The Theory of Public Choice--II

Přední strana obálky
James M. Buchanan, Robert D. Tollison
University of Michigan Press, 1984 - Počet stran: 452

That economics can usefully explain politics is no longer a novel idea, it is a well-established fact brought about by the work of many public choice scholars. This book, which is a sequel to a similar volume published in 1972, brings together a fresh collection of recent work in the public choice tradition. The essays demonstrate the power of the public choice approach in the analysis of government. Among the issues considered are income redistribution, fiscal limitations on government, voting rules and processes, the demand for public goods, the political business cycle, international negotiations, interest groups, and legislators.

James M. Buchanan is University Distinguished Professor and direct, Center for Study of Public Choice at George Mason University.

Robert D. Tollison, formerly director, Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, is now Abney Professor of Economics at Clemson University.

 

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Obsah

Public Choice 197282
3
Public Choice circa 1980
9
A Sketch of Positive Public Choice Theory and Its Normative Implications
11
A Survey
23
Recent Contributions to Public Choice Theory and Methods
69
Towards a Tax Constitution for Leviathan
71
Towards a Theory of YesNo Voting
90
Political Resource Allocation Controlled Agendas and the Status Quo
105
Empirical Public Choice
273
Discretionary Spending by Senators on Staff
275
Regulators as an Interest Group
287
PoliticoEconomic Models and Cycles
305
Legislatures as Unions
323
Burden Sharing Strategy and the Design of NATO
338
Constitutional and Philosophical Issues
359
Profitable Exchange and Intransitive Group Preferences
361

A New and Superior Process for Making Social Choices
121
An Economic Theory of Mutually Advantageous Issue Linkages in International Negotiations
134
Applications
157
The Coase Theorem and the Theory of the State
159
The Political Economy of the Welfare State
174
Some Simple Analytics
194
A RentSeeking Theory of French Mercantilism
206
Static Inefficiency Rent Seeking and the Rule of Law
224
The Political Economy of Economic Disorder
238
Rediscovery of an EighteenthCentury Method
382
Voting by Veto
395
On Equalizing the Distribution of Political Income
413
An Inquiry into the Use of Instruments of Evil to Do Good
422
Future Directions and Prospects
437
Constitutional Restrictions on the Power of Government
439
Contributors
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