Second and this is equally as important

the concession we made to Panama not to build a canal in any other Central American country is of no practical consequence because Panama is the only place it makes any sense to build a canal in any

case.

The Canal Study Commission initially examined 30 possible routes, one or more of which would have traversed Mexico, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, and Colombia. This field was then narrowed to 8 routes the only ones the Commission judged sufficiently feasible to warrant in-depth investigation. Of these 8 routes, 4 were entirely within Panama, and a fifth was partially within Panama. One of the 4 routes outside Panama involved construction of a lock (not a sea-level) canal, and was studied only for comparative purposes.

The remaining 3 non-Panamanian routes were:

Route 8 in Nicaragua and Costa Rica

Route 23 in Panama and Colombia

Route 25 in Colombia

Of these 3, routes 8 and 23 were eliminated by the Commission because they required excessive excavation. They were also longer, considerably more costly, and located in areas where no harbors to accommodate deep draft vessels were available.

The third non-Panamanian route, No. 25 through Colombia, was selected by the Commission as feasible only if nuclear excavation were employed. Otherwise it would be prohibitively expensive. But the Commission also rejected nuclear excavation as both technically and politically unacceptable. Consequently, they also rejected Route 25 as not viable.

Of the remaining 4 Panamanian routes, the Commission narrowed its choice to Routes 10 and 14, giving first nod to Route 10. (See Map 4.) This preferred route involves relatively small excavation quantities; retains the full Panama Canal capability at minimum risk during construction and for as long as desired after construction; and has good supporting facilities available. It lies approximately 10 miles west of the existing canal, just outside the present Canal Zone. Construction of a canal on Route 10 would not require a shift in Panama's metropolitan centers.

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SUMMARY

Taken together, the military and foreign policy values, the savings from retaining existing energy delivery infrastructures, and the reduced transportation costs of a sealevel canal would appear to justify such a project even in the absence of strict financial feasibility, which, as we have seen, is not itself obviously lacking. But there is even one further advantage of a sea-level canal. It has the potential of defusing the controversy over the present canal.

The United States perhaps in conjunction with other interested parties such as the State of Alaska, the international oil companies, Japan, Mexico, Venezuela, and countries on the west coast of South America - could guarantee the bonds to finance a new sea-level canal fully owned and operated by the Panamanians. It would be strictly a business arrangement with a Panamanian guarantee of access and reasonable tariffs as the only quid pro quo. This would provide Panama the economic control over her resources she demands, and would at the same time defuse the present controversy. The United States, for her part, would obtain the economic advantages already pointed out, and would achieve her ultimate goal of a defensible canal available to all at reasonable rates.

These advantages which would accrue to the United States through construction of a sea-level canal make it well worth our while to maintain the good will of the Panamanians, which I feel certain can be done if we ratify the treaties now before us.