My judgment is that the Governor should be ex-officio a member and presiding officer of this assembly, and that it should be permitted to meet in such frequent and regular or adjourned sessions as the exigencies of the public business may demand; that their terms of office be for four or six years and that they be paid salaries sufficient to justify them in devoting their entire time to the public business.1 Governor Hodges' suggestion proved too extreme, and although it occasioned much discussion it has not been favorably received. The plan submitted in Oregon in 1912 provided for a single house, of which the Governor and the minority candidates for the Governorship should be members with voting power proportionate to the votes they received as candidates. The movement for unicameral legislative bodies is thus summarized in the Illinois constitutional convention bulletin: In the United States and in the Australian Commonwealth all of the states have two-chambered legislatures. In Argentina the majority of the provinces (which correspond to our states) have the two-chambered system, but the others have single-chambered legislative bodies. In Germany before the war fifteen of the twenty-five states had singlechambered legislatures and most of the individual states of the LatinAmerican federations have but a single chamber. All the cantons of Switzerland which operate under the representative system have singlechambered bodies. In the Dominion of Canada only two of the nine provinces have two-chambered legislatures; and some countries which have two-chambered legislatures have such a relationship between the powers of the two legislative bodies that they practically amount to a single chamber. Since the Civil War there has been a decided tendency in all larger cities away from the two-chambered council, and the singlechambered legislative body for cities has pretty distinctly worked in a more satisfactory manner.2 The problem of the two-chambered legislature has been actively discussed in Great Britain and in other countries having a parliamentary system under which the government is managed by a Cabinet who are responsible to a popularly elected legislative body, and who resign when they lose the support of that body. It will be seen that the 1 Quoted in Illinois Constitutional Convention Bulletin, No. 8, p. 528. 2 Ibid., pp. 530-531. responsibility of such a governing group to two legislative bodies, each of which may be controlled at a particular time by different interests, would present difficulties. The tendency in all countries under a parliamentary system has been distinctly toward making the Cabinet, as a governing group, responsible to the larger and more popular of the two legislative bodies. This means that the other house has little influence upon measures of a political character. The experience of countries in which the single chamber has proved successful, along with the general criticism of our legislatures, has led to a movement for reform which argues for the single-chamber legislative body. Practically all of the advantages in favor of the bicameral system can be secured, it is contended, through a unicameral body. The arguments in favor of the bicameral system were that greater consideration would be given public measures, that evils and defects would be discovered through delay and further consideration, and that the two houses would result in a representation of the minority in the Senate and in a representation of the people, as a whole, in the lower house. It is seriously questioned, however, to-day whether the system of two houses has prevented hasty legislation, whether it has resulted in more care and consideration of measures, and, furthermore, whether it is advisable to have classes represented in legislative bodies. The defects of American legislative bodies which have become only too well known and which have called forth much deserved criticism and condemnation ought not to lead us to forget the large contributions to social and industrial reform which state and Federal legislative bodies have made during the last century. The many experiment stations, as James Bryce characterized our state governments, have been trying out all kinds of political and social reform. Out of failures have often evolved successful forms of organization or methods of administration which, when their efficacy was demonstrated in one state, have finally been adopted in other commonwealths. Bungling and cumbersome as many legislative methods seem, they have often produced results worthy of commendation. It is perhaps true, as has been suggested, that the Englishspeaking people can secure good government through poor political machinery. At any rate, the positive contributions of American legislative bodies add an interesting chapter to the evolution of social and political reform, an account of which does not fall within the scope of this volume. It remains to be determined whether a type of political machinery designed for the more simple and primitive conditions of a century ago can be made to function effectively under the complex conditions of to-day or whether the radical social and economic changes of a century require gradual political reorganization. SUPPLEMENTARY READINGS JOHN STUART MILL, Representative Government, Chap. V. P. S. REINSCH, American Legislatures and Legislative Methods (The Century Company, 1907). ARTHUR N. HOLCOMBE, State Government in the United States, Chap. IX, "The State Legislatures" (The Macmillan Company, 1916). H. W. Dodds, Procedure in State Legislatures, Supplement to the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Annals, May, 1918. C. L. JONES, Statute Law Making in the United States (Boston Book Company, 1912). "The Legislative Department," Illinois Constitutional Convention Bulletin, No. 8, Legislative Reference Bureau, Springfield, Illinois, 1920. Bulletins for the Constitutional Convention, Massachusetts, 1917-18, No. 9 No. 29 Biennial Elections and Legislative Sessions." "The Basis of the Apportionment of Representatives in No. 30 "The English System of Provisional Orders." CHAPTER V PROBLEMS OF EXECUTIVE ORGANIZATION AND DEFINITION AND SCOPE OF ADMINISTRATION THE term administration has been used in three different and rather distinct senses to designate, first, all of the powers and duties concerned with the execution of public policies; second, the exercise of these powers and duties; and, third, the body of officials or administrative personnel.1 The term is used more frequently in either the second or third meaning—that is, as to whether the emphasis is placed upon functions or upon the organization and personnel of the administrative branches of the government. European nations have given more definite meaning and significance to administration as a distinct branch of the government. The matters which have to do with the laws, rules, and regulations of government are of such significance in modern governments that the administration has been designated a separate branch of government.2 Administration as distinct from legislation involves, as Mr. Willoughby indicates, I. Problems of organization. 2. Problems of personnel. 3. Problems of material. 4. Problems of business practice and procedure. 1 See J. M. Mathews, Principles of State Administration (D. Appleton & Co., 1917), p. 3. 2 Cf. W. F. Willoughby, The Government of Modern States (The Century Company, 1919), chap. xvi, p. 385. The persons in charge of the execution of public policies are required, first, to ... determine the structural character or organization of the service or services by means of which the work of administration is to be performed. Secondly, they must make provision for the manning of this organization with a personnel and the determination of the conditions under which such personnel will give their services. Thirdly, they must provide for the material equipment required by this organization for the performance of its duties or fix the condition under which such material will be acquired. And, finally, decision has to be reached regarding the methods that will be employed in operating the services. These are all, it will be seen, matters purely of business administration.1 Where the distinction has been recognized between the policy-forming and the administrative agencies of government, it has been found necessary to subject the administration to control by the popular or policy-determining bodies. The different forms of control adopted are the popular or political control, the legislative, and the judicial. Popular control is always exercised to some extent through the agencies of public opinion. But popular control is rendered effective where provisions of constitutions or legislative acts, or both, are submitted to the electorate for approval. Where the offices are filled by election administrative officers are always subservient to public demands. Both the control and the supervision of the administration in the United States are exercised to a large extent by the legislature. But as the legislature cannot exercise this control in any direct and specific manner, it is necessary to provide within the administration itself methods of checking and supervising by means of accounts and reports so as to keep in constant touch with the work performed by those who have the immediate duty of putting laws into effect. The prime reason for the differences in the development of the practice and technic of administration is to 1 W. F. Willoughby, The Government of Modern States (The Century Company, 1919), p. 391. |