legal, the other extra-constitutional and largely beyond adequate control by law. SUPPLEMENTARY READINGS P. O. Ray, An Introduction to Political Parties and Practical Politics (Revised Edition), (Charles Scribner's Sons, 1917). A concise volume on party organization and party methods. M. OSTROGORSKI, Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties, Vol. II (The Macmillan Company, 1908). The historical development of the American party system, with a keen analysis of the accompanying evils. JAMES BRYCE, The American Commonwealth (Revised Edition), Vol. II, Part III (The Macmillan Company, 1910). An excellent description of parties and the party system of the latter part of the nineteenth century. C. A. BEARD, American Government and Politics (Third Edition), (The Macmillan Company, 1920). Chaps. VI and VII give a good background for study of modern party problems. See also Chap. XXIII for "Popular Control Through the Ballot." HERBERT CROLY, Marcus Alonzo Hanna, His Life and Work, Chaps. XI-XVI (The Macmillan Company, 1912), BEN B. LINDSEY and HARVEY J. HIGGINS, The Beast (Doubleday, Page & Co., 1910), and T. C. PLATT, Autobiography of Senator Platt (McClure's, 1910), Vol. XXXV, p. 423 ff. Should be consulted for impressions of the political machine at work. R. S. CHILDS, Short Ballot Principles (Houghton Mifflin Company, 1911). Bulletins for the Constitutional Convention, Massachusetts, 1917–18. No. 10, The Short Ballot; No. 23, Absent Voting; No. 24, "Public Administration and Partisan Politics," in the Annals of the An examination of the presidential primary at work with proposals of reform. -The Direct Primary in New Jersey, 1917. ARTHUR N. HOLCOMBE, State Government in the United States, Chaps. VI-VIII (The Macmillan Company, 1916). An excellent account of political parties in state governments. Secure publications of the Short Ballot Organization, and the Proportional Representation League. CHAPTER III THE MERIT SYSTEM AND PUBLIC CONTROL OF GOVERNMENT GOOD GOVERNMENT AND EFFICIENT PUBLIC SERVANTS1 ONE of the requirements for successful and efficient government is the selection of officials of good character and special qualifications for the public service. Whenever the offices are filled by men of high character and ability the government is likely to be conducted with a high degree of success. Such was the case when the Roman Senate in the days of the Republic was composed of men of unusual integrity and administrative ability. On the other hand, government is likely to be weak and inefficient when favoritism, influence, and corruption dominate political life. Such was the case with the monarchs of the old regime in France, who were thrust aside when the wave of revolution spread in 1789. Too little attention has been given to the ways and methods of recruiting the public service, and particularly is this true of the United States, where the doctrine "to the victor belong the spoils,' along with the principle of the rotation in office, has dominated political practice. One of the most difficult problems for democratic government centers around the patronage and the spoils of office, which are an outgrowth of the American party system. It remains for American democracy to learn the lesson of efficient administration from European nations and to adapt such administration to the theories and principles of popular government. 1 Secure: Annual Proceedings of the National Civil Service Reform League, Annual Report of the United States Civil Service Commission (Washington, D. C.), Annual Reports of State and City Civil Service Commissions, especially of Massachusetts, Illinois, Wisconsin, New York, and Ohio. Public offices are filled by one of three methods-by appointment, by election, or by selection through a merit system involving some form of competition. Prior to the nineteenth century the method of appointment was commonly pursued. With the advent of popular control of government, elections were introduced to fill many offices. Difficulties in securing competent public servants either by appointment, which results frequently in rewarding favorites, relatives, or personal friends, or by the elective system, which often brings into office politicians rather than competent officials, led to the introduction of the merit system based on competition. During the latter part of the nineteenth century the merit system was greatly extended. It has been difficult to reconcile the principles of the merit system, involving service during a period of efficiency and good behavior, with some of the early theories of popular government and democracy. This reconciliation has been made, however, and the merit system has had a promising development in countries where popular government prevails. In the development of democratic government, a distinction has been drawn between (a) political offices to be filled by election and (b) administrative offices to be filled chiefly by appointment on some basis of merit. In all government in which the people have any voice, there are policies to be decided and issues to be determined on which the popular will must be considered and in which the people should exercise control. Such matters as high or low taxes, good or bad roads, prohibition or saloons, are questions on which the popular verdict may well be expressed. For this purpose, certain offices are regarded as of a political nature, and these offices are usually the channel through which the public will and popular sentiment may prevail. On the other hand, there are in the management of government many details of administration which can be understood only by experience and for the performance of which certain qualifications and training are necessary. For these administrative positions the most effective service can be secured only through the selection of appointees on a basis of merit and promotion as a result of proved ability, with the assurance of permanence of tenure. In the words of Chief Justice Ryan, "where you want skill you must appoint; where you want representation elect." While certain political offices ought always to be filled by election, and while the popular will should be made to prevail through these public offices, the most difficult part of the problem is the method of recruiting the civil service in the large number of administrative positions in which political opinions ought to have little weight. The development of methods of recruiting the civil service in the United States will be briefly reviewed, and the present civil service system will then be compared with those of England and France. CIVIL SERVICE AND THE SPOILS SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES Early Administrations.-The beginning of civil service in the United States under the administration of Washington followed certain principles which characterized the method of appointment under all of the first presidents. The chief thought of Washington was the fitness of the appointee to fill the desired position. Among the qualities of fitness Washington considered, first, the ability to perform the functions of the office; second, previous experience, preferably in some official capacity; third, established reputation. In the beginning little attention was paid to political opinions or party politics, but as the strife between the Federalists and the Republicans grew, the President gradually adopted the practice expressed in a letter to Pickering: I shall not, while I have the honor of administering the government, bring men into any office of consequence knowingly whose political tenets are adverse to the measures the general government is pursuing; for this, in my opinion, would be a sort of political suicide. Although partisan feeling became intense during the administration of President Adams and a few party removals were made, it may be said that the administration of public business bore a better relation to the business standards of the country under the Federalists than in any subsequent period; and while there were evidences of the beginning of the spcils system, this practice did not seriously affect the efficiency of the civil service. With the election of Thomas Jefferson, the Republican party came into power, and, with the majority of the offices manned by Federalists, it is not surprising to find considerable pressure to force removals and to bring about a change in the personnel of the public service so as to be more nearly in accord with the popular verdict at the polls. Jefferson, however, laid down the rule of efficiency as the standard on which appointments were to be made and acceded to the demands of the partisans to change only a few officers for political purposes. However, by a few removals and by a gradual change as the time of appointments expired, the character of the civil service was changed, so that in five years it was regarded as strongly Republican as it had been Federalist in 1801. Despite this change, Jefferson adhered strictly to the idea of fitness for office as an essential. And it is generally conceded that the character of the civil service was not very seriously changed. With the Republican party in power and with most of the offices filled by Republicans, few changes in the civil service were made during the administrations of Madison and Monroe. The first specific change in the Federal civil service came with the passage of the four-year law, which was enacted in 1820. This act fixed the term of four years, in place of the tenure at the pleasure of the President, for district attorneys, collectors of customs, naval officers, revenue officers, public-land agents, and pay |