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1851.

CORPORATIONS.

Art. XIII.

ARTICLE XIII.

CORPORATIONS.

SECTION 1. The general assembly shall pass no special act confer- Corporate powers. ring corporate powers.

For decisions holding statutes to be in conflict with this section, see Atkinson v. M. & C. R. Co., 15 O. S., 21; State v. Cincinnati, 20 O. S., 18; State v. Cincinnati, 23 O. S., 445; State v. Mitchell, 31 O. S., 592.

For decisions holding certain statutory provisions not to be in conflict with this section, see Foster v. Wood Co., 9 O. S., 540; Penn. & O. Canal Co. v. Portage Co., 27 O. S., 14; State v. Covington, 29 O. S., 102; Thorns v. Greenwood, 35 O. S., 000.

And see 6 of this article, note 2.

This section in its terms merely prohibits future special legislation conferring corporate powers, and does not, expressly nor by implication, abrogate former legislation of that character. Citizens' Bank v. Wright, 6. O. S., 318; State v. Roosa, 11 O. S., 16-25; State v. Union Tp., 80. S., 1 Debates, 260, 340-363, 447, 458; 2 Debates, 644-650, 654-659, 667, 675, 851, 863, 870.

394-400.

formed.

SEC. 2. Corporations may be formed under general laws; but all Corporations, how such laws may, from time to time, be altered or repealed.

On March 22, 1850, prior to the adoption of this Constitution, the general assembly passed a special act incorporating the Cincinnati, Lebanon and Xenia Railroad Company, authorizing commissioners therein named to open books, receive subscriptions to capital stock, and thereupon to organize a corporation under it. No steps were taken by the commissioners toward such subscription and organization until after this Constitution took effect, but such subscriptions were made and organization effected within the period limited by the special act for that purpose. Held: 1. That the special act was not abrogated or repealed by this section of the Constitution. 2. This section is prospective, and not retrospective, in its intent and application, conferring merely an authority to legislate, and does not repeal unaccepted acts of incorporation, enacted under the Constitution of 1802. State v. Roosa, 11 O. S., 16; C. W. & Z. R. R. Co. v. Com. of Clinton Co., 1 O. S., 77; Cass v. Dillon, 2 O. S., 607-623; Citizens' Bank v. Wright, 6 O. S., 318; State v. Van Horne, 7O. S., 327; State v. Union Tp., 8 O. S., 394-400; Com. of Knox Co. v. Nichols, 14 O. S., 260; Fosdick v. Perrysburg, Ib., 472.

Consolidated railroad companies organized in pursuance of the act of 1856 53 v. 143), are corporations formed under a general law within the meaning of this section, and as such are subject to the limitations and reservations contained therein, and in article I, section 2; and the general assembly may alter and regulate rates of fare chargeable by such companies. Shields v. State, 26 O. S., 86.

A county is not properly a corporation, but is at most but a local organization, which, for purposes of civil administration, is invested with a few functions characteristic of a corporate existence. C. W. & Z. R. R. Co. v. Com. of Clinton Co., 1 O. S., 77-89; Com. of Hamilton Co. v. Mighels, 7 O. S., 109; Hunter v. Com. of Mercer Co., 10 O. S., 520; State v. Cincinnati, 20 O. S., 18-37; Boalt v. Com. of Williams Co., 18 O., 13-16.

Where a corporation, in pursuance of an act of the legislature, transfers or conveys its franchise to be a corporation to others, the transaction, in legal effect, is a surrender or abandonment of its charter by the corporation, and a grant by the legislature of a similar charter to the transferees or purchasers; and the charter so granted is subject to all the provisions of the Constitution existing at the time it is so granted. State v. Sherman, 22 O. S., 411.

The act of April 4, 1863 60 v. 54, authorizing the purchasers of the property of a railroad company to acquire the franchise to be a corporation by deed from the company, is a general law within the meaning of this section of the Constitution." Ib.

I

But a deed made by such company to a corporation of another state, which corporation had become the assignee of property sold as contemplated in said act, without any new organization, or taking of stock, under the deed, or as a corporation of Ohio, does not constitute the foreign corporation, or its members, an Ohio corporation, and in so far as said act may assume to create them such, it is unconstitutional, for the reason that it does not secure the individual liability of the stockholders. Ib. 1 Debates, 260, 363-369, 458; 2 Debates, 644, 659-662, 675, 676, 851, 863, 870. SEC. 3. Dues from corporations shall be secured, by such individual Dues from corpoliability of the stockholders, and other means, as may be prescribed by cured. rations, how selaw; but, in all cases, each stockholder shall be liable, over and above the stock by him or her owned, and any amount unpaid thereon, to a further sum, at least equal in amount to such stock.

The legislature has no power, under the present Constitution of Ohio, to create corporations without securing the individual liability of their stockholders, at least to the minimum amount required by the Constitution; and if the act of incorporation does not secure this, either by express provision, or by requiring from the corporators or stockholders such acts, of organization or otherwise, as will subject them to the constitutional provision, the act will be unconstitutional and void. State v. Sherman, 22 O. S., 411.

The liability of individual stockholders is collateral to the principal obligation of the corporation, and is to be resorted to by the creditors only in case of the insolvency of the corporation, or where payment cannot be enforced against it by the ordinary process of execution. Wright v. McCormack, 17 O. S., 86.

This section is prospective in its intent and application. Citizens' Bank v. Wright, 6 O. S., 318; State v. Roosa, 11 O. S., 17.

1 Debates, 260, 369-385, 387-430, 433-443, 458; 2 Debates, 644, 667, 668, 676, 851, 863, 870. SEC. 4. The property of corporations, now existing or hereafter cre- Corporate propated, shall forever be subject to taxation, the same as the property of tax subject to individuals.

taxation.

Art. XIII.

Right of way.

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A corporate franchise, being a mere privilege or grant of authority by the government, is not property of any description, and consequently not subject to taxation. Exchange Bank v. Hines, 3 O. S., 1-8; Baker v. Cincinnati, 11 O. S., 534-540.

"There was no absolute necessity for this section, fo, without it, section two of article twelve would have embraced thes: corporations." Exchange Bank v. Hines, 3 O. S., 1-46-Thurman, J. 1 Debates, 260, 444, 458; 2 Debates, 659, 664-667, 676, 851, 863, 870.

SEC. 5. No right of way (1) shall be appropriated to the use of any corporation, (2) until full compensation (3) therefor be first made in money, or first secured by a deposit of money, (4) to the owner, irrespective of any benefit (5) from any improvement proposed by such corporation; which compensation shall be ascertained by a jury of twelve men, in a court of record, (6) as shall be prescribed by law. (7) (1) The general assembly possesses the constitutional power to confer upon a corporation authorized to construct a railroad, the right to appropriate grounds necessary for its use for a depot. Giesy v. C. W. & Z. R R. Co., 4 O. S., 308.

Where an incorporated company has, by its charter, authority to construct a road between given points, and to appropriate land to the width of sixty feet over which to locate the same, and, when finished, to charge and collect tolls from travelers who pass over it: Held, that after the company has made such an appropriation of land for the purpose of its road, and freeholders have, in accordance with, the provisions of the charter, ascertained and determined the owner's damage, it may, within the sixty feet of ground used for the road, build a toll-house and dig a well for the accommodation of the toll-gatherer. Ward v. Marietta and Newport Turnpike and

Bridge Co., 6 O. S., 15.

"Any other structure, within the sixty feet, and essential to the carrying out of the object sought by the corporators, and consonant with their charter, may, as an unavoidable and legitimate incident of the powers given them, be placed within the road limits." Ib., 17-Bowen, J. Under the general corporation act of 1852 (50 v. 274, 21, 27, 28), a railroad company has power to condemn land for new side tracks, leading from the main road to its depot buildings, whenever they become necessary in the proper management and operation of the road. Toledo and Wabash R. R. Co. v. Daniels, 16 O. S., 390.

Authority to lay down the necessary structure for a street railway, in a common highway or street, and to run cars thereon for the carriage of passengers for hire, may be lawfully granted to a company incorporated for that purpose, when no private right of the adjoining lot owners is thereby impaired. Street Railway v. Cumminsville, 14 O. S., 524.

A railroad company authorized to change the location of its track, on account of difficulty of construction and other causes, may do so at any time before the construction of its road is completed at the point where the change is made. Atkinson v. M. & C. R. R. Co., 15 O. S., 21. But having once located and constructed its road, the company can not re-locate it, and for that purpose appropriate private property. Io.; Moorehead v. L. M. R. R. Co., 17 O., 340.

So where the charter of a railroad company merely fixes a few points through which the road is to pass, from its commencement to its terminus, leaving the location of the road between the points specified to the discretion of the corporation, the railroad company having once located the road, their power to re-locate, and for that purpose to appropriate the property of an individual, has ceased. L. M. R. R. Co. v. Naylor, 2 O. S., 235.

The same principle applies, whether the case be that of an attempt to re-locate on the property of an individual, or that of using a street or highway for the purpose. Ib.

Grants of corporate power, being in derogation of common right, are to be strictly construedparticularly where the power claimed is a delegation of the sovereign power of eminent domain. Hence, where a railroad company is authorized by law only "to enter upon any land to survey, lay down and construct its road,' "to locate and construct branched roads from the main road to any town or places in the several counties through which the said road may pass, to appropriate land for "necessary side tracks," and "a right of way over adjacent lands sufficient to enable such company to construct and repair its road' ; and such company has located, and is engaged in the construction of its permanent main road along the north side of a town, it is not authorized to appropriate a temporary right of way, for the term of three years, along the south side of the town, to be used as a substitute for the main track while the same is in course of construction along the north side of the town. Currier v. M. & C. R. R. Co., 11 O. S., 228.

A railroad company organized under and made subject to the provisions of the "act regulating railroad companies," of February 11, 1848 (46 v. 40), is not authorized to condemn private property to its exclusive use solely for the purposes of a wharf. Iron R. R Co. v. Ironton, 19 O. S., 299.

The power given to municipal corporations to condemn private property for a public wharf is an express power; and the right of a railroad company to hold property exempt from the exercise of this power cannot be extended, by construction, to lands held by the company for uses and purposes for which it is not, by law, authorized to condemn private property. Ib.

(2) Corporate existence, and the right to exercise the power of eminent domain, can only be derived from legislative enactment; and before a company can demand a judgment of condemnation, it must show that both have been conferred upon it by a valid law, and that it has substantially complied with the conditions which the law has annexed to the exercise of the power. Atkinson v. M. & C. R. R. Co., 15 O. S, 21; A. & O. R. R. Co. v. Sullivant, 5 O. S., 276. A delegation of the power of eminent domain to a corporation as a necessary means to carry into effect the grant of its franchises, cannot be made the subject of either grant or sale. Coe v. C. P. & I. R. R. Co., 10 O. S., 372; Atkinson v. M. & C. R. R. Co., 15 O. S., 21-36. (But see Art. XIII, 2, note.)

(3) Where a piece or strip of land is, by appropriation made by a railroad company, severed from its connection with the other land of the owner, in estimating the compensation to be made to the owner, not only is the abstract value of the strip or piece taken to be considered, but also its relative value, and the effect arising from its severance from the residue of the owner's land, as well as the uses to which it is to be appropriated. C. & P. R. R. Co. v. Ball, 5 O. S., 569. Where a right of way originally appropriated for one public use is afterward taken for another, the owner of the fee simple title to the lands is entitled to recover a full and fair compensation for such additional burdens and inconveniences, not common to the general public, as accrue to him and his entire tract on which the easement is imposed, by reason of the change of uses to which the lands appropriated have been subjected. Hatch v. C. & I. R. R. Co., 18 O. S., 92.

The rightful power of a canal company over the canal, in the absence of any statute or contract to limit it, being exclusive, any use of the waters of the canal for purposes of navigation, or for watering stock by the owner of the fee simple of the lands intersected by it being a matter of sufferance and not of right, the loss of these conveniences by reason of the change of use,

1851.

CORPORATIONS.

Art. XIII.

whereby the canal-bed is transformed into the roadway of a railroad, does not constitute an element to be reckoned in estimating the amount of his compensation. Ib.

Nor is such owner entitled to recover damages on account of increased danger from fire to his buildings or other structures, by reason of such change of use, unless the proximity of his buildings, etc., to the railroad be such as to render the danger imminent and appreciable. Ib.

Where an entire tract of land is cut asunder by an appropriation of an easement upon it by a canal company, for the purpose of a canal; and this easement is afterward transferred by the canal company to a railroad company for the purpose of a railroad; and the latter, in the construction of its railroad, throws up embankments or excavates cuts across a common public highway, skirting the tract, and constituting the only convenient medium of access between the parcels into which the tract has been thus severed, the increased inconvenience and danger of access thus occasioned between the two parts of the tract are peculiar to the owner of the tract in the use of his property, not common to the public at large, and for this increase of inconvenience and danger, he is entitled to compensation. Ib.

See Art. 1, 19, Note 5.

(4) See Art. I, 19, Notes 5, 6.

5 The provisions of article one, section nineteen, and of this section-the one requiring compensation to be made without deduction for benefits, when property is applied to a public use, and the other providing for compensation irrespective of benefits, where it is taken by a corporation for a right of way-are, in legal effect, identical. When taken under either section, its fair market value in cash, at the time it is taken, must be paid to the owner; and the jury, in assessing the amount, have no right to consider or make use of the fact, that it has been increased in value by the proposal or construction of the improvement. Giesy v. C. W. & Z. R. R. Co., 4 O. S., 309.

In a proceeding by a railroad corporation for an appropriation of a right of way under the act of April 30, 1852 50 v. 201), the jury, after allowing for the full value of the land actually appropriated for the right of way, in view of all its uses and relations, without deductions for benefits of any kind, in their estimate and assessment of the incidental damages accruing to other lands of the owner, cannot legally take into consideration and make allowance for general benefits-or such as accrue to the community and vicinage at large-from the construction of the work proposed. Whether special benefits, or such as accrue directly or solely to the owner of the lands appropriated, may be taken into consideration and allowed for, quere. L. M. R. R. Co. v. Collet,

6 O. S., 182.

This question is answered in part by the following notes:

Where compensation is claimed for the location and construction of a railroad between coal mines and a navigable river on the land-owner's premises, whereby the conveniences of the river transportation for the coal to market were injured, or cut off, it is competent for the railroad company to show that the river transportation, in connection with the coal banks, had ceased to be valuable, or become of less value, by means of the facilities for coal transportation afforded by the railroad, for the purpose of reducing the damages. C. & P. R. R. Co. v. Ball, 5 O. S., 568. In case of a railroad appropriation for a right of way through a tract of land, causing incidental and local injury to the residue of the tract, although general resulting benefits from the railroad to the value of such residue of the land cannot be taken into account in estimating the amount of compensation to be paid the owner yet, where a local incidental benefit to the residue of the land is blended or connected, either in locality or subject matter, with a local incidental injury to such residue of the land, the benefit may be considered in fixing the compensation to be paid the owner, not by way of deduction from the compensation, but of showing the extent of the injury done the value of the residue of the land. b.

But in assessing the compensation for a local incidental injury to the residue of the owner's tract of land, arising from the appropriation of the right of way, and construction of a railroad, whether a local incidental benefit arising from the railroad structure to the residue of the tract, but not connected either in locality or subject matter with the injury, can be taken into the account in estimating the compensation for the damages, quere. Ib.

See Art. 1, 19, Note 8.

tice

6 "It had been held in Willyard v. Hamilton, 7 O., 2 pt., 115, that the value of property taken for public uses might rightfully be assessed by commissioners, it not being a case for trial by jury, secured by the Constitution, and that the proceeding need not be had in a court of jusAnd the reason why it was not secured by the Constitution was, that it had never been so regarded in England or this country prior to the adoption of that instrument. This course of proceeding by commissioners, had been much complained of as unjust and oppressive to the owner of the property; and to make at once a proceeding within the protection of the Constitution and to be pursued in a court of justice with a common law jury, this section was inserted, when the Constitution was revised. It intended to afford the party the same protection as in other cases of jury trial; no more and no less." Work v. State, 2 O. S., 296-307-Ranney, J. See Art. 1, 19, Note 7.

7. If a statute confer authority, as upon a company to construct works of public interest, or upon city authorities to improve streets, and provide the mode of rendering satisfaction or obtaining compensation, that mode must be followed. L. M. R. R. Co. v. Whitacre, 8 O. S., 590; Hueston v. E. & H. R. R. Co., 4 O. S., 685; Akron v. McComb, 18 O., 229.

But a rule of compensation and mode of ascertaining it, prescribed by a law passed prior to the adoption of the present Constitution, was abrogated by it and a new rule and mode of compensation thereby prescribed. Perrysburg C. & H. Co. v. Fitzgerald, 10 O. S., 513.

1 Debates, 260, 444-447, 458; 2 Debates, 644, 667, 668, 674-676, 841, 849-851, 863, 870.

Organization of

SEC. 6. The general assembly shall provide for the organization of cities, and incorporated villages, (1) by general laws, (2) and restrict cities, etc. their power of taxation, (3) assessment, (4) borrowing money, contracting debts and loaning their credit, so as to prevent the abuse of such power. (5)

I

The general act of May 3, 1852 50 v. 223, "to provide for the organization of cities and incorporated villages," did not annihilate and recreate the municipal corporations of the state, but recognized and contiued them, leaving their corporate identity unaffected. Fosdick v. Perrysburg, 14 0. S., 473

The power of creating municipal corporations necessarily implies authority to confer upon them such police powers as may be necessary for their internal government; and a resolution of a city council requiring lots, on which is stagnant water, to be filled up, being a reasonable sanitary measure for preserving the health of the inhabitants, is not in conflict with the Constitution. Bliss v. Kraus, 16 O. S., 54.

Art. XIII.

Associations with banking powers.

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Proceedings to annex contiguous territory to the corporate limits of a town, in pursuance of the fourteenth section of the act to provide for the organization of cities and incorporated villages (50 v. 223), are not in contravention of the provisions of the Constitution. Powers v. Com. of Wood Co., 8 O. S., 225; Blanchard v. Bissell, 11 O. S., 96.

(2) Under the restrictive and mandatory provisions of this and the first section of this article, the general assembly cannot, by a special act, confer additional powers on a corporation already existing; and in the purview and application of the provisions of these sections, there is no distinction between private and municipal corporations. State v. Cincinnati, 20 O. S., 18.

The act of April 16, 1870 (67 v. 141, "to prescribe the corporate limits of Cincinnati," is a special act. It assumes to confer upon the corporation of that city additional powers; to confer, on certain conditions, the power of municipal government, the power of police regulation, the power of judicial jurisdiction, and of assessment and taxation, over a number of outlying incorporated suburban villages and other territory not before within the limits of the city; and is therefore repugnant to the Constitution, and of no binding force and validity. lb.

(3) It is well settled in this state, by repeated adjudications, that, independent of constitutional prohibitions, it is within the legitimate scope of legislative power to authorize a city to aid in the construction of railroads or other public improvements in which such city has a special interest, and to impose taxes upon its citizens for that purpose. Walker v. Cincinnati, 21 O. S., 14; and see numerous authorities there cited.

It follows that it is equally competent for the legislature to authorize the entire construction of such improvements by a city having a special interest therein, and to empower the local authorities to provide means therefor by the taxation of its citizens. Ib.

Where the authority given is to construct a line of railroad, having one of its termini in such city, it does not affect the question of power, that the road when constructed will lie mainly outside of the State of Ohio. It is the corporate interest of the municipality which determines her right of taxation, and not the location of the road, which may well be constructed with the consent of the state into or through which it may pass. Ib.

Taxation can only be authorized for public purposes. Where, therefore, a statute authorizes a county, township, or municipality to levy taxes not above a given per cent. on the taxable property of the locality, for the purpose of building so much of a railroad as can be built for that amount, and the part of a railroad to be built can be of no public utility unless used to accomplish an unconstitutional purpose, such tax is illegal, and cannot be imposed. Taylor v. Com. of Ross Co., 22 O. S.

The power vested in the general assembly under this section to restrict the powers of taxation and assessment by municipal corporations is subject to the limitations imposed by article I, section 10, of the Constitution of the United States, which declares, that "no state shall pass any law impairing the obligations of contracts," and of article II, section 28, of the State Constitution. Goodale v. Fennell, 27 O. S., 426.

(4) Legislation authorizing cities and villages to levy special assessments for the purpose of improving streets, upon real property peculiarly and specially benefited, is not repugnant to the Constitution. And such assessment may be made upon property abutting on such streets, in proportion to the number of feet front abutting thereon. Bonsall v. Lebanon, 19 O., 418; Scovill v. Cleveland, 1 O. S., 126; Hill v. Higdon, 5 O. S., 243; Marion v. Epler, Ib., 250; Ernst v. Kankle, Ib., 520; Reeves v. Treas. of Wood Co., 8 O. S., 333; Foster v. Com. of Wood Co., 9O. S., 540; N. I. R. R. Co. v. Connelly, 10 O. S., 159; Maloy v. Marietta, 11 O. S., 636; Creighton v. Scott, 14 O. S., 438; State v. Com. of Warren Co., 17 O. S., 558.

Such assessment may be levied by the acre. Foster v. Com. of Wood Co., 9 O. S., 540.

Such assessment need not be levied upon all lands on such street, but only on those bounding upon the improvement or near thereto. Scovill v. Cleveland, 1 O. S., 127.

The assessment, whether by the front foot or upon the value assessed for taxation, must be uniform, operating alike upon all the lots or lands abutting upon the improvement, and the fact that one or more of the tracts may not have been benefited by the improvement, will not render such assessment invalid. N. I. R. R. Co. v. Connelly, 10 O. Š., 159.

Lands appropriated by a railroad company for its track through a city, and crossing the improved street at right angles, and upon which the track was constructed after the work had been completed, is liable to such assessment. And as between the railroad company and the person performing the work (whatever may be the rights of bona fide mortgagees of said railroad, the lands so appropriated may be sold to pay said assessment. Ib. The power to authorize assessments as distinguished from taxes proper, is comprehended in the general grant of legislative power to the general assembly. Reeves v. Treas. of Wood Co., 8 O. S., 333; Baker v. Cincinnati, 11 O. S., 534.

The power to authorize assessments for the construction of free turnpike roads, and the opening of drains, as well as for the improvement of streets and sidewalks, exists to the same extent under the present Constitution as under that of 1802. Reeves v. Treas. of Wood Co., 8 O. S., 333. (5) The authority and duty to prevent an abuse of the powers of taxation and sssessment by municipal corporations, is intrusted by this section of the Constitution to the general assembly, and not to the courts of the state. And the power of the legislature to authorize local taxation cannot be judicially denied on the ground that the purpose for which it is exercised is not local, unless the absence of all special local interest is clearly apparent. Walker v. Cincinnati, 21 O.

S., 14.

This section relates exclusively to cities and villages, and can have no application to counties or county commissioners. State v. Com. of Warren Co., 17 O. S., 561. 1 Debates, 260, 447, 458; 2 Debates, 668, 676, 838, 851, 863, 864, 870.

SEC. 7. No act of the general assembly, authorizing associations with banking powers, shall take effect until it shall be submitted to the people, at the general election next succeeding the passage thereof, and be approved by a majority of all the electors, voting at such election.

This section, as well as the second and third, is prospective, and not retrospective, in its intent
and application. Citizens' Bank v. Wright, 6O. S., 318; State v. Roosa, 11 O. S., 17.
The advancing of money by a building association to its members, as provided in the act of
February 21, 1867 64 v. 18, is not the exercise of banking powers. Forest City U. L. B. Ass. v.
Gallagher, 25 O. S., 208.

1 Debates, 707, 709; 2 Debates, 20, 344-346, 392-396, 402-424, 795-803, 806, 819, 820, 824, 850, 851, 864, 870.

1851.

JURISPRUDENCE-MISCELLANEOUS.

Arts. XIV, XV.

ARTICLE XIV.

JURISPRUDENCE.

SECTION 1. The general assembly, at its first session after the adoption Commissioners. of this constitution, shall provide for the appointment of three commissioners, and prescribe their tenure of office, compensation, and the mode of filling vacancies in said commission.

I Debates, 338, 551-554; 2 Debates, 331, 838, 864, 870.

SEC. 2. The said commissioners shall revise, reform, simplify, and Their duties. abridge the practice, pleadings, forms, and proceedings of the courts of record of this state; and, as far as practicable and expedient, shall provide for the abolition of the distinct forms of action at law, now in use, and for the administration of justice by a uniform mode of proceeding, without reference to any distinction between law and equity.

1 Debates, 338, 554-577; 2 Debates, 319-321, 324–326. 331, 838, 864, 870.

SEC. 3. The proceedings of the commissioners shall, from time to Their report. time, be reported to the general assembly, and be subject to the action of that body.

I Debates, 338; 2 Debates, 331, 838, 864, 870.

SECTION 1.

ARTICLE XV.

MISCELLANEOUS.

Columbus shall be the seat of government, until otherwise Seat of govern

directed by law. (See Const. 1802, Art. VII, § 4.)

1 Debates, 164, 259; 2 Debates, 318, 568, 633, 664, 854, 864, 870.

ment.

SEC. 2. The printing of the laws, journals, bills, legislative docu- Public printing. ments and papers for each branch of the general assembly, with the printing required for the executive and other departments of state, shall be let, on contract, to the lowest responsible bidder, by such executive officers, and in such manner, as shall be prescribed by law.

1 Debates, 163, 230; 2 Debates, 318, 560, 582-589, 632, 633, 664, 854, 864, 870.

SEC. 3. An accurate and detailed statement of the receipts and Receipts and expenditures. expenditures of the public money, the several amounts paid, to whom, and on what account, shall, from time to time, be published, as shall be prescribed by law.

1 Debates, 163, 237-239; 2 Debates, 151, 318, 564-566, 633, 664, 854, 864, 870.

office.

SEC. 4. No person shall be elected or appointed to any office in this Who eligible to state, unless he possess the qualifications of an elector.

This section does not, by implication, forbid the legislature to require other reasonable qualifi-
cations for office. State v. Covington, 29 O. S., 102.

It does not apply to the office of deputy clerk of the probate court, and therefore a female is
eligible to that office, and may lawfully discharge its duties. Warwick v. State, 25 O. S., 21.
The place of medical superintendent of a hospital for the insane, under the act of 1876 (73 V.
80), is an "office" within the meaning of this section. State v. Wilson, 29 O. S., 347.
See Art. V.

1 Debates, 163, 258; 2 Debates, 318, 567, 633, 664, 854, 864, 870.

SEC. 5. No person who shall hereafter fight a duel, assist in the Duelists ineli same as second, or send, accept, or knowingly carry, a challenge there- gible. for, shall hold any office in this state.

1 Debates, 164, 260-263; 2 Debates, 165, 318, 569, 578, 590, 633, 664, 854, 864, 870. Lotteries, and the sale of lottery tickets, for any purpose Lotteries. whatever, shall forever be prohibited in this state.

SEC. 6.

1 Debates, 164, 263; 2 Debates, 318, 569, 633, 664, 854, 864, 870.

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