ration of Pennsylvania under the act of that State of June 8, 1891, coal which is owned by the corporation, but at the time of the assess- ment situated in another State and not to be returned to Pennsyl- vania, should not be included. Delaware, L. & W. R. R. Co. v. Penn- sylvania, 341.
2. Of national banks-Kentucky statute of March 21, 1900, held void-Dis- crimination.
The statute of Kentucky of March 21, 1900, taxing shares of national banks, from the years 1893 to 1900 and thereafter held, void and in conflict with 5219, Rev. Stat., as to those portions which are retro- active as imposing a burden on the bank not borne by other moneyed corporations of the State, and valid and not in conflict with § 5219 as to taxes imposed thereafter. A difference in methods in assessing shares of national banks from that of taxing state banks does not necessarily amount to a discrimination, rendering the act invalid under § 5219, and justify the judicial interference of courts for the protection of the shareholders, unless it appears that the difference in method actually results in imposing a greater burden on the national banks than is imposed on other moneyed capital in the State. Covington v. First National Bank, 100.
3. State taxation of personal property employed in interstate transportation— Taxation of vessels.
The general rule that tangible personal property is subject to taxation by the State in which it is, no matter where the domicil of the owner may be, is not affected by the fact that the property is employed in interstate transportation on either land or water. Vessels registered or enrolled are not exempt from ordinary rules respecting taxation of personal property. The artificial situs created as the home port of a vessel, under § 4141, Rev. Stat., only controls the place of taxation in the absence of an actual situs elsewhere. Vessels, though engaged in interstate commerce, employed in such commerce wholly within the limits of a State, are subject to taxation in that State although they may have been registered or enrolled at a port outside its limits. Old Dominion Steamship Co. v. Virginia, 299.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 6; COURTS, 2.
Personal name; right to exclusive use.
In an action to restrain the use of a personal name in trade, where it ap-
pears that defendant has the right to use the name and has not done anything to promote confusion in the mind of the public except to use it, complainant's case must stand or fall on the possession of the ex- clusive right to the use of the name. A personal name-an ordinary family surname such as Remington-cannot be exclusively appro- priated by any one as against others having a right to use it; it is mani- festly incapable of exclusive appropriation as a valid trade-mark, and its registration as such can not in itself give it validity. Every man has
a right to use his name reasonably and honestly in every way, whether in a firm or corporation; nor is a person obliged to abandon the use of his name or to unreasonably restrict it. It is not the use, but dis- honesty in the use, of the name that is condemned, and it is a question of evidence in each case whether there is a false representation or not. One corporation cannot restrain another from using in its corporate title a name to which others have a common right. Where persons or corporations have a right to use a name courts will not interfere where the only confusion results from a similarity of names and not from the manner of the use. The essence of the wrong in unfair competition consists in the sale of the goods of one person for that of another, and if defendant is not attempting to palm off its goods as those of com- plainant the action fails. Howe Scale Co. v. Wyckoff, Seamans & Benedict, 118.
Treaty of 1859 with Yakima Indians, construed-Preservation of fishing rights under-Power of Federal Government to create servitude of lands which State must recognize.
This court will construe a treaty with Indians as they understood it and as justice and reason demand. The right of taking fish at all usual and accustomed places in common with the citizens of the Territory of Washington and the right of erecting temporary buildings for curing them, reserved to the Yakima Indians in the treaty of 1859, was not a grant of right to the Indians but a reservation by the Indians of rights already possessed and not granted away by them. The rights so reserved imposed a servitude on the entire land relinquished to the United States under the treaty and which, as was intended to be, was continuing against the United States and its grantees as well as against the State and its grantees. The United States has power to create rights appropriate to the object for which it holds territory while preparing the way for future States to be carved therefrom and admitted to the Union; securing the right to the Indians to fish is appropriate to such object, and after its admission to the Union the State cannot disre- gard the right so secured on the ground of its equal footing with the original States. Patents granted by the United States for lands in Washington along the Columbia River and by the State for lands under the water thereof and rights given by the State to use fishing wheels are subject to such reasonable regulations as will secure to the Yakima Indians the fishery rights reserved by the treaty of 1859. United States v. Winans, 371.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 3, 10; JURISDICTION, F 4;
REMOVAL OF CAUSES.
UNFAIR COMPETITION.
See TRADE NAME.
VESSELS.
See PILOTAGE, 1;
TAXATION, 3.
VOLUNTARY PAYMENT.
See GARNISHMENT.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 11; GRAND JURY.
Technical possession of goods-Effect, as delivery of goods, of transfer of ware- house receipt.
Prior to the petition, the bankrupt, a wholesale merchant in Chicago, walled off part of the basement of his store and let it at a nominal rental to a warehouse company and there stored goods, so that they were not seen from the store, and the company alone had access thereto; and it exhibited signs to the effect that it occupied the premises and had pos- session of the goods, it charged the merchant for storage, and issued to him certificates or receipts for the goods, which he pledged and en- dorsed over to banks as collateral for loans. In an action brought by the trustee who claimed that goods were in the possession of the bank- rupt and not of the warehouse company; Held, that a bailee asserting a lien for charges has the technical possession of the goods. The trans- fer of a warehouse receipt is not a symbolical delivery, but a real de- livery to the same extent as if the goods had been transported to an- other warehouse named by the pledgee. Upon the facts in this case there is no reason to deny such a place of storage the character of a public warehouse so far as the Illinois statutes are concerned. The receipts issued in this case were to be deemed valid warehouse receipts so that their endorsement and delivery as security for loans constituted a pledge of the goods represented thereby valid as against attaching creditors, and if the receipts were not valid as warehouse receipts, the transaction constituted an equally valid pledge of the goods as such security. Union Trust Co. v. Wilson, 530.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 4;
WRIT AND PROCESS.
1. Sufficiency of service on foreign corporation.
A Delaware corporation having its principal office in Indiana, and con- tinuously carrying on a grain and stock brokerage business through the same persons in Illinois under an arrangement practically equivalent to agency, held, under the circumstances of this case, and in view of the statutes of Illinois as to service on foreign corporations, to be carrying on business in Illinois, and that service on such persons of process in a suit against it in the Circuit Court of the United States for Illinois was sufficient. Board of Trade v. Hammond Elevator Co., 424.
2. Where the foreign corporation was doing no business and had no assets in the State, service upon a former officer residing therein, held, insuffi- cient under the circumstances of this case. Ib.
3. Semble, service on a director of a corporation, which is doing no business and has no property in the State, when he is casually in the State for a few days, is bad.
Remington v. Central Pacific R. R. Co., 95.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 8;
JURISDICTION, A 2, 3, 4;
NATIONAL BANKS, 2.
Ex E.HR
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