tion cannot be riveted upon them to the same degree. If they are absolutely pledged they are simply registering devices and an unnecessary and a cumbersome addition to the party machinery. If they are not pledged absolutely the party voter has no proper assurance either of their allegiance or of their deliberation. They lend themselves easily to secret control by party managers and furnish the means not for true representation, but for nonrepresentation, or misrepresentation of the party. It is not difficult to provide, and provision should be made, for all necessary consultation and recommendations by party leaders. But they do not constitute the party and their recommendations, which should be made in a responsible and public manner, as well as other proposals of candidacies should be subject to the final decision of the party voters. It is no more complicated or expensive to have a primary election, under due protection and with an official ballot, at which the party nominees shall be directly chosen, than to have a similar election of delegates. There are no greater opportunities for fraudulent practices in the former case than in the latter, nor as many. It is difficult to interest the people in intermediaries, and general participation of the voters in the primaries is conditioned upon their appreciation of the fact that they accomplish something by such participation. If it be desired to have the form without the substance, to have representatives who as a rule do not represent and those chosen for deliberation who usually do not deliberate, and to transfer the absolute decision to party leaders with the alternative to the party voter of bolting his ticket and meeting the reproach of party disloyalty, the present system may be defended. But if it be desired to have true party representation and that the party members should express decisively their wishes, this may be accomplished through a direct vote. Following the recommendations of Governor Hughes, the HinmanGreen bill was again introduced in the legislature with the modification that the system of designation by committees should be regarded as optional and not mandatory. At the instance of the committee appointed to investigate direct nominations, another primary measure, bearing the names of the chairman and vice-chairman, Mr. Meade and Mr. Phillips, was introduced in the legislature. This bill embodied the principles laid down by the committee in its report, and left the convention system undisturbed. In a special message Governor Hughes declared that the bill was "not a grant but a denial of needed primary reform." A third primary law, introduced by Mr. Grady in the Senate and Mr. Frisbie in the Assembly representing the Democratic League, provided for the nomination of certain candidates by direct vote, but exempted New York City from the operation of the law. A fourth primary bill was introduced in the Senate at the instance of Mr. Cobb shortly after his election to majority leadership on the unhappy downfall of Mr. Allds. This bill, brought forward by the Senate Judiciary Committee, was a compromise measure, and provided for the direct nomination of candidates for the State legislature, county offices and the House of Representatives. It furthermore exempted the county officers of New York City from the operation of the law in the years in which mayoralty elections were held. None of these bills, however, became a law at the regular session of the legislature (1910), and Governor Hughes to force the issue called a special session for the purpose of compelling a straight forward consideration of the question of direct nominations. At this special session every effort was made to bring the friends of direct nominations together, and the Cobb bill, with slight modification, was introduced in the legislature as a compromise measure. The supporters of Governor Hughes wheeled all their forces into line, and Mr. Roosevelt publicly called upon the members of his party to aid in the passage of the measure. In spite of all the powerful influences that could be brought to bear, the special session adjourned without enacting any direct primary legislation. It was perfectly evident, even to casual observers, that the defeat of the new proposal was due to a bi-partisan combination of Republican and Democratic organization leaders. Accordingly, the advocates of the direct primary in both parties set vigorously about the task of committing their respective state conventions to the new cause. As a result, both of the old parties accepted the principle of direct nominations in some form. The Republican convention declared as follows: To Governor Hughes is due the credit of arousing the interest of the people and convincing them of the need of directly electing their party officers and directly nominating their party candidates. We promise legislation which will enact these principles into law. The Democratic convention came out even more emphatically: We declare in favor of state-wide direct primaries to ensure to the people the right to choose members of political committees and nominate candidates for public office. The election of November, 1910, gave the victory to the Democrats and the government of the commonwealth is now in the hands of a party definitely committed to a system of state-wide direct primaries. So things stand at the beginning of the year 1911." 2 In his message to the legislature, January 4, 1911, Governor Dix said: "I strongly recommend to you a revision of the election and primary laws of the State, so as to provide for a system of direct nominations-state-wide in its application-which shall insure to the people the right to choose members of political committees and nominate candidates for public office. The more completely the people are brought into close touch with these most important matters, and the more they can be induced to take part in their party primaries, the stronger and more healthy will be the atmosphere of public confidence surrounding party nominations, and the more likely the vast majority of our citizens to exercise the right of suffrage on election day." A FEW CONSIDERATIONS ON THE SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES BY MEANS OTHER THAN WAR BY THEODORE MARBURG Baltimore, Md. The success of international arbitrations-between 250 and 260 since 1815-and the present frequency of them, combined with the growing consciousness of the economic waste involved in war and in preparation for war, have projected into the field of practical politics the question of a settlement of international disputes by means other than war. The possibility of avoiding war by entering into treaties of arbitration after the dispute has arisen and after diplomacy has failed to adjust the dispute is no longer relied upon as the sole means of averting a resort to force. Coming into being with the First Hague Conference (1899), the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague, which sets up a list of judges from which an arbitration tribunal may be drawn, marked a distinct forward step. Its very existence has not only invited the nations to use arbitration as a means of settling present disputes but has promoted the making of so-called general treaties looking forward to the submission of a certain category of future disputes to arbitration. From May 18, 1899, to March 21, 1910, there were negotiated 133 such treaties. The First Hague Conference likewise set up the Commission of Inquiry, which provides machinery for ascertaining the facts, and in one notable instance at least-the Dogger Bank affair (1904)-has justified its existence. Another device for abating strife between nations is neutralization. It has been applied to Switzerland, (1815), Belgium (1832) and Luxemburg (1839) long enough to prove its value. The fact that certain great powers stood ready to forbid any violation of the independence or territorial integrity of these states has certainly acted as an effective deterrent to powerful neighbors who might have had an ambition to commit acts of aggression against them. The world is probably destined to see a great extension of this principle not only with regard to small independent powers but possibly with regard to certain areas or possessions of some of the great powers. But the principle is not capable of universal application. It must be used with discrimination. The progress of the world may be retarded by the neutralization of countries where backward conditions prevail. It may be well to lay down some such principle as this, e.g., that neutralization is applicable with advantage only to countries which have fairly just laws administered with some approximation to justice, an underlying qualification which in fact applies with equal force to permanently successful protectorates for the reason that a protectorate in which there is a constant failure of justice must eventually either be left to be disciplined by foreign powers, the personal or property rights of whose citizens are violated, or must be entered and directly administered by the power which has set up the protectorate. But extension of the principle of neutralization is necessarily slow and subject to serious limitations; arbitration and actual adjudication are capable of much more general application as a means of avoiding international strife. Arbitration itself has its limitations, arising chiefly from the fact that its governing principle is compromise, and it is because of this that we witness the growing movement for the establishment of a true international court of justice. The establishment of such a court, governed by the principle of res adjudicata, it is felt, would preserve peace between nations more stoutly than any other single institution thus far existing or suggested. Not only would its operation at once begin to create authorative international law in the form of judge-made law, but its very existence would invite the codification of international law and the formal adoption of such law by the nations, just as the Prize Court, adopted by the Second Hague Conference, led to the London Conference (1908-09) which codified the law of prize. The criticism has been made that the awards of courts of arbitration have been so generally accepted because burning questions have not been submitted to arbitration; that wars which have actually occurred were over differences too serious for peaceable adjustment. There is much force in this criticism, but impartial analyses of past wars by more than one writer show that the criticism is far too sweeping. Moreover, nations which hesitiate to enter a court of arbitration because they regard the interests at stake as too important to subject to the risk of compromise, will be more willing to abide the decision of a true court of justice which shall be governed by estab |