little was imported, and loud complaints were heard, especially on the part of the official classes, with fixed and limited incomes, as to the effect of the treaties. In these circumstances the Japanese govern.ment sought the postponement for a year of the exercise by the citizens and subjects of the treaty powers of the right, which they were to possess after January 1, 1862, to reside in Yeddo for purposes of trade, lest it might be impossible to protect them in the enjoyment of the privilege. Mr. Harris seconded, with the concurrence of the English and French ministers, the Japanese government's wishes. No decision had been reached by the government of the United States when news was received of the assassination on the night of January 15, 1861, of Mr. Heusken, secretary to the American legation, without other cause than the fact of his being a foreigner. The Japanese government appeared to be unable to bring the offenders to punishment. Apprehensive lest any concession might encourage the party opposed to the execution of the treaties and render the position of foreigners in Japan still more insecure, the government of the United States not only announced the opinion that no postponement of the opening of Yeddo ought to be granted, but also proposed to the governments of the treaty powers a plan of cooperation which was to be embodied in an informal convention. Under this plan the diplomatic or consular representatives of the treaty powers were to address to the Japanese government a joint note expressive of the determination of their governments to require the fulfilment of all the stipulations of the treaties, and, if the reply of Japan should be unfavorable or evasive, the powers were then to employ such force as might be necessary. Attention was at the same time called to the circumstance that the assent of Congress was requisite to the commencement of hostilities against a foreign power by the United States. But before any definite action was taken on these proposals a despatch was received from Mr. Harris, under date of May 8, 1861, enclosing communications from the Tycoon of Japan to the President of the United States and from the Japanese ministers for foreign affairs to the Secretary of State. The communications of the Tycoon and his ministers strongly urged the postponement of the opening of the cities of Yeddo and Osaka and the harbors of Hiogo and Nee-egata; and Mr. Harris suggested that discretionary power should be given to himself to act, in concert with his colleagues, in such manner as he might deem most advisable. The government of the United States reconsidered its plan for a naval demonstration, chiefly out of deference to Mr. Harris's judgment, and conferred upon him the discretion which he solicited, at the same time insisting that he should not, except in the extremest necessity, consent to any postponement of any covenant in the treaty without first receiving satisfaction of some marked kind for the assassination of Mr. Heusken. The form and mode of that satisfaction were left to Mr. Harris's discretion. When Mr. Harris received these instructions he advised the Japanese government of their purport, and effected a settlement of the case of Mr. Heusken. The Japanese government promised to use every effort to bring the assassins to justice, and paid the sum of $10,000 for the use of the victim's widowed mother, who was dependent upon him for support. It was expressly understood that the payment of this sum should not in any way release the Japanese government from its obligation to bring the murderers of Mr. Heusken to punish ment. Mr. Harris, min. to Japan, to Mr. Cass, Sec. of State, No. 26, Aug. 1, 1860, Dip. Cor. 1862, 793; Mr. Harris to the Secretary of State, No. 20, May 8, 1861, id. 794; Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Harris, No. 17, July 23, 1861, id. 813; same to same, No. 18, Aug. 1, 1861, id. 814; same to same, No. 20, Oct. 7, 1861, id. 816; Mr. Harris to Mr. Seward, No. 50, Nov. 27, 1861, id. 806. For Mr. Seward's proposal of a joint naval demonstration, see his note For the form of the proposed convention or joint note relative to a joint For the Japanese record of Harris's reception, see For. Rel. 1879, 620. On the night of July 5, 1861, an attack was made on the British legation at Yeddo. Mr. Alcock, the British minister, escaped uninjured, but Mr. Oliphant, secretary of legation, and Mr. Morrison, consul for Nagasaki, were wounded. The attack seems to have been in some measure due to a feeling of dislike to the English, and in particular to the British minister; but Mr. Harris, in reporting the incident, said that it was not to be concealed that he himself, in common with his colleague, was "subject to the same unpopularity that attaches to the presence of all foreigners in Japan." Mr. Harris's successor, Mr. Pruyn, was instructed to "seek no exclusive advantages," but to consult freely with his colleagues on all subjects, with a view to maintain the prestige of Western civilization in Yeddo. 66 The antiforeign feeling continued, and in June, 1862, another attack was made on the guards of the British legation. The British chargé d'affaires withdrew from Yeddo to Yokohama, and, with the return of the Dutch consul-general to Nagasaki, Mr. Pruyn was the only minister resident left in Yeddo. The antiforeign agitation continued; all the foreign legations were threatened with attack, and individual foreigners were subjected to personal violence sometimes resulting in their death. On the morning of May 24, 1863, the American legation was burned. Mr. Pruyn stated that he desired to believe that the fire was purely accidental, although for months attempts had been made to induce him to leave Yeddo. On the 31st of June, he retired to Yokohama. Before this incident occurred, Mr. Pruyn was instructed on June 18, 1863, to "cooperate with the representatives of the other treaty powers" in any difficulties that might arise, and was informed that the U. S. S. Wyoming would obey his orders. The situation was fully reviewed by Mr. Seward in instructions to Mr. Pruyn of July 7 and 10, and September 1, 1863. These instructions enjoined the importance of “concert and unity among the treaty powers,” in “the common interests of civilization and humanity," unobstructed by jealousy or suspicion, or unkind debate of any sort." It appeared that the British legation had demanded indemnities before a certain date on pain of hostilities, and that the French naval forces were prepared to act in concert with the English. It was apprehended, however, that, if the government should conclude to grant the indemnities, a civil war was likely to break out under the auspices of the Mikado and a combination of daimios hostile to the foreign policy of the Tycoon. In these circumstances, Mr. Pruyn was directed to exert his "whole moral influence" to preserve peace between the other treaty powers and Japan, on the basis if necessary of a compliance by the latter with the terms prescribed by the powers, since it was not doubted that those terms would be formulated simply with a view to the necessary security of foreigners of all nations. As to the injuries suffered by Americans, if the Japanese should grant adequate indemnities and guarantee the safety of American residents, the Wyoming was not to commit any hostile act against the Japanese government or power. But if, on the contrary, it should seem to Mr. Pruyn to be necessary "for the Wyoming to use her guns, for the safety of the legation or of Americans residing in Japan, then her commander will employ all necessary force for that purpose." The prime objects of the United States were declared to be: "First, to deserve and win the confidence of the Japanese government and people, if possible, with a view to the common interest of all the treaty powers; secondly, to sustain and cooperate with the legations of those powers, in good faith, so as to render their efforts to the same end effective." When news was received at Washington of the burning of the American legation, Mr. Pruyn was instructed to demand of the government of the Tycoon the prompt payment of an indemnity, the exertion of diligence to discover and punish the incendiaries, the permanent reestablishment and guaranteed safety of the legation at Yeddo, and the full observance of the treaties between the two countries. He was to employ the naval forces at his command for the protection of the legation and of American citizens under all circumstances, and to inform the government of the Tycoon that additional forces would be sent, as occasion should arise, to maintain the demands of the United States. Mr. Harris, min. to Japan, to Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, No. 28, July 9, 1861, Dip. Cor. 1861, 421; Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Pruyn, No. 2, Nov. 15, 1861, Dip. Cor. 1862, 817; same to same, No. 42, June 29, 1863, Dip. Cor. 1863, II. 1033; same to same, No. 43, July 7, 1863, id. 1037; same to same, No. 45, July 10, 1863, id. 1039; same to same, No. 46, Sept. 1, 1863, id. 1057; same to same, No. 47, Sept. 9, 1863, id. 1059. See, also, Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Welles, Sec. of Navy, July 14, 1863, 61 MS. Dom. Let. 204. As to the attack on the American merchant ship Pembroke by the Prince of Nagato, see Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Pruyn, No. 50, Oct. 3, 1863, Dip. Cor. 1863, II. 1060, acknowledging the receipt of Mr. Pruyn's despatches Nos. 48 and 49, of July 24, and No. 50, of July 25, 1863, printed in the same volume. In this instruction Mr. Seward said: "You will, in all cases, hold the claims of this government and of citizens of the United States distinct and separate from those of other governments and subjects of other powers. But this separation will not be expected to restrain you from acting with your colleagues, and giving them your moral support; and when there is need, with reference to common defence, or to save a common right, or secure a common object, just and lawful in itself, the naval forces of the United States will be expected to cooperate with those of the other Western powers." See further, as to the case of the Pembroke, supra, § 1093. As to building ships of war for Japan, see S. Ex. Doc. 33, 37 Cong. 3 sess. 5. AFFAIR OF SHIMONOSEKI. As the treaties were made by the Tycoon's government, they were not recognized by the partisans of the Mikado. Chief among these was the Prince of Chosu, ruler of the provinces of Sueoo and Nagato. He had possession of the fortifications commanding the straits of Shimonoseki, and also had with him the person of the Mikado, and, refusing to recognize the validity of the treaties concluded by the Tycoon, he closed the passage to the inland sea. At the request of the Tycoon's government, naval forces of the United States, Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands jointly proceeded to open the straits by force. On the 4th to the 8th of September, inclusive, 1864, they destroyed the batteries commanding the straits, blew up the magazines, threw the shot and shell into the sea, carried away seventy cannon, and obtained the unconditional surrender of the prince, with an agreement on his part to pay the expenses of the expedition. The ratification of the treaties by the Mikado and the firm establishment of the foreign policy of the Tycoon speedily followed. The government of the Tycoon, preferring to assume the expenses of the expedition, entered into a convention October 22, 1864, and agreed to pay to the governments of the United States, Great Britain, France, and Holland the sum of $3,000,000. It so happened that no vessel in the naval service of the United States then in Japanese waters was in a condition to take part in the expedition, and the steamer Takiang was chartered for the service and was manned with a crew of eighteen persons from the U. S. S. Jamestown, who, with her own crew of forty, made a crew of fifty-eight in all. The mode of dividing the indemnity between the four participating powers was discussed at Paris in 1865, and it was finally decided that, to mark the high estimate placed upon the united action of all the powers then represented in Japan, the indemnity should be divided among the four governments in equal shares, without regard to the actual material force contributed by each to the expedition. The proceedings of the treaty powers in this instance were not intended nor considered as an act of interference in the political affairs of Japan. Their object was the enforcement of treaty rights, with the approval of the government that granted them; and the effect which the expedition may have had on the fortunes of parties in Japan was purely incidental. In the subsequent revolution which led to the fall of the Shogunate and the restoration of the imperial authority under the Mikado, the foreign powers declared their neutrality. The only wish of the United States was for the establishment and maintenance of a strong central government by which the treaties might be enforced and the native autonomy preserved. S. Ex. Doc. 58, 41 Cong. 2 sess.; Dip. Cor. 1864, III. 553, 579, 581, 584. the convention of October 22, 1864, amounted to $785,000. The |