mination," and that if the minister was desirous that such a step should be taken he would, upon a suggestion from the Department of State, proceed, in conjunction with the Secretary of the Treasury, to bring the cases as soon as possible to adjudication. The Chinese minister, while expressing his confidence in the courts, said: "The questions submitted by me were of a diplomatic character involving the construction of conventions entered into between two equal and sovereign governments, and I could not, by any action on my part, recognize the competency of a domestic tribunal of one of the parties to take such action as would irrevocably bind the other party to the convention. If I am not misinformed, the Supreme Court of the United States has already decided, in what is known as the Scott law case, that if the Congress of the United States legislates in direct violation of the treaty, the courts of the United States must respect and enforce the legislation; but I understand it recognized in the same decision that such legislation did not release the government of the United States from its international obligations under the treaty. And however much the courts may feel bound to follow the legislation of Congress, I apprehend you will not contend that adverse legislation or the judgment of a domestic tribunal can release a government from its solemn treaty obligations." Mr. Hay, Sec. of State, to Mr. Wu, Chinese min., Jan. 4, 1899, For. Rel. 1899, 194; Mr. Wu, Chinese min., to Mr. Hay, Sec. of State, Jan. 25, 1899, id. 195. . "Legislation such as that enacted by the State of Iowa [imposing discriminating taxes on foreign insurance companies] is beyond the control of the executive branch of the general government, and even did this legislation contravene any existing treaty the remedy would lie in an appeal to the courts of law. "This Department had called the attention of the governors of the States in which the legislation in question is said to have been adopted, or to be pending, to the violation of certain treaty stipulations made by the United States with other countries, and in some instances assurances have been given that the reports of such intended legislation are unfounded." Mr. Hay, Sec. of State, to Mr. Tower, British chargé, April 27, 1899, (2) RULE AS TO POLITICAL QUESTIONS. $ 761. While treaties are a part of the supreme law of the land, they are nevertheless to be viewed in two lights-that is to say, in the light of politics and in the light of juridical law. The decision of political H. Doc. 551-vol 5-16 questions is preeminently the function of the political branch of the government, of the Executive, or of Congress, as the case may be; and when a political question is so determined the courts follow that determination. Such was the decision of the Supreme Court in cases involving boundary and other questions, under the treaty of 1803 with France, of 1819 with Spain, and of 1848 with Mexico. Doe et al. v. Braden, 16 How. 635; Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 314; The Whether the King of Spain had power to annul a grant is a question which was foreclosed in every judicial tribunal of the United States by the action of the President and Senate treating with him as having that power. Nor will the court review the action of the Executive in this respect, it being impossible for the executive department of the government to conduct our foreign relations with any advantage to the country, and fulfil the duties which the Constitution has imposed upon it, if every court in the country was authorized to inquire and decide whether the person who ratified the treaty on behalf of a foreign nation had the power, by its constitution and laws, to make the engagements into which he entered. Doe v. Braden, 16 How. 635. By Article X. of the treaty with the Pottawatomie Indians, proclaimed August 7, 1868, 15 Stat. 531, 533, it was agreed that the claims of the tribe " for depredations committed by others upon their stock, timber or other property," might be presented to the Interior Department accompanied by evidence, and that "examination and report shall be made to Congress of the amount found to be equitably due, in order that such action may be taken as shall be just in the premises." Various claims were presented under this article to the Secretary of the Interior, and reported by him to Congress. By the acts of March 3, 1885, and March 3, 1891, the claims and all the papers relating thereto were referred to the Court of Claims. (23 Stat. 362, 372; 26 Stat. 989, 1011.) Nothing was done under the first-named act because it required strictly legal evidence. The act of March 3, 1891, directed the court to consider all the papers on file or of record; and it used the same words as the treaty, namely," for the depredations committed by others." The papers showed depredations committed by Indians, as well as by white men, and the Court of Claims gave judgment for all. The United States appealed on the ground that claims for depredations by other Indians were improperly reported. Held, that Congress, when it legislated, had before it all the claims and did not discriminate between them; that, if the meaning of the treaty was doubtful, it was competent for Congress to resolve the doubt and accept responsibility for all the claims; that it was natural for Congress to adopt the interpretation of the Interior Department; and that, at any rate, the language was broad enough to cover claims arising out of acts of Indians as well as out of acts of white men. United States v. Navarre (1899), 173 U. S. 77. The United States Supreme Court has no power to set itself up as the instrumentality for enforcing the provisions of a treaty with a foreign nation which the government of the United States, as a sovereign power, chooses to disregard. Botiller v. Dominguez, 130 U. S. 238; 9 S. Ct. Rep. 525. A court can not inquire whether a treaty was properly executed or whether it was procured by undue influence. Leighton v. United States, 29 Ct. Cl. 288. The granting an injunction to restrain the Executive from making payment under a treaty is not within the province of the judiciary. Grundy, At. Gen., 1839, 3 Op. 471. "I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 29th ultimo in relation to the pending application in the supreme court of this District for a writ of mandamus against the Secretary of State at the instance of La Abra Silver Mining Company, in which you embody, as your own, the report of Mr. Solicitor-General Phillips to you. “ The suggestion of Chief Justice Carter, as reported by Mr. Phillips, namely, that a pro forma judgment with a view to an appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States was all that was wanted by the parties can not be entertained for a moment with my consent. I have a most decided objection to any judgment, pro forma or otherwise, being rendered against the Secretary of State. "The pending case involves, as I view it, an important question in regard to the relative powers of the several branches of the national government. It is for this reason. if no other, entitled to a full hearing in every court through which it may have to pass before reaching the Supreme Court of the United States. . . "The powers of the President are fixed by the Constitution. He has in this matter only exercised the treaty-making power. Congress, a coordinate branch of the government, can not enlarge those powers, and most certainly can not restrict or limit them." Mr. Frelinghuysen, Sec. of State, to Mr. Brewster, Dec. 4, 1882, 144, MS. 5. DATE OF TAKING EFFECT. $ 762. A treaty is binding on the contracting parties, unless otherwise provided, from the date of its signature, the exchange of ratifications having, in such case, a retroactive effect, confirming the treaty from that date. Davis v. Concordia, 9 How. 280; Hylton v. Brown, 1 Wash. C. C. 343; See, as to the treaty with France of Feb. 23, 1853, Succession of Schaffer, The treaty by which France ceded Louisiana to the United States took effect from its date, April 30, 1803. Its subsequent ratification and the formal transfer of possession have relation to that date. The same rule applies to the treaty of San Ildefonso, Oct. 1. 1800, by which France acquired Louisiana from Spain. United States v. Reynes, 9 How. 127; Davis v. Concordia, id. 280. So far as it affects the relations of the sovereigns concerned, a treaty when ratified operates from the day of its signature. Hence, although the ratifications of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, which was signed December 10, 1898, were not exchanged till April 11, 1899, it was held that sec. 10 of the act of March 3, 1899 (30 Stat. 1151), prohibiting unauthorized obstructions to navigation in the waters of the United States, applied to the navigable waters of Porto Rico. It was observed that, while certain provisions of the treaty became operative from the date of the exchange of ratifications and others (as Arts. IV. and VI.) upon signature, "the relinquishment of sovereignty and cession of domain, which were the main purposes of the treaty, and were formulated in several articles, are unqualified and must be regarded as immediate and absolute from the date of signature, subject only to the possibility of a failure of ratification. It is impossible to suppose that the sovereignty of the United States in its full scope did not attach at once or was suspended until ratification should be complete." Knox, At. Gen., Oct. 17, 1901, 551, 558, citing United States v. Arredondo, 6 Pet. 691; Haver v. Yaker, 9 Wall. 321; United States v. Reynes, 9 How. 127; Davis v. Concordia, 9 How. 280; De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 1, 200; Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244, 287; Dooley v. United States, 182 U. S. 222, 230; Halleck, Int. Law (1861), 815, and discussing Halleck, Int. Law (1861), 855. The Attorney-General, referring to Halleck, Int. Law (1861), 831, said: "It is difficult to conceive that so far as matters of sovereign do minion are concerned there is any break of continuity between the cessation of hostilities and the negotiation of a treaty of cession, or between negotiation and ratification; and if ratification is followed by legislation respecting the acquired territory, which fully emphasizes the assumption of the new duties and rights of sovereignty, I can conceive no valid reason for doubting that this sovereignty extends over all the usual public phases thereof, including the jurisdiction over public waters, from the moment when hostilities resulted in military control of the acquired territory." (23 Op. 556-557.) The States of New Granada, Ecuador, and Venezuela, formerly constituting the original Republic of Colombia, established by treaty a board of commissioners to hear and determine claims against that Republic and to fix the proportion due thereon from each of such States. The commissioners rejected a claim presented by a citizen of the United States on the ground that the capture, out of which the claim grew, took place a few days before the exchange of the ratifications of the treaty between the United States and Colombia, by which it was stipulated that free ships should make free goods. The Department of State said that this objection was fully answered by the statement "that, although the treaty stipulates that certain of its parts are to remain in force twelve years from the exchange of the ratifications, this is by no means tantamount to saying that it was not to be operative until that exchange should have been effected. The treaty had been ratified by both parties before the capture, and as the exchange of the ratifications is a mere ceremony, intended only to furnish each party with formal proof of the ratification of the other, no doubt is entertained of our right to insist upon the application of the treaty to any case that might have occurred under it subsequently to its ratification by Colombia." Mr. Forsyth, Sec. of State, to Mr. Semple, chargé d'affaires to New “But a different rule prevails when the treaty operates on individual rights. The principle of relation does not apply to rights of this character, which were vested before the treaty was ratified; it is not considered as concluded until there is an exchange of ratifications.” Davis, Notes, U. S. Treaty Vol. (1776–1887), 1228, citing Davis v. Con- See Montault v. United States, 12 Howard, 47. The rule that treaties, where individual rights are concerned, take effect not on the date of their signature, but on that of the exchange of ratifications, was held to be applicable to the exaction of duties |