The Theory of Public Choice--IIJames M. Buchanan, Robert D. Tollison University of Michigan Press, 1984 - Počet stran: 452 That economics can usefully explain politics is no longer a novel idea, it is a well-established fact brought about by the work of many public choice scholars. This book, which is a sequel to a similar volume published in 1972, brings together a fresh collection of recent work in the public choice tradition. The essays demonstrate the power of the public choice approach in the analysis of government. Among the issues considered are income redistribution, fiscal limitations on government, voting rules and processes, the demand for public goods, the political business cycle, international negotiations, interest groups, and legislators. James M. Buchanan is University Distinguished Professor and direct, Center for Study of Public Choice at George Mason University. Robert D. Tollison, formerly director, Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, is now Abney Professor of Economics at Clemson University. |
Obsah
Public Choice 197282 | 3 |
Public Choice circa 1980 | 9 |
A Sketch of Positive Public Choice Theory and Its Normative Implications | 11 |
A Survey | 23 |
Recent Contributions to Public Choice Theory and Methods | 69 |
Towards a Tax Constitution for Leviathan | 71 |
Towards a Theory of YesNo Voting | 90 |
Political Resource Allocation Controlled Agendas and the Status Quo | 105 |
Empirical Public Choice | 273 |
Discretionary Spending by Senators on Staff | 275 |
Regulators as an Interest Group | 287 |
PoliticoEconomic Models and Cycles | 305 |
Legislatures as Unions | 323 |
Burden Sharing Strategy and the Design of NATO | 338 |
Constitutional and Philosophical Issues | 359 |
Profitable Exchange and Intransitive Group Preferences | 361 |
A New and Superior Process for Making Social Choices | 121 |
An Economic Theory of Mutually Advantageous Issue Linkages in International Negotiations | 134 |
Applications | 157 |
The Coase Theorem and the Theory of the State | 159 |
The Political Economy of the Welfare State | 174 |
Some Simple Analytics | 194 |
A RentSeeking Theory of French Mercantilism | 206 |
Static Inefficiency Rent Seeking and the Rule of Law | 224 |
The Political Economy of Economic Disorder | 238 |
Rediscovery of an EighteenthCentury Method | 382 |
Voting by Veto | 395 |
On Equalizing the Distribution of Political Income | 413 |
An Inquiry into the Use of Instruments of Evil to Do Good | 422 |
Future Directions and Prospects | 437 |
Constitutional Restrictions on the Power of Government | 439 |
Contributors | |
Další vydání - Zobrazit všechny
Theory of Public Choice: Political Applications of Economics, Svazek 1 James M. Buchanan,Robert D. Tollison Zobrazení fragmentů - 1972 |
Theory of Public Choice: Political Applications of Economics, Svazek 1 James M. Buchanan,Robert D. Tollison Zobrazení fragmentů - 1972 |
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