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And Estates
Tail.
Co. Cop.
$ 53.
Rowden v.
Malster,

Cro. Car. 42.

ante, § 2.

3 Rep. 8 b.

manor, and the freehold remains in the lord; yet it is most usual to grant estates of this nature to the copyholder and his heirs; by which he acquires a customary estate in fee simple.

47. It was formerly much doubted whether the statute De Donis extended to copyholds, so as to convert what was formerly a conditional fee in a copyhold, into an estate tail. In a case which arose in 18 Ja. I. the question was, whether the surrender of a copyhold estate to a person and the heirs male of his body, there being no custom to warrant such an estate, gave the surrenderee an estate tail, or a con ditional fee.

It was held by Croke and two other justices, against the opinion of Yelverton, that the statute De Donis did not extend to copyholds; consequently that the surrenderee took a conditional fee.

48. This resolution appears contrary to the passage already cited from Littleton, where he expressly says 1 Inst. 60 b. that copyholds may be granted in tail. Lord Coke was of opinion that Littleton must be understood to speak only of such copyholds as might be entailed by the particular customs of the manors whereof they were held in which case, the statute De Donis cooperating with the custom, would give to such an estate all the qualities of an estate tail.

Erish v.
Reeves,
Cro. Eliz.
717.

1 Inst. 60 b.

49. Lord Coke also says, that although lands have anciently and usually been granted, by copy of courtroll, to many men and the heirs of their bodies, that would not prove a custom of entailing copyholds: for such grants might have created conditional fees. But if a remainder had been limited over after such an estate, and enjoyed; or if the issue had avoided the alienation of the ancestor; or recovered the same in a writ of formedon in the descender; these

and such like would be sufficient to prove a custom of entailing.

50. In a special verdict in 7 Ann. the question was whether a copyhold could be entailed, without laying a special custom for so doing; it was adjudged by the whole Court that it might. Lord Holt rejected the notion of Lord Coke about the statute De Donis co-operating with the custom: and held that that statute turned all conditional fees into estates tail. It has been the constant practice for the last century to limit copyholds to persons and the heirs of their bodies; and yet there is no case in which any doubt has arisen but that this was an estate tail within the statute De Donis.

Adams v.
11 Mod. 199.
Hincloe,

for Life.

51. Copyholds may also be granted for life, and And Estates in many manors the custom is to grant copyholds only for one, two, or three lives: in some of those manors the custom gives the copyholder a right to a renewal of the grant, upon the falling of the lives; from which Wharton they are called tenant right estates.

52. Where copyholds are granted for lives, the pays the fine takes the beneficial interest;

person who

v. King, infra, c. 4.

and the other persons named in the grant are trustees Tit. 12. c. 1. for him.

of Copy

Ven v.

53. It is laid down by Roll, that if a copyhold is No general granted to two persons for three lives, and the tenants Occupancy pur anter vie die, living the cestuis que vie, there shall holds. be no occupant, but the lord shall have the estate; Howell, for no one can gain a copyhold by occupancy, but 1 Roll Ab. by admission of the lord. Lord Holt has said, that 511. an occupancy is for supplying the freehold; but the 1000. freehold of a copyhold estate is in the lord, and the Zonch v. tenant has only an estate at will.

2 Ld. Raym.

Forse, infra.

54. There may however be a special occupancy of But special a copyhold. For Lord Chief Baron Gilbert, after ceupancy

VOL. I.

X

is allowed.

And Estates
Tail.
Co. Cop.
§ 53.
Rowden v.
Malster,

Cro. Car. 42.

ante, § 2.

1 Inst. 60 b.

3 Rep. 8 b. Erish v. Reeves, Cro. Eliz. 717.

1 Inst. 60 b.

manor, and the freehold remains in the lord; yet it is most usual to grant estates of this nature to the copyholder and his heirs; by which he acquires a customary estate in fee simple.

47. It was formerly much doubted whether the statute De Donis extended to copyholds, so as to convert what was formerly a conditional fee in a copyhold, into an estate tail. In a case which arose in 18 Ja. I. the question was, whether the surrender of a copyhold estate to a person and the heirs male of his body, there being no custom to warrant such an estate, gave the surrenderee an estate tail, or a conditional fee.

It was held by Croke and two other justices, against the opinion of Yelverton, that the statute De Donis did not extend to copyholds; consequently that the surrenderee took a conditional fee.

48. This resolution appears contrary to the passage already cited from Littleton, where he expressly says that copyholds may be granted in tail. Lord Coke was of opinion that Littleton must be understood to speak only of such copyholds as might be entailed by the particular customs of the manors whereof they were held in which case, the statute De Donis cooperating with the custom, would give to such an estate all the qualities of an estate tail.

49. Lord Coke also says, that although lands have anciently and usually been granted, by copy of courtroll, to many men and the heirs of their bodies, that would not prove a custom of entailing copyholds: for such grants might have created conditional fees. But if a remainder had been limited over after such an estate, and enjoyed; or if the issue had avoided the alienation of the ancestor; or recovered the same in a writ of formedon in the descender; these

and such like would be sufficient to prove a custom of entailing.

50. In a special verdict in 7 Ann. the question was whether a copyhold could be entailed, without laying a special custom for so doing; it was adjudged by the whole Court that it might. Lord Holt rejected the notion of Lord Coke about the statute De Donis co-operating with the custom: and held that that statute turned all conditional fees into estates tail. It has been the constant practice for the last century to limit copyholds to persons and the heirs of their bodies; and yet there is no case in which any doubt has arisen but that this was an estate tail within the statute De Donis.

Adams v.
Hincloe,
11 Mod. 199.

for Life.

51. Copyholds may also be granted for life, and And Estates in many manors the custom is to grant copyholds only for one, two, or three lives: in some of those manors the custom gives the copyholder a right to a renewal of the grant, upon the falling of the lives; from which Wharton they are called tenant right estates.

person who

v. King, infra, c. 4.

52. Where copyholds are granted for lives, the pays the fine takes the beneficial interest; and the other persons named in the grant are trustees Tit. 12. c. 1. for him.

holds.

V'en v.

Howell,

53. It is laid down by Roll, that if a copyhold is No general granted to two persons for three lives, and the tenants Occupancy of Copypur anter vie die, living the cestuis que vie, there shall be no occupant, but the lord shall have the estate; for no one can gain a copyhold by occupancy, but 1 Roll Ab. by admission of the lord. Lord Holt has said, that an occupancy is for supplying the freehold; but the freehold of a copyhold estate is in the lord, and the Zouch v. tenant has only an estate at will.

511.

2 Ld. Raym.

1000.

Forse, infra.

54. There may however be a special occupancy of But special a copyhold. For Lord Chief Baron Gilbert, after Occupancy VOL. I.

X

is allowed.

Ten. 326.

Doe v.
Martin,
2 Black. R.
1148.

Tit. 3. c. 1. $49.

Zouch v.
Forse,

7 East, 186.

citing the passage above stated from Roll's Ab., says, if the limitation had been to the tenants and their heirs during the lives of the cestuis que vie, the heir in such case would have the estate, not the lord; because he had excluded himself, and expressly granted the copyhold to the grantee and his heirs, during such a time. This doctrine has been confirmed in the following case.

55. Juliana Ramsey surrendered certain copyhold estates, to the use of Richard Tonson, his heirs and assigns, for her life; and he was admitted accordingly. Richard Tonson died in the lifetime of Juliana Ramsey; and the question was, whether his heir was entitled as special occupant ?

Lord Chief Justice De Grey said, that though in copyholds there could be no general occupant, since the freehold was never out of the lord, yet it did not follow there could be no special occupant, when the lord had expressly granted the estate to one and his heirs, during the life of A. B.; indeed the term of special occupant was in such case, and in all others, a very forced and improper phrase; and he thought there was great weight in what was said by Vaughan, 201.-that the heir took it as a descendible freehold. Such however was the language of the law. The Court was unanimously of opinion that the heir of Richard Tonson took as special occupant.

56. The statutes 29 Ch. II. and 14 Geo. II., which have been already stated, and by which estates pour auter vie are appropriated, where there is no special occupant, do not extend to copyholds.

57. A tenant pour auter vie of a copyhold died in the lifetime of the cestui que vie; his administrator was admitted, and brought an ejectment for the

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