Or which cannot take Effect. 56. In the same manner, where the whole of an estate is conveyed for particular purposes, or on parPrec. in Cha. ticular trusts only, which by accident or otherwise 162-541. 3 P. Wms. 20. Digby v. Legard, 3 P. Wms. 22. n. Ackroyd v. Smithson, 1 Bro. R. 503. 2d Edit. Exception. Hill v. Epis. 1 Atk. 618. cannot take effect, a trust will result to the original It was decreed by Lord Bathurst, that this was a resulting trust, as to the share of the person who died in the lifetime of the testatrix, for the benefit of the heir. 58. The rule, that where lands are devised for a particular purpose, what remains after that purpose is satisfied, results to the heir, admits of several exceptions. 59. R. Smith devised an advowson to Grace Smith, willing and desiring her to sell and dispose of the same to Eton College; and on their refusal, to Trinity College, Oxford, &c. Soon after the death of the testator, Grace Smith presented a person to the living; upon which the heirs at law of the testator filed their bill, praying that the Bishop might be enjoined from accepting the presentee of Grace Smith; insisting that the testator did not intend the then avoidance should go to Grace Smith; but that she ought to be considered altogether as a trustee for the heirs at law of the testator. Lord Hardwicke said, the general question was, whether there was a resulting trust or not: on the first hearing he inclined to think there was, but he had changed his opinion entirely. The general rule, that where lands were devised for a particular purpose, what remained resulted, admitted of several exceptions. If J. S. devised lands to A. to sell them to B. for the particular advantage of B., that advantage is the only purpose to be served, according to the intent of the testator; and to be satisfied by the mere act of selling, let the money go where it will. Yet there was no precedent of a resulting trust, in such a case. Nor was there any warrant from the words or intent of the testator to say, the devise severed the beneficial interest, but was only an injunction on the devisee to enjoy the thing devised in a particular manner. A. devised lands to J. S., to sell for the best price to B., or to lease for three years at such a fine; there was no resulting trust. So that the devise here amounted to no more than this: the testator gave the advowson to G. Smith; but if such or such a college would buy it, then he laid an injunction upon her to sell; King v. therefore there were two objects of the testator's Dennison, benevolence; Grace Smith, and the Colleges. If 1 Ves. & Beam. 260. is made. 60. Where a person makes a conveyance of the legal Where no estate to trustees, upon such trusts, and for such Appointment intents and purposes as he shall appoint, and never Fitzg. 223. makes an appointment, there will be a resulting trust to him and his heirs. For the trust in equity must Clere's Case, follow the rules of law in the case of a use. Tit. 11. c. 4. 61. It has been long settled, that where a trustee Renewal of a takes a renewal of a lease in his own name, the Lease by a renewed lease shall, in equity, be subject to the Trustee. former trust. H h 4 1 Cha. Ca. 191. This doctrine is founded on general policy, to pre 1 Vern. 276. vent fraud: for as the trustee's situation in respect to 484. Keech v. Blewett v. Millett, the estate, gives him access to the landlord, it would be dangerous to permit him to make use of that access for his own benefit. 62. A lease of the profits of Rumford market was devised to a trustee, in trust for an infant; before the expiration of the term, the trustee applied to the lessor for a renewal, for the benefit of the infant, which he refused; in regard that it being only the profits of a market, there could be no distress; and the only security for payment of the rent would be a covenant, which the infant could not enter into. The trustee then took a lease for his own benefit. It was decreed by Lord King, that the lease should be assigned to the infant: that the trustee should account for the profits, since the renewal, and be indemnified from the covenants in the lease. He said he must consider this as a trust for the infant; for if a trustee, on a refusal to renew, might have a lease to himself, few trust estates would be renewed 7 Bro. Parl. by the cestui que trust. That the trustee should rather have let it run out, than have taken a lease himself. It might seem hard that the trustee was the only per. son of all mankind who could not have the lease; but it was very proper that rule should be strictly pursued, and not in the least relaxed. For it was very obvious what would be the consequence of letting trustees take leases, on a refusal to renew to the cestui que trust. Ca. 367. Killick v. Flexney, 4 Bro. R. 161. James v. Dean, 11 Ves. 383. Fitzgibbon v. Scanlan, I Dow. 261. Or by a Person having a particular Estate. 63. This doctrine has been extended to the case of persons having only a particular and limited interest in a leasehold. Lee v. 64. Thus where a tenant for life of a crown lease, Taster v. Marriot, under a marriage settlement, got a reversionary Amb. 668. renewal of the lease; it was decreed by Sir T. Sewell, 734. M. R., that it should go to the uses of the settle- Vernon, ment; and the decree was affirmed by Lord 5 Bro. Parl. Camden. Ca. 10. 2 Atk. 150. 65. Where any fraud is committed in obtaining a Where there conveyance, the grantee in such conveyance will be is Fraud. considered in equity as a trustee for the person who has been defrauded. 66. It has been stated that the statute of uses does Trusts of Copyholds. not extend to copyhold estates: therefore if a copyhold is surrendered to A. to the use of B., the legal estate will not be transferred to B.; but he will be entitled in equity to the rents and profits, and to call upon A. for a surrender of the estate. 67. It appears to have been held in a modern case, Doe v. that copyholds are not within the seventh section of Danvers, 7 East, 299. the statute of frauds, for this applies only to cases where the legal and equitable estates are separated. But there may be a resulting or implied trust of a copyhold, as well as of a freehold estate. 1 Vern. 415. 68. Thus where copyhold estates are granted for Howe v. lives, the person who pays the consideration will be Howe, deemed the real owner; and the other persons Right v. whose names are inserted in the grant, trustees for Bawden, him. 3 East, 260. Drew, 1 P. Wms. 69. Copyhold lands were granted to husband and Benger v. wife, and J. S., for their several lives, successive; but by the copy it appeared that the fine was the money 780. of the husband and wife. Lord Macclesfield said, the third person (J. S.) was but a trustee for the husband and wife, by whom the purchase money was paid. Withers v. Sinith v. 1 Atk. 385. A Purchase in the Name of a Child is ment. 70. By the custom of the manor of A., copyholds were grantable for three lives, successivè sicut nominantur. One Price being the last life in an old copy, the lord of the manor advised him to renew; upon that he inquired after two healthy young persons, and named the defendants Harris and Bowles; a copy was granted, to hold to them successive. It also appeared on the copy, that the fine, which was 1201. was paid by Price; and that the defendants were strangers to Price. Lord Hardwicke was of opinion, that resulting trusts of copyholds, as well as of freeholds, were within the eighth section of the statute of frauds; therefore that the representatives of Price were entitled to the copyhold, by operation of law. 71. In a modern case the Court of King's Bench observed, that in the West it was usual, upon copyholds for lives, for the cestuis que trust to take, in the order in which they stood in the copy: but the person who put in the lives, and paid the fine, had a power to dispose of the estate. 72. Where a father purchases lands in the name of his infant child, without any declaration of trust, and an Advance- takes the profits during the minority of the child, such purchase will be considered in equity as an advancement of the child, and not as a trust for the Grey v. Grey, father. Because between a father and his child, 1 Cha. Ca. blood is a sufficient consideration to raise a use. And herein the law of trusts does, as it ought to do, agree with the law of uses. For if before the statute 27 Hen. VIII. a father had made a feoffment to his son, without any consideration, no use would have resulted to the father, because blood was a sufficient consideration to have vested the use in the son. Besides, as a father is bound by the law of nature to 296. Finch R. 341. |