, under orders of the Secretary of
the Treasury, and who during that period never made any demand for
royalties, cannot, under the circumstances of this case, recover such
royalties in the Court of Claims on the ground that a contract existed
between him and the Government, because, prior to the use of the
device by the Government, the Chief of the Bureau promised to have
his rights to the invention protected. Harley v. United States, 229.
VOL. CXCVIII-39