Howell v. Sherwood. levied upon and the alias in no fair sense came within the purview of the act mentioned. It did not have to recite former levies. There was a clerk's certificate indorsed thereon showing the writ to be an alias, the amount collected theretofore and the amount due. (3) Whether the judgment against Carleton carried costs or not, it did carry interest under then existing statutes. Computing interest, the judgment was not fully satisfied by the levy and sale under the first execution, and points made in that behalf by defendant against the execution are disallowed with the oth ers. (c) Of the sheriff's deed on the execution sale under the Carleton judgment. It is not contended that the sheriff's deed does not make all prescribed statutory recitals. It is rich and accurate in recitals. Having described the judgment, the execution, the levy on the land in dispute (describing it), the advertisement, the place, viz., at the courthouse door, the time, viz., February 2, between 9 a. m. and 5 p. m. during the session of the circuit court at its January term, 1864, it goes on to say that the sheriff did (quoting): "Expose for sale at public auction for ready money, all the right, title, interest and estate of the said Charles Carleton of, in and to above described real estate, and George W. Jameson being the highest and last bidder for said real estate, at the price and sum of sixty dollars, the same was stricken off and sold to the said George W. Jameson for that sum. "Now, Therefore, in consideration of the premises, and of the said sum of sixty dollars to me said sheriff in hand paid by the said George W. Jameson, the receipt whereof I do hereby acknowledge, and by virtue of the authority in me vested by law, I, Thomas A. Reed, sheriff as aforesaid, do hereby assign, transfer and convey to the said George W. Jameson, his Howell v. Sherwood. heirs and assigns, forever, with all rights and appurtenances thereunto belonging. "In Testimony Whereof, I, Thomas A. Reed, sheriff of the county of Greene, have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal this 2d day of February, A. D. 1864. "THOMAS A. REED, Sheriff, (Seal.)" The vice in the deed is said to be that there are no words operative to convey the land. The lan In some jurisdictions a sheriff's deed is not necessary to transfer land sold under sheriff's hammer on execution levy, and knocked down to a bidder. Title went to such purchaser by operation of law. [17 Cyc. 1340.] But in Missouri a deed is essential. [Dunnica v. Coy, 24 Mo. 167; R. S. 1909, sec. 2231.] guage of that statute is mandatory. If such deed be so defective as only to convey an equitable one, a plaintiff, who in ejectment is strictly at law and not in equity, can not recover on such equitable title. [Ables v. Webb, 186 Mo. 1. c. 247.] His remedy in such predicament is to get a corrected deed in the statutory way. [Dixon v. Hunter, 204 Mo. 387 et seq.] While a sheriff's deed is not entitled by inference to as liberal a presumption of intendment as is a direct conveyance by a grantor, yet it is entitled to the effect that its face imports. [Nelson v. Brodhack, 44 Mo. 1. c. 603; DePaige v. Douglas, 234 Mo. 78.] Every human document must be interpreted in a forum of reason in the light of common sense-which latter, after all, is the sum and quintessence of reason. An execution is defined by Coke to be the very "end and fruit of the laws." Executio est finis et fructus legis. [Co. Litt. 289b.] A sale and a conveyance to follow are but a main part and parcel of that end and fruit. He sues in vain who can not have execution together with all appurtenant incidents. Accordingly courts look fa Howell v. Sherwood. vorably on judicial sales. They do not approach a sheriff's deed with any sour predisposition to make its parts perish if possible by overnice construction. Contra, they get at its true intendment by its four corners precisely as they do in other deeds. [Robinson v. Levy, 217 Mo 1. c. 520.] The whole instrument must be construed together to get the intendment. Agreeably thereto we might cite many examples from the books if there were a call to do so. In old learning deeds were divided into artificial and technical parts -a formidable and bristling array, witness: the "premises," the "habendum," the "tenendum," the "reddendum," the "conditions," the "warranty," the "covenants" and the "conclusion." One provision was not allowed to impinge on another. The language expressive of the intention must appear at the right place and in the right clause and order. But old things, passing away, have been consigned to a judicial scrap-pile, and all things have become new in that regard. "The modern rule, which prevails in this State, is much simpler and much more calculated to carry out the wishes of the grantor. The intention of the grantor, as gathered from the four corners of the instrument, is now the pole star of construction. That intention may be expressed anywhere in the instrument, and in any words, the simpler and plainer the better, that will impart it, and the court will enforce it no matter in what part of the instrument it is found." [Per MARSHALL, J., in Utter v. Sidman, 170 Mo. 1. c. 294.] We see no reason why a sheriff's deed may not somewhat profit and prosper by that rule so long as it complies with the cited statute. Quickened by such precepts we conclude that although the deed has a syntactical blemish, yet, taken as a whole, it is well enough. This because: It is argued that under the wording of the deed it is not clear that the land in dispute was conveyed. That argument travels in this way (borrowing from Howell v. Sherwood. one of defendant's briefs): "Here, however, the deed does not undertake to convey any particular interest in any designated real estate, unless the presumption is indulged that the sheriff did not levy upon any other property of the execution defendant than that recited in the premises and the further presumption that, if he did, Jameson did not become the purchaser of it, thus founding one presumption upon another in violation of settled precedents." But that argument, when brought to book, we think fallacious. It is not a question of presumption. at all. The return of the sheriff on the execution shows a levy upon, a seizure and sale of no land but that in dispute. Agreeably thereto is the advertisement. So, the recitals of the sheriff's deed describes only the land in dispute and proceeds to say that Carleton's right, estate, title and interest in that very land was stricken off and "sold" to Jameson. Therefore, we see no ambiguity in subject-matter. Finally the transitive verbs "assign, transfer and convey" are used, followed by the phrase, "to the said George W. Jameson, etc." If between the latter phrase and those transitive verbs there had appeared the word "it," or such phrase as "the premises" or "the same" or "said land" or "the real estate" or "the property" there would be no lapse in syntax. But the omission avails nothing. As the verbs used are transitive verbs they point to and call imperatively for an object. Can there be reasonable doubt about that object? Clearly, no. It was "it," "the same," "the land." Those verbs, assign, convey and transfer, connect themselves irresistibly with the thing sold and mentioned before, viz., the land. A thing necessarily implied is within the intendment of any instrument. The maxim is: The expressing of those things which are implied, operates nothing. (Expressio eorum quae tacite insunt nihil operatur.) A school boy, parsing, could not well miss the object called for by Howell v. Sherwood. those verbs. Peradventure, now and then, speaking with caution, even a court may know as much as a school boy (on a pinch). Nor do we think the prior phrase, "sold to the said George W. Jameson," is without some little significance when read with what follows and goes before. When the context permits such construction in aid of the intendment of the deed, the word "sold" may be allowed to mean transferred -"a consummated contract of sale." [Forthman v. Deters, 206 Ill. 1. c. 166; Web., tit. "Sell."] It is good and acceptable doctrine that sheriff's deeds (like others) should contain somewhere within their four corners words apt to convey the land. [Rorer on Judicial Sales (2 Ed.), sec. 946.] Here there are apt words and the only possible question is over the identity of the thing conveyed. Under the verbiage of this sheriff's deed there can be, as said, no substantial question about that. If A recites he has "sold" his land, describing it, to B, and hereby assigns, transfers and conveys to B, there can be no doubt on what A conveys or B acquires. The point is disallowed to defendant. III. Of a certain administrator's deed. Having acquired title under the sheriff's deed held valid, supra, Jameson conveyed to Harrison J. Lindenbower in 1868. Lindenbower dying and his estate being in the hands of the public administrator, plaintiff, H. E. Howell, acquired Lindenbower's title in 1883 by a deed from one Julian, paying more than the appraised value. The deed describes Julian as "former public administrator of the county of Greene in the State of Missouri, in charge of the estate of H. J. Lindenbower, deceased." It is signed similarly. Defendant objects to that deed because a former public administrator had no authority to execute it. The challenge is without substance. Public administrators, at the time in hand, were not discharged at the |