made with England, had likewise concluded treaties with Spain and Italy, which, as he confidently assumed, insured the pénétration pacifique, i. e., the conquest, unhindered by Europe, of Morocco. How this plan presently fell through and how Delcassé was overthrown shall not be related here; on the other hand, attention should be called to the intimidating efforts to which England resorted for the purpose of exerting pressure upon Germany. The first effort of this nature took the form of an address delivered on Feb. 3, 1905, by Arthur Lee, a Civil Lord of the English Admiralty, who threatened the German fleet with destruction; the second effort came after Emperor William had landed in Tangier on March 31 and after Delcassé had been overthrown, and took the form of an appearance of an English fleet before Swinemünde, on which occasion it was officially asserted that the resolution had been adopted back in May, that is, at a time when the intrigues of Delcassé were culminating and when a war between Germany and France seemed likely to break out at any time. For even after Delcassé's overthrow England did not give up the game as lost; it declined to take part in a conference regarding Morocco and considered in all seriousness the question of an invasion. England's naval superiority was so great that the success of such an invasion could not seem doubtful, and in London it was thought that they could even do without the support of France. These plans were finally given up; for some time it was not known very well in London what decisions had been reached in the meeting between the Czar and Emperor William at Bjorkö, and there was a feeling of uncertainty. Accordingly, England also sent delegates to the conference at Algeciras, wherein we were obliged to deal solely, except for the Austrian delegates, with friends of the English-French combination.

The result, therefore, could only be a vague understanding, wherein was concealed the germ of subsequent conflicts. The first consequence, nevertheless, was a relaxation of German-English relations.

In December, 1905, a Liberal Ministry had taken the helm, and the idea was conceived of diverting Germany by other means from the pursuit of a "world policy." Sir Edward Grey championed the contention that more intimate relations between England and Germany were, to be sure, desirable, but could only be effected if we swallowed France's Morocco policy unflinchingly, like bitter medicine. For this event Mr. Haldane, the new Minister of War, proposed an understanding between us similar to that which England had reached with France. This constituted the preliminary step toward an endeavor to effect more intimate relations, an endeavor which at first had a non-official character. German Burgomasters visited the City of London and were cordially received by King Edward himself. This was followed, in August, 1906, by a meeting between the King and his imperial nephew, in Homburg vor der Höhe, which, as was to be expected, passed off in a satisfactory manner. It should, nevertheless, be recalled to mind that the King expressed himself very ironically on the subject of The Hague Conference, which, he asserted, was a humbug. And Sir Charles Hardinge, who entered into negotiations with Secretary of State von Tschirschky, also voiced the opinion that the conference should offer no opportunity for serious interference with England's naval policy. On this point English and German views concurred, though from different motives. In the following September the English Minister of War, Mr. Haldane, was our guest. He came for the purpose of studying German military organization, and every conceivable courtesy was extended to him. In the addresses which he delivered after his return to England he referred many times to his sojourn in Berlin. He also made the assertion that the relations of England to France were closer and more intimate than ever before, that to Russia they were friendly, and that to Germany they were better than they recently had been. We now know a fact which the Liberté also divulged at that time-that an EnglishFrench military convention had then been signed with reference to future possibil

ities. This fact was immediately denied, but it was merely a question of word quibbling. No convention, to be sure, was actually signed by the Government, but the "inner circle" of the Cabinet undoubtedly agreed that "conversations between the military authorities of the two nations should take place, and these military conversations were held regularly, just as if a secret alliance existed, until the outbreak of the present war. Parallel with these political preparations were efforts that stood in sharp contrast to the irritating activities carried on without interruption by the above-mentioned anti-German press, which we embrace under the name "Pearson and Harmsworth Press." In England, as well as in Germany, societies were organized with the object of mitigating and, if possible, entirely abolishing the differences and antagonisms which existed between the two nations; these were the so-called Friendship Committees." In England the Duke of Argyll and Lord Avebury were at the head of such a committee, and a visit made to London by representatives of our press initiated a well-meant movement which found enthusiastic representatives on both sides. English and German clergymen traveled back and forth between England and Germany, representatives of the English press paid a return visit to Germany, English and German workingmen's representatives endeavored to cement feelings of friendship by making personal observations and acquaintances, and in a similar way representatives of the Parliamentary groups of both countries thought and acted, while the leaders of science were working together at congresses held in Berlin and London. In this way were formed a number of valuable personal relations which led to political friendships and resulted in a conscious co-operation toward an honest English-German understanding.

These efforts continued until shortly before the month of August, 1914. One may safely say, moreover, that nobody has interceded more zealously and more constantly for English-German friendship and co-operation and for the removal of the difficulties that are ever

cropping up anew than our Emperor. The enthusiasm with which Emperor William was always received in England on occasion of his numerous visits, especially in November and December, 1907, again in 1910, when he went to London to attend the funeral of Edward VII., and again in 1911, when he visited King George, would be absolutely inconceivable hypocrisy, which we regard as out of the question, had it not been the spontaneous expression of popular sentiment. Official English policy, however, followed other channels. As early as the year 1907 Sir Edward Grey had succeeded in securing from Russia an agreement which united England and Russia in co-operation at the expense of Persia, but which, indirectly, also affected German interests, the injury to which was later happily warded off by the Treaty of Potsdam. It soon became evident, moreover, that England, in concluding the agreement relating to Persia, was in reality less concerned about protecting its Asiatic interests than it was about including Russia in that coalition by means of which it expected to put a stop to the world policy of Germany and to check the further development of the German fleet. This became very distinctly evident on June 9, 1908, when a meeting took place at Reval between Edward VII. and Nicholas II. At that time it was agreed and decided between Hardinge and Iswolski, not officially, but in an oral exchange of views, that Russia would be ready to proceed hand in hand with England in European affairs (i. e., in the policy directed against Germany) as soon as it had sufficiently recovered from the after-effects of the war with Japan and the revolution. It was thought that this regeneration of Russia's military power would take six or eight years. The scope of this agree

ment is very obvious. Whereas Germany, during the persistent danger of a war with France over Morocco, had hitherto considered it highly probable that England would maintain a neutral attitude, it was obliged, as soon as England drew nearer to the Dual Alliance, to figure at all events upon a malevolent neutrality and very likely indeed upon open

hostility. Sir Edward Grey, to be sure, who had not yet escaped from the anxiety with which English friends of peace were following the King's trip to Russia, in order to cover up his game, on July 7 had declared in the lower house, in reply to a question directed to the Government, that the visit of the King by no means had any diplomatic significance which might lead to an alliance or to an agreement or to any kind of a convention; no negotiations were being entered into, he asserted, for the purpose of concluding a treaty or a convention with Russia, nor would any such treaty or convention be concluded during the King's visit. But he went on to say that the visit would have some political effect, and it was very true that political effect was desired. "We wish that the visit shall exert a beneficent influence upon the mutual relations of both empires." Public opinion in England allowed itself to be satisfied with this equivocal, oracular statement. In other countries, however, a keener insight was displayed. THE NEW YORK TIMES judged the situation correctly when it said: "It is always a mistake to force a warm friend, who is at the same time a business friend, a blood relative, out of intimate and useful friendship into bitter antagonism, and this mistake, according to the judgment of all non-partisan observers of contemporary history, has been committed by King Edward." When Edward VII. acceded to the throne, it went on to say, England was a warm friend of Germany and of the German Emperor, who had given

numerous

proofs of his friendship, and was not only willing but anxious to become England's ally; now, however, the guns of the two nations were, SO to speak, pointed at each other.

Such, indeed, was the actual case; a determined malevolence on the part of the King, the English statesmen, and that newspaper trust organized by Pearson and Harmsworth, began to mobilize Europe against Germany, and to incense, by means of cable and telegraph, the judgment of the world against Emperor and against the German policy.

our

No means seemed too infamous if it served this purpose. Over a private letter which Emperor William had sent to Admiral Lord Tweedmouth for the purpose of checking false rumors that were maliciously being spread abroad regarding our naval policy, The Times made a terrible fuss in order to disseminate the notion that Emperor William was interfering with the internal policy of Great Britain with a view to injuring English military power. The excitement of public opinion in England was then utilized by the press for the purpose of creating a sentiment in favor of a concentration of the British fleet in the North Sea. That, however, was certainly done at the instigation of the Government, which was fond of attributing resolutions it had already adopted to the pressure of public opinion throughout the country. The naval manoeuvres which in July, 1908, were carried out in the North Sea, close to our coastline, were participated in by a combination of the canal fleet and the so-called home fleet, and they bore a very provocative and demonstrative character. At this time, moreover, appeared that widely read book by Percival A. Hislam, entitled "The Admiralty of the Atlantic," the expositions of which culminated in the statement that a war between England and Germany was unavoidable, and that the sooner it broke out the shorter it would be and the less money and blood it would cost. All this, however, is rendered easily intelligible by the fact that the Balkan crisis, in consequence of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, had at that time assumed a very dangerous aspect, and was threatening to bring on a war between Austria and Russia and perhaps a world war, wherein England expected to gain its own particular ends. It was therefore a severe disappointment to English statesmen that Nicholas II., despite the vociferous protests of the Serbs, and despite the decidedly warlike attitude of the Russian people on March 25, 1909, recognized the annexation. The disappointment was all the more severe for the reason that shortly before that time, despite the still menacing conflict over Casablanca, the Morocco difficulties be