In an Associated Press dispatch from London dated Aug. 14, 1915, appeared the following summary account of the efforts made by the Quadruple Entente to bring to its side in the war the united force of the Balkan peoples:

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FFAIRS in the Balkans are approaching a crisis. While diplomatic negotiations are proceeding in an effort to induce States still neutral to cast their lot with one side or the other, the troops of the central powers massed on the Balkan frontiers are planning, it is believed, to force a way through to relieve Turkey, who is believed to be badly in need of shells.

The concentration of these troops, which has been followed by an artillery attack on Serbian positions, is equally a menace to Rumania, which again has refused to permit shells to pass through her territory to Turkey. The Rumanian Army is already partly mobilized, and four new divisions of reserves have been called out.

Bulgaria has as yet made no move while awaiting the reply of the Quadruple Entente to her demand that Serbia and Greece concede Macedonia to her in return for her military support. This

answer probably will be forthcoming after the meeting of the Greek and Serbian Parliaments next week.

While the Serbians point out what they consider the unfairness of the Bulgarian demand, they show an inclination to make some concessions to obtain the support of their former ally.

Greece is more firm in her refusal, but it is believed here that there may be a change in her policy when former Premier Venizelos returns to power, although he has a strong pro-German party opposed to him, and, according to a telegram from Berlin tonight, King Constantine will offer him the Premiership only on the understanding that strict neutrality shall be maintained. This was the point upon which the King and M. Venizelos disagreed when a new Cabinet was appointed and Parliament was dissolved.

Inasmuch as M. Venizelos was supported by the people at a general election, it was thought the King might fall into line, but the dispatch from Berlin indicates that he has not changed his views. Should Bulgaria attack Serbia, however, Greece is bound by treaty obligations to support Serbia as her ally.

Europe, and especially the powers constituting today the Quadruple Entente, committed the most unpardonable blunder when at the close of the first Balkan war, in May, 1913, they tore asunder the Balkan League, which such men as Eleutherios Venizelos for Greece, Nicholas Pashitch for Serbia, and Ivan Gueshoff for Bulgaria took the pains of forming, with the aim of doing away with the Turk in Europe.

Today Germany, looking over the later failures of her diplomacy, cannot but give due credit to the men who succeeded in breaking the Balkan League, thus making it possible for Turkey to take once more the field at a time when, had things gone otherwise, she would already be dead and buried.

For Germany to keep the Balkan States neutral when the partition of the Ottoman Empire is well nigh at hand

means something more than a diplomatic success. It means her victory against Russia, and may mean more if the strait remains closed and Serbia open to a new invasion. And for this reason those who place the key to the solution of the European war in the Balkans are only too well on the right side.

This in large part explains the recent activity on the part of the Allies of the Entente in their efforts to reconstruct the Balkan League, and to throw its weight in the balance against the coalition of the three empires. But to form a Balkan alliance is more difficult than to destroy it, and the Entente powers have felt this difficulty since they first approached the Balkan statesmen with the object of reconciling the differences which arose after the disruption of the league in 1913. The obstacles to such an effort were, and are, still great; yet greater has been the activity of the German Foreign Office in the Balkan capitals, where every means was used in order to render any rapprochement between the Balkan peoples impossible.

Mutual distrust has always been characteristic of these nationalities, and racial hatred is easily awakened when adroitly manipulated by ingenious outsiders. It must be said that the Balkan peoples have been too long under the influences of outsiders if they do not see their position in the light of their common interests. Germany, therefore, has a very fertile ground to work on when it comes to set up Bulgar against Greek and Rumanian against Serbian, and all three against Bulgar; while Germany may cite any time to the Balkan States the different cases in which the Entente powers have not been so proBalkan as to sacrifice an iota of their particular interests in favor of their socalled protégés.

To counterpoise the work of the Germans the Allies must act in such a way as to convince the Balkans that only by fighting in unison at the side of the Entente will they eventually get what they have been striving for during a long period of years. At the same time the Allies must live up to the standards

of liberty and righteousness as exemplified in their gallant defense of heroic Belgium. The principle of nationality once raised, the Allies are bound to uphold it and to apply it wherever possible. A war that is giving Poland a new birth of freedom should not subjugate other small peoples to objectionable masters. If this is a war for liberation, then let it be a sincere effort for that purpose. The Balkan peoples are not afraid to join in this struggle on the side of the champions of the liberties of the small peoples. But of one thing they want to be sure beforehand, and this is that in case of victory their aspirations will be materialized. Let us see now what the Balkans want in order to throw in their lot with the Allies.

In the first place, they do not want to see Russia in Constantinople. On this score Greeks and Bulgars and Rumanians, and even Serbs, agree. With Russia once established on the Bosporus, the Balkan peoples fear a dominion that will overwhelm one day their national existence. This fear is openly expressed all over the Balkans, and finds the most cloquent echo in the utterances of the powerful nationalist parties of Rumania, Bulgaria, and Greece, and in the majority of the press of these countries. With the strait in the hands of Russia, Rumania would feel as if bottled up in the Black Sea, with her huge grain exports at the mercy of such a formidable concurrent as the Russian Empire. Bulgaria fears Russian occupation of Constantinople more than any one of her neighbors. It seems that there is not enough room for two Czars in the Balkans, and it is most likely that with the advent of the one the other must go. As for Greece, her claims on Byzantium are too well known to allow any doubt as to her sentiments with regard to an eventual occupation of Constantinople by the Russians. Serbia at the same time devoted as she is to Russia, would see with some uneasiness the master of all the Slavs established on the Balkan peninsula.

In order to allay these apprehensions of the Balkan States, the Allies must

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find a way, or rather a formula, by which to convince them that their fears are groundless, and that the giving of Constantinople to Russia will not in the least endanger their national individuality, and their various interests. the Entente Powers can do. By taking the sting off the Russian occupation of Constantinople, a way for further negotiations with the Balkan States is opened. Let us examine now the other points of the question covering the possibilities of Balkan co-operation with the Entente powers.

As I previously said, the Allies want all the Balkan States with them. What they are looking for is not the separate assistance that each of these States can offer to the Allies in the case of entering the war. The co-operation of all the Balkans with the Entente is wanted, and to that end the reconstruction of the Balkan League is imperative. It is to this purpose that the Allies have been sounding lately the Balkan Governments in the effort to find a common ground where their views and aspirations could meet. They began with Athens, where they found, in the person of E. K. Venizelos, a statesman who was willing to compromise the Greco-Bulgarian differences in view of the brilliant future that opened for Greece in Asia Minor in case of her co-operation with the Entente. The promises of the Allies, however, not being well defined, King Constantine thought it better to dismiss his Premier and to ask the opinion of the country on the matter. The question of going to war or not going to war with the Allies was not put to the electorate; nevertheless Mr. Venizelos came out victorious at the election, simply because the Hellenic people wants him and no other at the head of the Government. Notwithstanding this there is a strong movement in Greece against the idea of any territorial concession to Bulgaria, no matter what compensations are offered elsewhere by the Allies. The Greek non-concessionists are strengthened in their stand by the attitude of the Allies themselves, which persist in making vague promises wholly unsuitable to the Greek mind.

With Bulgaria the case is different.