Russell on the 9th of September replied that, in pursuance of an agreement between the British and French governments, Mr. Bunch was instructed to communicate to the Confederate authorities the desire of those governments that the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th articles of the Declaration of Paris should be observed by the Confederate States in the prosecution of hostilities, the commerce of Great Britain and France being deeply interested in the maintenance of those articles; that Mr. Bunch, in what he had done in that matter, had acted in obedience to his instructions; and that the British government could not accept as a reason for removing him a statement, in a letter from someone not named, that the "first step" toward the recognition of the Confederacy by Great Britain had been taken. Mr. Seward, writing on October 23, 1861, said that, so far as Mr. Bunch's proceedings were covered by the British government's avowal of responsibility, the matter was to be settled directly between the two governments; but that the United States could not admit that Mr. Bunch, while exercising consular privileges with the consent of the United States, could carry on communication with insurgents in arms against the Federal government; that the United States must revoke Mr. Bunch's exequatur, since he had not only been a bearer of communications between the insurgents and a foreign government, in violation of the laws of the United States, but had also abused the confidence of the two governments by reporting that the first step had been taken toward the recognition by Great Britain of the sovereignty of the Confederate States, and also because his conduct had all along “been that, not of a friend to this government, or even of a neutral, but of a partisan of faction and disunion." The exequatur of Mr. Bunch had, added Mr. Seward, been withdrawn because his services as a consul were "not agreeable to this government," and the consular privileges taken from him would be allowed to any successor against whom no grave "personal objections" should exist. Mr. Seward, in saying that Mr. Bunch had violated a law of the United States, alluded to the so-called Logan Act of 1798, which forbids any person, not specially appointed or duly authorized by the President, whether a "citizen or denizen," from counselling or aiding in any political correspondence with the government of any foreign state with an intent to influence the measures of such government in relation to disputes with the United States or to defeat the measures of the latter. Earl Russell, in a note to Mr. Adams of November 26, 1861, intimated an opinion that the act in question was inapplicable to the case of Mr. Bunch, and also denied the charge that Mr. Bunch had acted as a partisan of faction and disunion; but he did not dispute the President's naked right to withdraw Mr. Bunch's exequatur. Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Adams, min. to England, No. 64, Aug. 17, 1861, Dip. Cor. 1861, 117; Mr. Adams to Earl Russell, Sept. 3, 1861, id. 136; Earl Russell to Mr. Adams, Sept. 9, 1861, id. 140; Mr. Seward to Mr. Adams, No. 109, Oct. 23, 1861, id. 148; Earl Russell to Mr. Adams, Nov. 26, 1861, Dip. Cor. 1862, 7. "Mr. Bunch continued to reside at Charleston." (Bernard, The Neutrality of Great Britain during the American Civil War, 186.) This statement by Bernard, of course, refers to the fact that Charleston continued, for a long while after the revocation of Mr. Bunch's exequatur, to be in the possession of the Confederate government. It is a curious circumstance that in 1875 Mr. Bunch, being then British minister resident at Bogotá, acted as arbitrator in a case between the United States and Colombia. (Moore, Int. Arbitrations, II. 1427, et seq.) As to the revocation of the exequaturs of various British consuls in 1856, for implication in the violation of the neutrality laws of the United States, see Crampton's case, supra, § 640. Mr. Seward, in an instruction to Mr. Kilpatrick, Chile, dated Feb. 19, 1866, informed him of the revocation on the 12th Case of Mr. Rogers. inst. of the exequator granted to Don Estaban Rogers on October 14, 1863, as Chilean consul ad interim at New York. Mr. Kilpatrick was instructed, in communicating the fact to the Chilean minister for foreign affairs, "to say that this measure was adopted for causes satisfactory to this government, and in defence of the dignity and honor of the United States," and to "add, at the same time, that should the Chilean government see fit to appoint a successor to Mr. Rogers, if entirely unobjectionable, the usual exequator will be granted to him.” On February 15 Mr. Asta Buruaga, the Chilean minister at Washington, who had seen a notice of the revocation of the exequatur in the press, complained that he had not been advised either of the action taken or of the reasons for it, and intimated that it was inspired by false representations of Spanish agents as to the consul's violation of the neutrality laws. Mr. Seward replied, February 16, that the action was taken "for causes satisfactory to this government, and in defense of the dignity and honor of the United States," and that Gen. Kilpatrick had been instructed to say to the Chilean government "that a new consul, if entirely unobjectionable, will be received by this government." Mr. Asta Buruaga subsequently left at the Department of State, April 26, 1866, a communication on the subject, dated the 2nd of that month, from the Chilean minister of foreign affairs. In this communication Mr. Covarrubias said that Mr. Seward's "laconic explanation," which was called forth by the minister's "timely and just observations," did not disclose the reason for the revocation of the exequatur. When, in 1859, Chile "was compelled, for good and powerful reasons, to cancel the exequatur of Mr. Trevitt, consul of the United States at Valparaiso," she addressed without delay to the United States minister explanations which were "spontaneous, clear, circumstantial, full, and satisfactory." She therefore looked with "double surprise and regret " upon the present case, in which she had “a right to expect at least that the international principle of reciprocity would have been consulted." Mr. Seward, May 29, replied, in a note to Mr. Asta Buruaga, that the President was not convinced that an error had been committed in the withdrawal of the exequator or in the manner in which it was done. The consul's exequator was summarily revoked "under full conviction on the part of this government that the complaints of his violation of the neutrality laws were sustained by presumptive proof, and that to allow him to continue to exercise consular functions while pursuing such unlawful practices would involve à necessity for explanations between the government of Chile and that of the United States, which could in no case improve the friendship existing between them, and might, perhaps, result in producing a rupture of relations which would be prejudicial to both, and to the cause of all the American republics." It was, however," an occasion of much regret " that a commercial agent of Chile "should have proved himself unworthy of the confidence reposed in him by the friendly governinent of the United States." Dip. Cor. 1866, II. 375, 419, 420, 425, 428. "By receiving consular representatives from a foreign country the United States come under no obligation of law or courtesy to allow the persons so received to retain and exercise consular functions, when, for any reason, those persons become unacceptable to this government, nor does this government come, under those circumstances, under an obligation to submit its proceedings, in revoking an exequatur, to revision by the government of a friendly nation whose commission the consul bore when the exequatur was revoked." Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Baron de Wetterstedt, April 23, 1866, MS. Janssen's case. In 1866 Mr. Janssen, who was consul of Oldenburg at New York, was summoned to be examined as a witness in a suit pending in the supreme court of the State against himself and certain other persons, as members of a commercial partnership. By Article IX. of the treaty between the United States and Hanover of 1846, to which Oldenburg had adhered, it was expressly provided that if consuls should carry on trade they should be "subjected to the same laws and usages to which private individuals of their nation are subjected in the same place;" nor did the treaty exempt consuls from being summoned to testify. When sued, Mr. Janssen caused an appearance to be entered for himself, and made no objection to the jurisdiction of the court, either on general grounds or on the ground that he was entitled to be proceeded against only in the Federal courts. When he was summoned to testify, however, his counsel disclosed to the court the fact of his consular character. The court then suggested that the proper course under the circumstances would be to dismiss the plaintiff's action on the ground that it should have been brought in the Federal courts, and such a motion was made and the action was dismissed. On December 26, 1866, President Johnson issued a proclamation revoking Mr. Janssen's exequatur on the ground of his "having refused to appear in the supreme court of the State of New York to answer in a suit there pending against himself and others on the plea that he is a consular officer of Oldenburg, thus seeking to use his official position to defeat the ends of justice." On the strength of the various decisions to the effect that the consul's privilege from suit in the State courts was official and could not be waived by him, an application was made by counsel for Mr. Janssen for the withdrawal of the proclamation. This question was referred to Mr. E. Peshine Smith, examiner of claims of the Department of State, who advised that the proclamation be not recalled. Mr. Smith said that the words "refused to appear to answer," in the proclamation, were descriptive of the refusal to appear as a witness as well as of a refusal to appear as a party; that, if Mr. Janssen had chosen to decline to appear as a party in a State court, no offense could have been taken; that the real offense imputed to him was his refusal to appear and answer as a witness; that it was in the proceedings in relation to his summons as a witness that his consular position was disclosed, and that it was really in consequence of this that the proceeding was dismissed. Mr. Smith further said: "This government instructs its consular officers, even where, as in France, there is a treaty stipulation, that they shall not be compelled to appear as witnesses before the courts; that it is nevertheless their duty, on invitation, to appear and give their testimony unless necessarily prevented; that they have no right on account of their official position, or disinclination, or personal inconveniences, to refuse compliance with such invitation, and that a refusal without good cause therefor will be regarded as an act of disrespect toward the government within whose jurisdiction the consul resides, and as a sufficient reason for his removal. (Consular Manual, sections 639 and 641.) The United States expect from the consular officers of foreign powers the same respect for the courts, and the same readiness to contribute their testimony when invoked in the administration of justice, which we enjoin upon our own officers. Especially is this expected from consuls engaged in commerce, as was Mr. Janssen. The fact that Mr. Janssen was himself a defendant in the action in no way diminished his obligation to appear as a witness. On the contrary, his voluntary appearance as a party, when he might have declined to appear, might well be regarded as a formal intimation of his willingness to do what anyone else would be bound to do in similar circumstances, and what he would not be permitted to refuse in a suit against any other person. I think, therefore, the revocation of Mr. Janssen's exequatur was rightful and ought not to be annulled." Report of Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to the President, March 28, 1867, That a consul of Hanover engaged in trade at San Francisco is not en- The Paraguayan government canceled its recognition of Mr. Usher, consular agent of the United States at Asuncion, on Usher's case. the ground that he had taken part in political differences in the country, and had used his abode or place of business at. Villa Rica as an asylum for persons hostile to the government, and had hoisted the flag of the United States over the building as an emblem of his authority. The Department of State said that if Mr. Usher was guilty of the things charged, the action of the Paraguayan government could not be complained of; but that he denied the truth of the charges. The Department of state, however, did not undertake to determine this question of fact, but based its decision on other grounds. It appeared that Mr. Usher was appointed as consular agent at Asuncion and was so recognized by the Paraguayan government. His right, therefore, to display the flag of the United States, if such a right existed, was limited to Asuncion, and did not accompany him to other parts of Paraguay. By assuming to exercise it at the remote point of Villa Rica, especially in the state of affairs then existing, he plainly went beyond the bounds of his authority, and his action in " exercising an important political attribute of that character" there was not justified, and the United States could not "find fault with the Paraguayan government at its correcting his mistake by canceling his recognition as consular agent at Asuncion." Mr. Fish, Sec. of State, to Mr. Stevens, June 23, 1873, MS. Inst. Paraguay, I. 163. The exequatur of the Pontifical consul at New York appointed prior to 1871 will not be canceled on the sole ground of the absorption of the Pope's temporal power in that of Italy. Mr. Fish, Sec. of State, to Baron Blanc, July 18, 1876, MS. Notes to |