necessity, let us not, while we feel that ill, shun the cure, which consists only in an honest avowal that liberty and equal rights are the end and aim of all our institutions, and, that to tolerate Slavery beyond the narrowest limits prescribed for it by the Constitution, is a perversion of them all. which he represented would not quietly submit. | sion, that Slavery is an ill, tolerated only from He might, perhaps, subject himself to ridicule, for attempting the display of a spirit of prophecy which he did not possess, or of zeal and enthusiasm for which he was entitled to little credit. But he warned the advocates of this measure against the certain effects which it must produce. Effects destructive of the peace and harmony of the Union. He believed that they were kindling a fire which all the waters of the ocean could not extinguish. It could be extinguished only in blood! Slavery, sir, I repeat, is not established by our Constitution: but a part of the States are indulged in the commission of a sin from which they could not at once be restrained, and which they would not consent to abandon. But, sir, if we could, by any process of reasoning, be brought to believe it justifiable to hold others to involuntary servitude, policy forbids that we should increase it. Even the present slaveholding States have an interest, I think, in limiting the extent of involuntary servitude: for, should slaves become much more numerous, and, conscious of their strength, draw the sword against their masters, it will be to the free States the masters must resort for an efficient power to suppress servile insurrection. But we have made a treaty with France, which, we are told, can only be preserved by the charms of Slavery. When Mr. LIVERMORE, of N. H., said, I am in favor of the proposed amendment. The object of it is to prevent the extension of Slavery over the Territory ceded to the United States by France. It accords with the dictates of reason, and the best feelings of the human heart; and is not calculated to interrupt any legitimate right arising either from the Constitution or any other compact. I propose to show what Slavery is, and to mention a few of the many evils which follow in its train; and I hope to evince that we are not bound to tolerate the existence of so disgraceful a state of things beyond its present extent, and that it would be impolitic and very unjust, to let it Sir, said Mr L., until the ceded Territory shall spread over the whole face of our Western Ter- have been made into States, and the new ritory. Slavery in the United States, is the con- States admitted into the Union, we can do what dition of man subjected to the will of a master, we will with it. We can govern it as a province, who can make any disposition of him short of or sell it to any other nation. A part of it is taking away his life. In those States where it is probably at this time sold to Spain, and the intolerated, laws are enacted, making it penal to in- habitants of it may soon not only enjoy the comstruct slaves in the art of reading, and they are forts of Slavery, but the blessings of the holy innot permitted to attend public worship, or to hear quisition along with them. The question is on the gospel preached. Thus, the light of science the admission of Missouri, as a State, into the and of religion is utterly excluded from the Union. Surely it will not be contended that we mind, that the body may be more easily bowed are bound by the treaty to admit it. The treatydown to servitude. The bodies of slaves may, making power does not extend so far. Can the with impunity, be prostituted to any purpose, President and Senate, by a treaty with Great and deformed in any manner by their owners. Britain, make the province of Lower Canada a The sympathies of nature in slaves are disre-State of this Union? To be received as a State garded mothers and children are sold and separated; the children wring their little hands, and expire in agonies of grief, while the bereft mothers commit suicide, in despair. How long will the desire of wealth render us blind to the sin of holding both the bodies and souls of our fellow-men in chains! But, sir, I am admonished of the Constitution, and told we cannot emancipate slaves. I know we may not infringe that instrument, and therefore do not propose to emancipate slaves. The proposition before us goes only to prevent our citizens from making slaves of such as have a right to freedom. In the present slaveholding States let Slavery continue, for our boasted Constitution connives at An opportunity is now presented, if not to it; but do not, for the sake of cotton and tobacco, diminish, at least to prevent the growth of a sin let it be told to future ages that, while pretend- which sits heavily on the soul of every one of ing to love liberty, we have purchased an exten- us. By embracing this opportunity, we may resive country, to disgrace it with the foulest re-trieve the national character, and, in some degree, proach of nations. Our Constitution requires no such thing of us. The ends for which that supreme law was made, are succinctly stated in its preface. They are first to form a more perfect Union, and insure domestic tranquillity. Will Slavery effect this? Can we, sir, by mingling bond with free, black spirits with white, like Shakespeare's witches in Macbeth, form a more perfect Union, and insure domestic tranquillity? Secondly, to establish justice. Is justice to be established by subjecting half mankind to the will of the other half? Justice, sir, is blind to colors, and weighs in equal scales the rights of all men, whether white or black. Thirdly, to provide for the common defense, and secure the blessings of liberty. Does Slavery add anything to the common defense? Sir, the strength of a republic is in the arm of freedom. But, above all things, do the blessings of liberty consist in Slavery? If there is any sincerity in our profes into this Union, is a privilege which no country our own. But if we suffer it to pass unimproved, let us at least be consistent, and declare that our Constitution was made to impose Slavery, and not to establish liberty. Let us no longer tell idle tales about the gradual abolition of Slavery; away with colonization societies, if their design is only to rid us of free blacks and turbulent slaves; have done also with bible societies, whose views are extended to Africa and the East Indies, while they overlook the deplorable condition of their sable brethren within our own borders; make no more laws to prohibit the importation of slaves, for the world must see that the object of such laws is alone to prevent the glutting of a prodigious market for the flesh and blood of man, which we are about to establish in the West, and to enhance the price of sturdy wretches, reared, like black cattle and horses, for sale on our own plantations. The House bill thus passed, reached the Senate, Feb. 17th, when it was read twice and sent to a Select Committee already raised on a like application from Alabama, consisting of Messrs. Tait of Ga., Morrow of Ohio, Williams of Miss., Edwards of Ill., Williams of Tenn. On the 22nd, Mr. Tait, from this Committee, reported the bill with amendments, strikout the anti-slavery restrictions inserted by the House. This bill was taken up in Committee of the Whole on the 27th, when Mr. Wilson of N. J. moved its postponement to the 5th of March-that is, to the end of the session--negatived: Yeas 14; Nays 23. The Senate then proceeded to vote on agreeing to the amendments reported by the Select Committee, viz. : 1. to strike out of the House bill the following: "And that all children of slaves born within the said State, after the admission thereof into the Union, shall be free, but may be held to service until the age of twenty-one years." Which was stricken out by the following vote: YEAS-Against the Restriction: Messrs. Barbour of Va Lacock of Pa. Leake of Miss. Macon of N. C. Otis of Mass. Palmer of Vt. Roberts of Penn. Sanford of N. Y. Tait, of Ga. Talbort of Ky. Taylor of Ind. Thomas of Ill. Trichenor of Vt. Van Dyke of Del. Williams of Miss. The Senate then proceeded to vote on the residue of the House Restriction, as follows: "And provided also, That the further introduction of slavery or involuntary servitude be prohibited, except for the punishment of crimes, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted." The vote on this clause was as follows: Macon of N. C. Eppes of Va. The bill thus amended was ordered to be engrossed, and was (March 2nd--last day but one of the Session) read a third time, and passed without a division. The bill was on that day returned to the House, and the amendments of the Senate read: whereupon, Mr. Tallmadge of N. Y. moved that the bill be postponed indefinitely. Yeas 69; Nays 74. [The record shows hardly a vote changed from Yea, on the original passage of the Restriction, to Nay now, but many members who voted then were now absent or silent.] The vote was then taken on concurring in the Senate's amendments, as aforesaid, and the House refused to concur: Yeas 76; Nays 78. [Hardly a vote changed; but more Members voting than on the previous division, and less than when the Restriction was carried.] The bill was now returned to the Senate, with a message of non-concurrence; when Mr. Tait moved that the Senate adhere to its amendment, which was carried without a division. The bill being thus remanded to the House, Mr. Taylor of N. Y. moved that the House adhere to its disagreement, which prevailed. Yeas 78; Nays 66. So the bill fell between the two Houses, and was lost. The southern portion of the then Territory of Missouri (organized by separation from Louisiana in 1812) was excluded from the proposed State of Missouri, and organized as a separate Territory, entitled Arkansas. The bill being under consideration, Mr. Taylor of N.Y. moved that the foregoing restriction be applied to it also; and the clause, proposing that slaves born therein after the passage of this act be free at twenty-five years of age, was carried (Feb. 17th) by 75 Yeas to 73 Nays; but that providing against the farther introduction of slaves was lost: Yeas 70; Nays 71. The next day, the clause just adopted was stricken out, and the bill ultimately passed without any allusion to Slavery. Arkansas of course became a Slave Territory and ultimately (1836) a Slave State. VII. THE SECOND MISSOURI STRUGGLE. A new Congress assembled on the 6th of December, 1819. Mr. Clay was again chosen Speaker. On the 8th, Mr. Scott, delegate from Missouri, moved that the memorial of her Territorial Legislature, as also of several citizens, praying her admission into the Union as a State, be referred to a select committee; carried, and Messrs. Scott of Mo., Robertson of Ky., Terrell of ia., Strother of Va., and De Witt of N. Y. | cannot be retraced; and it appears to us that the (all but the last from the slave region), were appointed said committee. Mr. Strong of N. Y. that day gave notice of a bill "To prohibit the further extension of Slavery in the United States." On the 14th, Mr. Taylor of N. Y. moved a select committee on this subject, which was granted; and the mover, with Messrs. Livermore of N. H., Barbour (P. P.) of Va., Lowndes of S. C., Fuller of Mass., Hardin of Ky., and Cuthbert of Ga., were appointed such committee. A majority of this committee being Pro-Slavery, Mr. Taylor could do nothing; and on the 28th the Committee was, on motion, discharged from the further consideration of the subject. On the same day Mr. Taylor moved : "That a Committee be appointed with instructions to report a bill prohibiting the further admission of Slaves into the Territories of the United States west of the river Mississippi." On motion of Mr. Smith, of Md., this resolve was sent to the Committee of the Whole, and made a special order for Jan. 10th; but it was not taken up, and appears to have slept the sleep of death. In the Senate, the memorial of the Missouri Territorial Legislature, asking admission as a State, was presented by Mr. Smith of S. C., Dec. 29th, and referred to the Judiciary Committee, which consisted of, Messrs. Smith of S. C., Leake of Miss., Burrill of R. I., Logan of Ky., Otis of Mass. DANIEL WEBSTER ON SLAVERY EXTENSION. The following "Memorial to the Congress of the United States, on the subject of restraining the increase of Slavery in New States to be admitted into the Union," in pursuance of a vote of the inhabitants of Boston and its vicinity, assembled at the State House on the 3rd of December, 1819, was drawn up by Daniel Webster, and signed by himself, George Blake, Josiah Quincy, James T. Austin, etc. It is inserted here instead of the resolves of the various New England Legislatures, as a fuller and clearer statement of the views of the great body of the people of that section during the pendency of the Missouri question : "MEMORIAL "To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States, in Congress assembled: "The undersigned, inhabitants of Boston and its vicinity, beg leave most respectfully and humbly to represent: That the question of the introduction of Slavery into the new States to be formed on the west side of the Mississippi River, appears to them to be a question of the last importance to the future welfare of the United States. If the progress of this great evil is ever to be arrested, it seems to the undersigned that this is the time to arrest it. A false step taken now, happiness of unborn millions rests on the measure which Congress on this occasion may adopt. Considering this as no local question, nor a question to be decided by a temporary expediency, but as involving great interests of the whole United States, and affecting deeply and essentially and the perpetuation of the blessings of liberty, those objects of common defense, general welfare, for which the Constitution itself was formed, we have presumed, in this way, to offer our sentiments and express our wishes to the National Legislature. And as various reasons have been suggested against prohibiting Slavery in the new States, it may perhaps be permitted to us to state our reasons, both for believing that Congress possesses the constitutional power to make such prohibition a condition, on the admission of a new State into the Union, and that it is just and proper that they should exercise that power. And in the first place, as to the constitutional authority of Congress. The Constitution of the United States has declared that 'Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States: and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to prejudice the claims of the United States or of any particular State.' It is very well known, that the saving in this clause of the claims of any particular State, was designed to apply to claims by the then existing States, of territory which was also claimed by the United States as their own property. It has, therefore, no bearing on the present question. The power, then, of Congress over its own territories, is, by the very terms of the Constitution, unlimited. It may make all' needful rules and regulations,' which of course include all such regulations as its own views of policy or expediency shall, from time to time, dictate. If, therefore, in its judgment it be needful for the benefit of a territory to enact a prohibition of Slavery, it would seem to be as much within its power of legislation as any other act of local policy. Its sovereignty being complete and universal as to the territory, it may exercise over it the most ample jurisdiction in every respect. It possesses, in this view, all the authority which any State Legislature possesses over its own territory; and if any State Legislature may, in its discretion, abolish or prohibit Slavery within its own limits, in virtue of its general legislative authority, for the same reason Congress also may exercise the like authority over its own territories. And that a State Legislature, unless restrained by questionable, and has been established by general some constitutional provision, may so do, is unpractice. ** ** * * * "The creation of a new State, is, in effect, a compact between Congress and the inhabitants of the proposed State. Congress would not probbitants of Missouri to form a Constitution of their ably claim the power of compelling the inhaown, and come into the Union as a State. It is as plain, that the inhabitants of that territory have no right of admission into the Union, as a State, without the consent of Congress. Neither party is bound to form this connection. It can be formed only by the consent of both. What, then, prevents Congress, as one of the stipulating parties, to propose its terms? And if the other party assents to these terms, why do they not effectually bind both parties? Or if the inhabitants of the Territory do not choose to accept the proposed terms, but prefer to remain under a Territorial Government, has Congress deprived them of any right, or subjected them to any restraint, which, in its discretion, it had no authority to do? If the admission of new States be not the discretionary exercise of a constitutional power, but in all cases an imperative duty, how is it to be per. formed? If the Constitution means that Congress shall admit new States, does it mean that Congress shall do this on every application and under all circumstances? Or if this construction cannot be admitted, and if it must be conceded that Congress must in some respects exercise its discretion on the admission of new States, how is it to be shown that that discretion may not be exercised in regard to this subject as well as in regard to others? "The Constitution declares, 'that the migration or importation of such persons as any of the States now existing, shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress, prior to the year 1808. It is most manifest that the Constitution does contemplate, in the very terms of this clause, that Congress possesses the authority to prohibit the migration or importation of slaves; for it limits the exercise of this authority for a specific period of time, leaving it to its full operation ever afterward. And this power seems necessarily included in the authority which belongs to Congress, to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States.' No person has ever doubted that the prohibition of the foreign slave trade was completely within the authority of Congress since the year 1808. And why? Certainly only because it is embraced in the regula tion of foreign commerce; and if so, it may for the like reason be prohibited since that period between the States. Commerce in slaves, since the year 1808, being as much subject to the regulation of Congress as any other commerce, if it should see fit to enact that no slave should ever be sold from one State to another, it is not perceived how its constitutional right to make such provision could be questioned. It would seem to be too plain to be questioned, that Congress did possess the power, before the year 1808, to prohibit the migration or importation of slaves into the territories (and in point of fact it exercised that power) as well as into any new States; and that its authority, after that year, might be as fully exercised to prevent the migration or importation of slaves into any of the old States. And if it may prohibit new States from importing slaves, it may surely, as we humbly submit, make it a condition of the admission of such States into the Union, that they shall never import them. In relation, too, to its own Territories, Congress possesses a more extensive authority, and may, in various other ways, effect the object. It might, for example, make it an express condition of its grants of the soil, that its owners shall never hold slaves; and thus prevent the possession of slaves from ever being connected with the ownership of the soil. 86 As corroborative of the views which have been already suggested, the memorialists would respectfully call the attention of Congress to the history of the national legislation, under the Confederation as well as under the present Constitution, on this interfering subject. Unless the inemorialists greatly mistake, it will demonstrate the sense of the nation, at every period of its legislation, to have been, that the prohibition of Slavery was no infringement of any just rights belonging to free States, and was not incompatible with the enjoyments of all the rights and immunities which an admission into the Union was supposed to confer. "The memorialists, after this general survey, would respectfully ask the attention of Congress to the state of the question of the right of Congress to prohibit Slavery in that part of the former Territory of Louisiana which now forms the Missouri Territory. Louisiana was purchased of France by the Treaty of the 30th April, 1803. The third article of that Treaty is as follows: The inhabitants of the ceded Territory shall be incorporated into the Union of the United States, and admitted as soon as possible, according to the principles of the Federal Constitution, to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of the United States; and in the mean time they shall be maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and the religion which they profess.' Although the language of this article is not very precise or accurate, the memorialists conceive that its real import and intent cannot be mistaken. The first clause provides for the admission of the ceded territory into the Union, and the succeeding clause shows this must be according to the principles of the Federal Constitution; and this very qualification necessarily excludes the idea that Congress were not to be at liberty to impose any conditions upon such admission which were consistent with the principles of that Constitution, and which had been, or might justly be, applied to other new States. The language is not by any means so pointed as that of the Resolve of 1780; and yet it has been seen that that Resolve was never supposed to inhibit the authority of Congress, as to the introduction of slavery. And it is clear, upon the plainest rule of construction, that in the absence of all restrictive language, a clause, merely providing for the admission of a territory into the Union, must be construed to authorize an admission in the manner, and upon the terms, which the Constitution itself would justify. This construction derives additional support from the next clause. The inhabitants shall be admitted as soon as possible, according to the principles of the Federal Constitution, to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of the United States.' The rights, advantages, and immunities here spoken of, must, from the very force of the terms of the clause, be such as are recognized or communicated by the Constitution of the United States; such as are common to all citizens, and are uniform throughout the United States. The clause cannot be referred to rights, advantages, and immunities derived exclusively from the State Government, for these do not depend upon the Federal Constitution. Besides, it would be impossible that all the rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of the different States, could be at the same time enjoyed by the same persons. These rights are different in different States; a right exists in one State which is denied in others, or is repugnant to other rights enjoyed in others. In some of the States, a freeholder alone is entitled to vote in elections; in some a qualification of personal property is sufficient; and in others, age and freedom are the sole qualifications of electors. In some States, no citizen is permitted to hold slaves: in others, he possesses that power absolutely; in others, it is limited. The obvious meaning, therefore, of the clause is, that the rights derived under the Federal Constitution, shall be enjoyed by the inhabitant of Louisiana in the same manner as by the citizens of other States. The United States, by the Constitution, are bound to guarantee to every State in the Union a republican form of government; and the inhabitants of Louisiana are entitled, when a State, to this guarantee. Each State has a right to two Senators, and to Representatives according to a certain enumeration of population, pointed out in the Constitution. The inhabitants of Louisiana, upon their admission into the Union, are also entitled to these privileges. The Constitution further declares, that the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States.' It would seem as if the meaning of this clause could not well be misinterpreted. It obviously applies to the case of the removal of a citizen of one State to another State; and in such a case it secures to the migrating citizen all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the State to which he removes. It cannot surely be contended, upon any rational interpretation, that it gives to the citizens of each State all the privileges and immunities of the citizens of every other State, at the same time, and under all circumstances. Such a construction would lead to the most extraordinary consequences. It would at once destroy all the fundamental limitations of the State constitutions upon the rights of their own citizens; and leave all those rights to the mercy of the citizens of any other State, which should adopt different limitations. According to this construction, if all the State constitutions, save one, prohibited slavery, it would be in the power of that single State, by the admission of the right of its citizens to hold slaves, to communicate the same right to the citizens of all the other States within their own exclusive limits, in defiance of their own constitutional prohibitions; and to render the absurdity still more apparent, the same construction would communicate the most opposite and irreconcilable rights to the citizens of different States at the same time. It seems, therefore, to be undeniable, upon any rational interpretation, that this clause of the Constitution communicated no rights in any State which its own citizens do not enjoy; and that the citizens of Louisiana, upon their admission into the Union, in receiving the benefit of this clause, would not enjoy higher or more extensive rights than the citizens of Ohio. It would communicate to the former no right of holding slaves except in States where the citizens already possessed the same right under their own State Constitutions and laws. * * * * * "Upon the whole, the memorialists would most respectfully submit that the terms of the Constitution, as well as the practice of the Governments under it, must, as they humbly conceive, entirely justify the conclusion that Congress may prohibit the further introduction of Slavery into its own territories, and also make such prohibition a condition of the admission of any new State into the Union. "If the constitutional power of Congress to make the proposed prohibition be satisfactorily shown, the justice and policy of such prohibition seem to the undersigned to be supported by plain and strong reasons. The permission of Slavery in a new State, necessarily draws after it an extension of that inequality of representation, which already exists in regard to the original States. It cannot be expected that those of the original States, which do not hold slaves, can look on such an extension as being politically just. As between the original States the representation rests on compact and plighted faith; and your memorialists have no wish that that compact should be disturbed, or that plighted faith in the slightest degree violated. But the subject assumes an entirely different character, when a new State proposes to be admitted. With her there is no compact, and no faith plighted; and where is the reason that she should come into the Union with more than an equal share of political importance and political power? Already the ratio of representation, established by the Constitution, has given to the States holding slaves twenty members of the House of Representatives more than they would have been entitled to, except under the particular provision of the Constitution. In all probability, this number will be doubled in thirty years. Under these circumstances, we deem it not an unreasonable expectation that the inhabitants of Missouri should propose to come into the Union, renouncing the right in question, and establishing a constitution prohibiting it for Without dwelling on this topic, we have still thought it our duty to present it to the consideration of Congress. We present it with a ever. deep and earnest feeling of its importance, and we respectfully solicit for it the full consideration of the National Legislature. "Your memorialists were not without the hope that the time had at length arrived when the inconvenience and the danger of this description of population had become apparent in all parts of this country, and in all parts of the civilized world. It might have been hoped that the new States themselves would have had such a view of their own permanent interests and prosperity as would have led them to prohibit its extension and increase. The wonderful increase and prosperity of the States north of the Ohio is unquestionably to be ascribed, in a great measure, to the conse quences of the ordinance of 1787; and few, indeed, are the occasions, in the history of nations, in which so much can be done, by a single act, for the benefit of future generations, as was done by that ordinance, and as may now be done by the Congress of the United States. We appeal to the justice and to the wisdom of the National Councils to prevent the further progress of a great and serious evil. We appeal to those who look forward to the remote consequences of their measures, and who cannot balance a temporary or trifling convenience, if there were such, against a permanent, growing, and desolating evil. We cannot forbear to remind the two Houses of Congress that the early and decisive measures adopted by the American Government for the abolition of the slave-trade, are among the proudest memorials of our nation's glory. That Slavery was ever tolerated in the Republie is, as yet, to be attributed to the policy of another Government. No imputation, thus far, rests on any portion of the American Confederacy. The Missouri Territory is a new country. If its extensive and fertile field shall be opened as a market for slaves, the Government will seem to become a party to a traffic which, in so many acts, through so many years, it has denounced as impolitic, unchristian, inhuman. To enact laws to punish the traffic, and, at the same time, to tempt cupidity and avarice by the allurements of an insatiable market, is inconsistent and irreconcilable. Government, by such a course, would only defeat its own purposes, and render nugatory its own measures. Nor can the laws derive support from the manners of the people, if the power of moral sentiment be weakened by enjoying, under the permission of Government, great facilities to commit offenses. The laws of the United States have denounced heavy penalties against the traffic in slaves, because such traffic is deemed unjust and inhuman. We appeal to the spirit of these laws: We appeal to this justice and humanity: We ask whether they ought not to operate, on the present occasion, with all their force? We have a strong feeling of the injustice of any toleration of Slavery. Circumstances have entailed it on a portion of our community, which cannot be immediately relieved from it without consequences more injurious than the suffering of the evil. But to permit it in a new country, where yet no habits are formed which render it indispensable, what is it, but to encourage that rapacity, and fraud, and violence, against which we have so long pointed the denunciations of our penal code? What is it, but to tarnish the proud fame of the country? What is it, but to throw suspicion on its good faith, and to render questionable all its professions of regard for the right of humanity and the liberties of mankind? "As inhabitants of a free country-as citizens of a great and rising Republic-as members of a Christian community-as living in a liberal and enlightened age, and as feeling ourselves called upon by the dictates of religion and humanity, we have presumed to offer our sentiments to Congress on this question, with a solicitude for |