use as a basis any one of the various criteria established by law, and arrive, according to each, at the conclusion that the export of war materials from the United States as it is carried on cannot be made to accord with the requirements of neutrality. It is not a question as to whether the branch of American industry occupied with the production of war material shall be protected in order that its export, as it has been carried on in peace times, may suffer no impairment.

Furthermore, this industry has experienced an unexpected increase because of the war. In order to manufacture the immense amount of weapons, munitions, and other war material of all kinds which Great Britain and her allies have ordered in the United States of America in the course of the last month, it required not only the full utilization and adaptations of existing plants, but the creation of new factories, as well as the diversion of large numbers of workmen from all branches of trade-in short, a widespread change in the economic life of the country-the right of the American Government can from no quarter be disputed to decree an embargo on this obviously enormous export of war material which is notoriously for the exclusive benefit of one of the belligerent parties.

The United States Government could meet with no objection if it were to avail itself of its competency, even if it took recourse to the passage of a law in accordance with its Constitution. Even if it proved correct in principle that a neutral State may not change the law in force within its jurisdiction concerning its attitude toward belligerents during the war, there is, however, an exception to the principle, as is clearly shown in the preamble of the Thirteenth Hague Convention: “* * *** where experience has shown the necessity for such change for the protection of the rights of that power."

This case arises for the United States Government by the mere fact that Austria-Hungary as well as Germany are cut off from any commercial intercourse

Iwith the United States without the existence of a legal ground-a legally effective blockade.

To the possible objection that although American industry is perfectly willing to supply Austria-Hungary and Germany as well as Great Britain and her allies, the United States are not able to carry on trade in consequence of the war situation. It may well be mentioned that the United States Government is without doubt in a position to remedy the above-described condition. It would be entirely sufficient to hold out to the adversaries of Austria-Hungary and Germany the inhibition of the export of foodstuffs and raw materials if the legitimate trade in these articles between the Union and the two central powers is not permitted.

If the Washington Cabinet could find itself prepared to act in this direction, it would not only follow the tradition always upheld in the United States to safeguard the freedom of the seas, but it would also offer the great service of defeating the criminal endeavor of the enemies of Austria-Hungary and Germany to enlist starvation as an ally.

The Imperial and Royal Government, in the spirit of the excellent relations which have never ceased to exist between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the United States of America, and in the name of sincere friendship, permits itself to make an appeal to the Government of the Union to submit to careful examination the point of view herein before taken in this most important question and consider the statements given herewith. The revision of the present attitude of the Government of the Union to agree with the views proffered by the Imperial and Royal Government would not only be according to the conviction of the Imperial and Royal Government-within the scope of the rights and duties of a neutral Government, but also in the direction of those principles prompted by humanity and the love of peace which the United States of America has ever written upon her banner.

The undersigned has the honor, &c.
BURIAN.

Department of State,

Washington, D. C., Aug. 12, 1915. Please present a note to the Royal Foreign Office in reply to its note of June 29 in the following sense:

The Government of the United States has given careful consideration to the statement of the Imperial and Royal Government in regard to the exportation of arms and ammunition from the United States to the countries at war with Austria-Hungary and Germany. The Government of the United States notes with satisfaction the recognition by the Imperial and Royal Governmert of the undoubted fact that its attitude with regard to the exportation of arms and ammunition from the United States is prompted by its intention to "maintain the strictest neutrality and to conform to the letter of the provisions of international treaties," but is surprised to find the Imperial and Royal Government implying that the observance of the strict principles of the law under the conditions which have developed in the present war is insufficient, and asserting that this Government should go beyond the long-recognized rules governing such traffic by neutrals and adopt measures to "maintain an attitude of strict parity with respect to both belligerent parties."

To this assertion of an obligation to change or modify the rules of international usage on account of special conditions, the Government of the United States cannot accede. The recognition of an obligation of this sort, unknown to the international practice of the past, would impose upon every neutral nation a duty to sit in judgment on the progress of a war and to restrict its commercial intercourse with a belligerent whose naval successes prevented the neutral from trade with the enemy. The contention of the Imperial and Royal Government appears to be that the advantages gained to a belligerent by its superiority on the sea should be equalized by the neutral powers by the estab

lishment of a system of non-intercourse with the victor. The Imperial and Royal Government confines its comments to arms and ammunition, but, if the principle for which it contends is sound, it should apply with equal force to all articles of contraband. A belligerent controlling the high seas might possess an ample supply of arms and ammunition, but be in want of food and clothing. On the novel principle that equalization is a neutral duty, neutral nations would be obligated to place an embargo on such articles because one of the belligerents could not obtain them through commercial intercourse.

But if this principle, so strongly urged by the Imperial and Royal Government, should be admitted to obtain by reason of the superiority of a belligerent at sea, ought it not to operate equally as to a belligerent superior on land? Applying this theory of equalization, a belligerent who lacks the necessary munitions to contend successfully on land ought to be permitted to purchase them from neutrals, while a belligerent with an abundance of war stores or with the power to produce them should be debarred from such traffic.

Manifestly the idea of strict neutrality now advanced by the Imperial and Royal Government would involve a neutral nation in a mass of perplexities which would obscure the whole field of international obligation, produce economic confusion and deprive all commerce and industry of legitimate fields of enterprise, already heavily burdened by the unavoidable restriction of war.

In this connection it is pertinent to direct the attention of the Imperial and Royal Government to the fact that Austria-Hungary and Germany, particularly the latter, have during the years preceding the present European war produced a great surplus of arms and ammunition which they sold throughout the world, and especially to belligerents. Never during that period did either of them

suggest or apply the principle now advocated by the Imperial and Royal Government.

During the Boer War between Great Britain and the South African republics the patrol of the coasts of neighboring neutral colonies by British naval vessels prevented arms and ammunition reaching the Transvaal or the Orange Free State. The allied republics were in a situation almost identical in that respect with that in which Austria-Hungary and Germany find themselves at the present time. Yet, in spite of the commercial isolation of one belligerent, Germany sold to Great Britain, the other belligerent, hundreds of thousands of kilos of explosives, gunpowder, cartridges, shot, and weapons; and it is known that Austria-Hungary also sold similar munitions to the same purchaser, though in smaller quantities. While, as compared with the present war, the quantities sold were small (a table of the sales is appended) the principle of neutrality involved was the same. If at that time Austria-Hungary and her present ally had refused to sell arms and ammunition to Great Britain on the ground that to do so would violate the spirit of strict neutrality, the Imperial and Royal Government might with greater consistency and greater force urge its present contention.

It might be further so pointed out that during the Crimean war large quantities of arms and military stores were furnished to Russia by Prussian manufacturers; that during the recent war between Turkey and Italy, as this Government is advised, arms and ammunition were furnished to the Ottoman Government by Germany; and that during the Balkan wars the belligerents were supplied with munitions by both AustriaHungary and Germany. While these latter cases are not analogous, as is the case of the South African war, to the situation of Austria-Hungary and Germany in the present war, they nevertheless clearly indicate the long-established practice of the two empires in the matter of trade in war supplies.

In view of the foregoing statements, this Government is reluctant to believe that the Imperial and Royal Govern

ment will ascribe to the United States a lack of impartial neutrality in continuing its legitimate trade in all kinds of supplies used to render the armed forces of a belligerent efficient, even though the circumstances of the present war prevent Austria-Hungary from obtaining such supplies from the markets of the United States, which have been and remain, so far as the action and policy of this Government are concerned, open to all belligerents alike.

But, in addition to the question of principle, there is a practical and substantial reason why the Government of the United States has from the foundation of the Republic to the present time advocated and practiced unrestricted trade in arms and military supplies. It has never been the policy of this country to maintain in time of peace a large military establishment or stores of arms and ammunition sufficient to repel invasion by a well equipped and powerful enemy. It has desired to remain at peace with all nations and to avoid any appearance of menacing such peace by the threat of its armies and navies. In consequence of this standing policy the United States would, in the event of attack by a foreign power, be at the outset of the war seriously, if not fatally, embarrassed by the lack of arms and ammunition and by the means to produce them in sufficient quantities to supply the requirements of national defense. The United States has always depended upon the right and power to purchase arms and ammunition from neutral nations in case of foreign attack. This right, which it claims for itself, it cannot deny to others.

A nation whose principle and policy it is to rely upon international obligations and international justice to preserve its political and territorial integrity might become the prey of an aggressive nation whose policy and practice it is to increase its military strength during times of peace with the design of conquest, unless the nation attacked can, after war had been declared, go into the markets of the world and purchase the means to defend itself against the aggressor.

The general adoption by the nations of the world of the theory that neutral

powers ought to prohibit the sale of arms and ammunition to belligerents would compel every nation to have in readiness at all times sufficient munitions of war to meet any emergency which might arise, and to erect and maintain establishments for the manufacture of arms and ammunition sufficient to supply the needs of its military and naval forces throughout the progress of a war. Manifestly the application of this theory would result in every nation becoming an armed camp, ready to resist aggression and tempted to employ force in asserting its rights rather than appeal to reason and justice for the settlement of international disputes.

Perceiving, as it does, that the adoption of the principle that it is the duty of a neutral to prohibit the sale of arms and ammunition to a belligerent during the progress of a war would inevitably give the advantage to the belligerent which had encouraged the manufacture of munitions in time of peace, and which had laid in vast stores of arms and ammunition in anticipation of war, the Government of the United States is convinced that the adoption of the theory would force militarism on the world and work against the universal peace which is the desire and purpose of all nations with one another.

The Government of the United States, in the foregoing discussion of the practical reason why it has advocated and practiced trade in munitions of war, wishes to be understood as speaking with no thought of expressing or implying any judgment with regard to the circumstances of the present war, but as merely putting very frankly the argument in this matter which has been conclusive in determining the policy of the United States.

While the practice of nations, so well illustrated by the practice of AustriaHungary and Germany during the South African war, and the manifest evil which would result from a change of the practice, render compliance with the suggestions of the Imperial and Royal Government out of the question, certain assertions appearing in the Austro-Hungarian statement as grounds for its contentions

cannot be passed over without comment. These assertions are substantially as follows:

(1) That the exportation of arms and ammunition from the United States to belligerents contravenes the preamble of The Hague Convention, No. 13, of 1907;

(2) That it is consistent with the refusal of this Government to allow delivery of supplies to vessels of war on the high seas;

(3) That "according to all authorities on international law, who concern themselves more properly with the question," exportation should be prevented “when this traffic assumes such a form of such dimensions that the neutrality of a nation becomes involved thereby."

As to the assertion that the exportation of arms and ammunition contravenes the preamble of The Hague Convention, No. 13, of 1907, this Government presumes that reference is made to the last paragraph of the preamble, which is as follows:

"Seeing that in this category of ideas these rules should not in principle be altered in the course of the war by a neutral power except in a case where experience has shown the necessity for such change for the protection of the rights of that power."

Manifestly, the only ground to change the rules laid down by the convention, one of which, it should be noted, explicitly declares that a neutral is not bound to prohibit the exportation of contraband of war, is the necessity of a neutral power to do so in order to protect its own rights. The right and duty to determine when this necessity exists rests with the neutral, not with a belligerent. It is discretionary, not mandatory. If a neutral power does not avail itself of the right, a belligerent is not privileged to complain, for in doing so it would be in the position of declaring to the neutral power what is necessary to protect that power's own rights. The Imperial and Royal Government cannot but perceive that complaint of this nature would invite just rebuke.

With reference to the asserted inconsistency of the course adopted by this Government in relation to the exporta