The memorandum concluded with the statement that if the situation thus described should continue Russia would be obliged to consider Chinese neutrality "from the standpoint of her own interests." Replying, on January 17, 1905, to this memorandum, Mr. Hay stated that he had communicated the complaint of the Russian government to the American minister at Peking with instructions to express the hope that China would scrupulously observe her neutral obligations, any departure from which would seriously embarrass not only China, but also the powers interested in limiting the area of hostilities. Mr. Hay added that the Chinese government declared with great earnestness that it had observed strict neutrality during the pending war, while Japan insisted that she had kept and intended to keep inviolate the pledges made by her to respect China's neutrality. within the limits agreed on. Mr. Hay, in conclusion, expressed the hope and confidence that no power, whether belligerent or neutral, might violate the neutrality which the whole civilized world had agreed to respect, the violation of which could only be disastrous to all the powers concerned. Count Cassini replied, on January 18, 1905, that China's denial was met by a series of facts, for the most part of public knowledge, which the foreign representatives at Peking, or at any rate those who wished "to reach a conscientious appreciation of the true condition of things," could not fail to note and report to their governments. There was, he declared, on the one hand, a series of acts contrary to Chinese neutraliy, and incited by Japan; on the other hand, denials unsupported by any evidence. He specially emphasized the case of the Ryeshitelni. In a note to Count Cassini of January 23, 1905, Mr. Hay observed that it did not seem to be incumbent upon him to take up the question touching the asserted inaction of the United States and Europe with regard to the case of the Ryeshitelni, or the consequences of what Count Cassini termed the leniency evinced both to China and Japan. The correspondence exchanged at the time showed, said Mr. Hay, that the seizure of the refugee torpedo boat in the port of a neutral by one of the belligerents found no encouragement whatever from the United States, while the attitude of the United States, when the Askold and her companion vessels subsequently took refuge at Shanghai, was in full encouragement of the efforts and eventual success of China in enforcing neutrality. Mr. Hay concluded with the statment that the general solicitude of all the interested states would make it expedient and proper that the matters concerning which the Russian government had raised an international issue should be considered in a conference of the powers. On January 23, 1905, the Chinese minister at Washington handed to Mr. Hay a translation of a telegram from Peking, dated the 21st of January, and containing a detailed reply to the Russian charges. This reply was as follows: 1. That the seizure of the Ryeshitelni was entirely unexpected and without any connivance on the part of the Chinese authorities; that the Chinese government had already instituted an inquiry and demanded from the Japanese minister the restitution of the torpedo boat; and that, although the incident was not yet closed, everything that could be done had been done. 2. That Hunghutse bandits were first called into service by Russian officers, and were employed against the Japanese army; that whenever any such bandits were known to have crossed into neutral territory the local authorities repeatedly effected their capture and punishment; and that the law of nations did not hold a neutral government responsible for the acts of individuals who might take part in the conflict. 3. That no Japanese officers were employed with the foreigndrilled troops in the north; that Japanese were employed at the provincial college at Pauting as translators, just as Russian subjects held positions in various educational institutions in the maritime customs service; and that the law of nations did not prohibit a neutral government from employing the citizens of a belligerent power. 4. That no permission had been given to the Japanese to use the Miao-Dao Islands; and that, although a watch had been kept, no attempt on the part of the Japanese to land had been reported. 5. That strict orders had been given prohibiting the shipment of contraband to the seat of war, and that the customs authorities had absolutely refused clearance papers for such purposes. 6. That shipments of iron ore, which had been complained of, were made by a private company; and that, besides, pig iron was not to be considered as a contraband article. 7. That China was not to be suspected of a desire to take part in the conflict, because she sought to maintain her military establishment in the interest of peace and tranquillity. The telegram went further and charged that Russia had committed violations of neutral rights (1) by building bridges and quartering troops west of the Liao River, (2) by using force in Chinese territory to compel the sale to them of cattle and provisions and by secretly carrying off supplies, (3) by smuggling rifles, guns, and ammunition concealed in merchandise, (4) by the act of the captain of a Russian vessel, sent under escort from Chefoo to Shanghai, in secretly making his escape at Wusung. On January 28, 1905, the Japanese minister handed to Mr. Hay a telegram from Baron Komura, in reply to the Russian charges. In this telegram the following statements were made: 1. That the capture of the Ryeshitelni involved no violation of Chinese neutrality by Japan, the capture being a measure of selfdefense made necessary by the prior disregard of Chinese neutrality by Russia. 2. That no Hunghutses were employed by the Japanese, and that no Japanese military instructors were with the Chinese soldiers on the northern boundary of Chi-li. 3. That the Miao-Dao Islands had not been used as a naval base by Japan, but had been constantly so used by Russia till the fall of Port Arthur. 4. That the Japanese had obtained from Chinese ports, through private persons, articles which were contraband of war, but that this constituted no breach of China's neutrality on the part of either China or Japan, and that Russia, during the siege of Port Arthur, in fact drew a large part of her military supplies for that place from China. 5. That the pig iron obtained from Hanyang was purchased by a private firm in Japan under a contract made four years previously; that the Japanese Government was not a party to the contract nor had anything to do with the transaction. 6. That the allegation that the Chinese were making preparations with a view to take part with Japan in hostilities was entirely destitute of foundation. The Japanese telegram concluded with a narration of eight of the "more conspicuous instances" in which Russia had violated the neutrality of China, and declared that Japan was anxious to do nothing inconsistent with a loyal adhesion to her engagement concerning that neutrality. Count Cassini, Russian amb., to Mr. Hay, Sec. of State, Jan. 13, 1905, MS. Notes from Russia; Mr. Hay, Sec. of State, to Mr. Coolidge, charge at Peking. Jan. 14, 1905,MS. Inst. China, VII. 21; Mr. Hay to Count Cassini, No. 253, Jan. 17, 1905, MS. Notes to Russia, VIII. 454; Count Cassini to Mr. Hay, Jan. 18, 1905, MS. Notes from Russia; Mr. Hay to Count Cassini, No. 254, Jan. 23, 1905, MS. Notes to Russia, VIII. 456; translation of telegram from the Waiwu Pu, Peking, to Chinese Minister Liang, Jan. 21, 1905, handed by Minister Liang to Mr. Hay, Jan. 23, 1905, MS. Notes from China; telegram from Baron Komura to Mr. Takahira, handed by the latter to Mr. Hay, Jan. 28, 1905, MS. Notes from Japan. By the treaty of peace, signed at Portsmouth, Aug. 23/Sept. 5, 1905, Japan and Russia mutually engage (Art. II.) " to evacuate completely and simultaneously Manchuria, except the territory affected by the lease of the Liao-tung Peninsula," the evacuation to begin immediately after the treaty becomes operative and to be completed within 18 months; but they reserve the right to maintain guards, not to exceed fifteen per kilometer, to protect their respective railway lines. They also engage to restore to China the exclusive administration of the places to be evacuated, and disavow the possession in Manchuria of "any territorial advantages or preferential or exclusive concessions to the impairment of Chinese sovereignty or inconsistent with the principle of equal opportunity;" and promise "not to obstruct any general measures common to all countries which China may take for the development of the commerce or industry of Manchuria." Russia transfers (Art. V.) to Japan the lease of Port Arthur and the Liao-tung Peninsula, and also (Art. VI.) the railway between Chang-chun-fu and Kuan-chang-tsu and Port Arthur, and the appurtenant coal mines. Apart from this railway, Russia and Japan engage (Art. VII.) to use their railways in Manchuria exclusively for commercial and industrial and not for strategic purposes. Hishida, The International Position of Japan as a Great Power, 275–277. X. COLOMBIA. § 814. As to the Isthmus of Panama, see supra, §§ 337-350. By a fundamental law" of July 12, 1821, or, as some say, by an act of December 17, 1819, a union was formed between New Granada and Venezuela under the name of the Republic of Colombia. In 1829-1831 this republic was dismembered, and from it arose the three republics of New Granada, Venezuela, and Ecuador. By a treaty of December 23, 1834, the respective liabilities of these republics upon the obligations of the former Republic of Colombia was determined. In 1862 New Granada became the United States of Colombia, and later, by the constitution of August 4, 1886, the Republic of Colombia. Moore, Int. Arbitrations, IV. 3494, 3526-3527; 19 Br. & For. State Pap. 1350-1357; For. Rel. 1886, 176; Mr. Marcy, Sec. of State, to Mr. Green, Feb. 3, 1854, MS. Inst. Columbia. As to the Republic of Panama, see supra, § 344. As to the treaty between the United States and New Granada of 1846 For a history of the diplomatic relations between the United States and Concerning trade on the San Blas coast, see For. Rel. 1890, 239, 241, 245, As to the Weckbecker claim and its settlement, see For. Rel. 1894, 193, 195. Panama, see Mr. Moore, Act. Sec. of State, to Mr. Lincoln, min. to The board of commissioners, under the treaty between the three States formerly composing the Republic of Colombia, denied that that treaty authorized them to consider the claims of citizens of the United States. This decision was altogether unexpected to the United States, since it was understood that certain articles of the treaty, which were inserted at the instance of Mr. McAfee, the diplomatic representative of the United States in Colombia, were expressly designed to confer such power. With reference to this condition of things, the Department of State said: "This government never deemed itself bound to wait for the completion of such arrangements as those States proposed to make among themselves for the adjustment of the debts of Colombia. Upon the dissolution of that confederacy, its members became and have been informed that we held them jointly and severally liable for our claims, but rather than urge them upon the individual States in a way that might be inconvenient to them, it was thought best to suspend further diplomatic recourse in regard to them and to direct the chargé d'affaires at Bogotá to present them as an informal agent to the board of commissioners, as you have done. Strictly speaking, it was the duty of the individual claimants to have. appointed private agents to advocate their interests before the board of commissioners. With this view, upon the receipt at this Department of a copy of the convention, a notice, embracing a summary of its contents, was published in the Globe. If that board should have failed to make a just disposition of the claims, it would then have been the duty as it was the intention of this government to seek satisfaction from the individual States through the ordinary diplomatic channel. Consequently, as the time for the presentation of claims to the board may have expired before this letter can reach you, we must proceed to make a demand on the separate states. You will therefore avail yourself of the first convenient opportunity to inform the government of New Granada of this determination. You will state that in consideration of the forbearance of this government and especially of the patience with which it waited for the ratification of the convention between those states and that the just claims of our citizens have not been acknowledged by the board of commissioners, it has good reason to expect that the several states of which the Colombian Confederacy was composed will use all practicable diligence towards examining those claims and deciding upon their merits. That for whatever sums may be allowed to be due, the United States will be willing to exonerate those governments from all further accountability in any particular case, upon the payment of their proportions, according to the convention adverted to. An informal agreement with the minister of foreign affairs like that concluded by Mr. Moore in the cases of the Josephine and Ranger would be sufficient for us, but in case the |