text of "patriotism," robber nations still walk abroad to murder and steal. To exert coercive force on his own initiative is no longer regarded as a rightful attribute of the individual, save in such rare emergencies as would be admitted in justification by the courts of law. Except in such emergencies also, as the enlightened judgment of the most of the world is coming to see, violence committed by one state upon another is no more susceptible of excuse. The reason is that the exertion of force works evil on both sides, no less to "the slayer than the slain," and if it can be admitted as warrantable in any case, it can only be for the sake of some ultimate good immeasurably outweighing the harm. "The whole realm of the possessive impulses," therefore, "and of the use of force to which they give rise, stands in need of control by a public neutral authority, in the interests of liberty no less than of justice. Within a nation, this public authority will naturally be the state; in relations between nations, if the present anarchy is to cease, it will have to be some international parliament. But the motive underlying the public control of men's possessive impulses should always be the increase of liberty, both by the prevention of private tyranny, and by the liberation of creative impulses. If public control is not to do more harm than good, it must be so exercised as to leave the utmost freedom of private initiative in all ways that do not involve the private use of force."

But turning to that which creates rather than acquires, which imagines but does not plot, which takes from none but gives to all, the interference

of the state should be for encouragement, and not for repression or control. "The creative impulses, unlike those that are possessive, are directed to ends in which one man's gain is not another man's loss. man's loss. The man who makes a scientific discovery or writes a poem is enriching others at the same time as himself. Any increase in knowledge or good-will is a gain to all who are affected by it, not only to the actual possessor. Those who feel the joy of life are a happiness to others as well as to themselves. Force cannot create such things, though it can destroy them; no principle of distributive justice applies to them, since the gain of each is the gain of all. For these reasons the creative part of a man's activity ought to be as free as possible from all public control, in order that it may remain spontaneous and full of vigor. The only function of the state in regard to this part of the individual life should be to do everything possible towards providing outlets and opportunities." Thus, for a practical example, the true object of education, our author holds, is not to make all men think alike, but to make each man think in the way that is the fullest expression of his own personality. Undoubtedly the state has the right to insist that the children shall be educated, but not that they shall be educated on a uniform plan and to a uniform extent, to the consequent repression of individual gifts and the production of a uniform mediocrity. So, young people should be as free as possible to choose those occupations which are most attractive to them and most likely to develop their individual capacities. For finally, "the problem

which faces the modern world is the combination of individual initiative with the increase in the scope and size of organizations. Unless it is solved, individuals will grow less and less full of life and vigor, more and more passively submissive to conditions imposed upon them. A society composed of such individuals cannot be progressive, or add much to the world's stock of mental and spiritual possessions."

"Organizing Democracy."

That the safety of democracy depends upon the organization of democracy, and that the reform most needed in the way of securing wholesome and efficient action in the organs of democracy is to give to the executive authority (not covertly or by mere force of custom, but by law) a powerful, if not predominant, influence in the initiation and control of legislation, is the theme of Professor Arthur N. Holcombe's suggestive article in The New Republic for July 7, 1917, under the above caption. Distrust of the state legislatures, both as to their ability and their motives, has been rife. It has been sought to limit their capacity for harm, now by shortening their sessions, now by taking the government of the municipalities out of their control, and again by giving the people the right of initiative and referendum. "But too much cannot be expected from changes that merely limit the power of the people's representatives. Representative government is not to be regarded as an evil, to be tolerated only within the narrowest

possible limits. Those states which have proceeded most consistently upon that theory have not secured the best governments. Restricting legislators to activity only once in four years or only forty days at a time is a remedy that would cure the disease by the killing of the patient. The goal of the reformer must be, not to prevent the legislatures from legislating badly, but to permit them to legislate well." Many state governors have advocated the adoption of an executive budget, the establishment of a cabinet system of government in the states, or other forms of centralization of the administrative functions of government. These projects have most generally been rejected by the legislatures, not unnaturally reluctant to see their powers lessened or their prerogatives abridged. So the people have turned to constitutional conventions, but there also the proposed reforms have met with but little success thus far.

Whether we have adhered too rigorously to the doctrine of the separation of powers, or whether we have failed to apprehend the real nature of representative government, Professor Holcombe says that "the people of a state are not wholly dependent upon any one set of representatives. They are represented by localities through the members of the legislature. They are represented as a whole by the chief executive, and in most states by the supreme court. The entire legislative power is not conferred upon any one of these sets of representatives. It is divided between them." Then why rely wholly or mainly upon the legislative assembly for the performance of what

is necessary and beneficial in the process of law-making? Why not utilize the power of the people's other representatives? "The most promising plan for the better organization of representative government," says Professor Holcombe, "is to give a larger share in the process of legislation to that part of the government which best represents the people as a whole. This part is not the legislature. It is not the judiciary. It is the executive. The governor, as state government stands today, has the strongest claim to the right to voice the general will of the people of the whole state." We might We might well profit by example. The best organized government in the world today, he thinks, is that of the French Republic, and the reason is found in the practical monopoly of the initiative in legislation which has been acquired by the executive branch of the government. England, Germany, and Switzerland he adds as examples of a similar though somewhat inferior procedure. (Eleven countries of LatinAmerica have by their constitutions bestowed the initiative in legislation upon the chief executive, and seven others upon the cabinet ministers or secretaries, though in a few a reservation is made as to laws relating to taxes and laws for the raising of armies. In Belgium, Denmark, Holland, Spain, and Sweden, the king, as an integral part of the legislative body, has the right of initiative, exercised of course. through his ministers. In Norway the constitution provides that every bill shall first be presented in the lower house of the legislature "either by one of its members or by the government

In

through a councilor of state." Japan the practice is much like that in England, though perhaps individual legislators have more freedom. "Both houses shall vote upon projects of law submitted to them by the government, and may respectively initiate projects of law.") So that our author's assertion is not too surprising, that "a practical executive monopoly of the initiative in legislation is to be found in all the great and well-governed countries. of the world, except our own."

To take away the right of initiative from the individual members of the legislature, and vest it exclusively in the governor, appears to be what Professor Holcombe would most approve. But he realizes that it is not practicable. A monopoly of any sort is abhorrent to the spirit of American institutions. No plan for setting up a new monopoly in legislation would be listened to. "But it is practicable to give the gov

ernor such a share in the initiation of legislation as will secure many of the advantages obtained in other countries by the practical monopoly which has been acquired by the executive. It is practicable to give him the right to introduce bills into the legislature and to appear in the halls of legislation and explain the purpose and propriety of his proposals, or to send others to speak for him. It is practicable to provide that he shall frame and introduce the bills for the appropriation of public money and to limit the right of ordinary members to introduce appropriation bills not sanctioned by the governor. Once the way has been prepared for more spirited executive leadership, capable executives can be trusted to

take advantage of their opportunity to make the general public interest predominate over the conflicting private and local interests in the legislatures." He turns hopefully to the constitutional convention in Massachusetts as a possible leader in the inauguration of a new era in state government. To the present time, that convention has not perfected a constitutional amendment dealing with this subject. But a plan which has been approved by the committee on the executive, and which is still pending, includes the following proposals: That the governor shall have authority to initiate and recommend bills to the legislature, which shall be known as 'executive bills," and which cannot be stifled in committees,

because they must be acted on in thirty days; that the governor shall have power to refer to the voters for final decision any executive bill which the legislature refuses to pass, and also any bill passed by the legislature over the governor's veto; that the governor and the heads of the state departments shall have the right to appear before either branch of the legislature, and to speak, though not to vote; that the legislature may require the governor or the heads of state departments to appear before either branch to furnish information; that the governor may return any bill passed by the legislature with specific suggestions for its amendment; and that he may veto particular items in bills.