Kingdom v. Back v. Andrews, Prec. in Cha. 1. 2 Vern. 120. No Trust Pilkington v. Bayley, 7 Bro. Parl. Ca. 383. Hutchins v. Lee, 1 Atk. 447. All Trusts are execu tory. Collect. Jur. 83. A married man purchased a walk in a chase, and took the patent to himself and his wife, and J. S. for their lives, and the life of the longest liver of them. Lord Chancellor Jefferies held that this should be presumed an advancement and provision for the wife; for she could not be a trustee for her husband. Decreed to the wife for life, and if J. S. should survive her, then to be a trust for the executors of the husband. It was held 84. A husband purchased a copyhold, to himself, his wife and daughter, and their heirs. to be an advancement, and not a trust. And that a mortgage by the husband should not bind the lands after his decease, in the lifetime of the wife and daughter. 85. There can be no resulting or implied trust between a lessor and lessee; because every lessee is a purchaser by his contract, and his covenants: which excludes all possibility of implying a trust for the lessor. Therefore, if in that case there be any trust at all, it must be declared in writing. 86. There may however be a resulting or implied trust between the assignor and assignee of a leasehold estate. 87. There formerly prevailed a distinction between trusts executed and executory. But it is said by Lord Hardwicke, in the case of Bagshaw v Spencer, that all trusts are in the notion of law executory, and to be executed by subpoena, as the old books speak. At common law every use was a trust; then came the statute 27 Hen. VIII. which executed the legal estate to the use, and conjoined them together. The statute mentions trusts, as well as uses; and a trust executed is, in strictness, now a legal estate: therefore, in order to bring it into the jurisdiction of the Chancery, it must be executory; that is, the essential part of the trust is, that the trustee is to 88. A distinction has however been frequently admitted between a trust, created without any reference to a farther execution of it, by a conveyance directed to be made; and a trust whose effect is referred to another conveyance, directed to be made for its final execution. Of which an account will be given hereafter. Tit. 32. c. 19. Tit. 38. Trustees. c. 14. 1 Ves. 453. 89. When trusts were first introduced, it was held Who may be that none but those who were capable of being seised to a use, could be trustees. This has been altered; and it is now settled, that the king may be a trustee; but the remedy against him is in the Court of Exchequer. 3 Comm. 428. 90. A corporation may be a trustee, not only for Mayor of Coits own members, but also for third persons. And of ventry v. Att. Gen. 7 Bro. Parl Ca. 235. where a corporation is a trustee, the Court Chancery has the same jurisdiction over it, as over 46. a private person. 2 Ves. Jun. 91. When once a trust is sufficiently created, it 1 Ves. 408. will fasten itself on the estate. Therefore if a con Bennet v. veyance or devise, by which a trust is created, becomes void by the incapacity or death of the grantee or devisee; still the Court of Chancery will decree the trust to be carried into execution. The relief is administered by considering the land, in whatever person vested, as bound by the trust; and compelling the heir, or other person having the legal estate, to perform it. 92. A person devised lands to his daughter, a married woman, for her separate use. It was held that the husband should be a trustee for his wife. For as the testator had a power to devise the premises to trustees for the separate use of his wife, the Court of Chancery, in compliance with his declared intention, would supply the want of them. 93. An estate was devised to the Clock Makers Company, upon certain trusts. Decreed, that though 1 Bro. R. 81. the devise was void, the Clock Makers Company not Tit. 38. c. 2. being capable of taking, yet that the trust was sufficiently created to fasten itself upon any estate the law might raise; therefore that the heir at law was a trustee for the uses of the will. Sonley v. Clock Makers TITLE XII. TRUST. CHAPTER II. Of the Rules by which Trust Estates of Freehold are governed. 1. A Trust is equivalent to the legal Ownership. 5. Trusts are alienable. 8. Devisable and descendible. 10. And also limited for life. 25. Subject to Forfeiture for 27. But not for Felony. 35. Merge in the Legal Estate. 40. Where a Reconveyance will WE SECTION 1. E have seen that trust estates owe their origin A Trust is to the strict construction given by the conrts equivalent to the legal of law to the statute of uses; in consequence of which Ownership. the Court of Chancery interposed its authority. But in the exercise of this jurisdiction, the inconveniences with which uses were attended have been avoided; for although the court first laid it down that a trust, being in fact a use not executed by the statute, ought to be regulated by the rules which had been established respecting uses, before they were changed into legal estates; yet this was, in many instances, departed 1 Ves. 357. from; it being found much more convenient to consider a trust estate as equivalent to the legal ownership; and to regulate it in the same manner as the legal estate. Burgess v. infra. 2. Lord Mansfield has laid it down that, in the consideration of a court of equity, the cestui que trust is actually and absolutely seised of the freehold. That the legal consequences of an actual seisin shall ensue it being a maxim that equity follows the law, Watts v.Ball, which was a safe, as well as a fixed principle; as it made the substantial rules of property certain and 1 Bro R. 271. uniform. And Lord Thurlow has said that, in many acts of parliament, an equitable estate was considered the same as if it were a legal estate. That the words, seised in law or in equity, in the qualification act, showed that the word seised was applicable to both. And that the word seisin extended to being seised in equity. Tit. 11. c. 2. $8. infra, c. 4. 1 Black R. 155. Tit. 30. Trusts are alienable. 3. A trust estate still however retains some few qualities of a use. Thus confidence in the person is necessary to the existence of a trust: so that even at this day if a trustee sells the land, for a valuable consideration, to a person who has no notice of the trust, the purchaser will not be compelled, in Chancery, to execute it. 4. As for privity of estate, it was formerly held to be as necessary, as confidence in the person. But this seems to be now altered; for Lord Mansfield has said, "that part of the old law which did not allow any relief to be given for or against any estates in the post, does not now bind, by its authority, in the case of trusts." It seems however to be understood, that a lord by escheat is not bound to execute a trust. 5. Any disposition of a trust estate by the cestui que trust was formerly binding on the trustees, in a court of equity. But it is enacted by the statute of frauds, § 9, "that all grants and assignments of any trust or confidence shall be in writing, signed by the |