General Equilibrium with Price-Making FirmsSpringer Science & Business Media, 6. 12. 2012 - Počet stran: 247 Motivation. That elegant fiction the competitive equilibrium seems still to dominate the frontiers of theoretical microeconomics. We may think of it in a general way as a state of affairs wherein economic agents, responding "rationally" to annoWlced prices, make choices which are consistent and feasible. The prices may also be described as "taken": for one reason or another the agents who respond to them consider them as given. The existence of such a state, its optimality, its robustness against free bargaining among agents when there are many of them, its Wliqueness, its stability when price displacements evoke specified adjustments--all these issues have been studied, and continue to be studied in a variety of settings. Slowly the equilibrium investigated begins to incorporate public goods, externalities of certain kinds, differences in agents' information, and infinitely many time periods. The appeal of such results need not be belabored: the equilibrium studied may sustain an optimal resource allocation, and when it does it sus tains it in a manner that appears to be informationally efficient and to accord well with individual incentives. Therefore it is important to extend the circumstances under which an equilibrium exists, under which it sustains opti mality, and under which it survives displacements as well as free bargaining among agents. |
Obsah
EQUILIBRIA | 12 |
4 | 73 |
A twomonopoly economy A Bertrand duopoly example | 101 |
5 | 118 |
DESCRIPTION OF EQUILIBRIA | 120 |
general abstract framework and a specific example namely | 154 |
the separablefixedcost | 176 |
3 Second illustration of an admissible assign | 185 |
Další vydání - Zobrazit všechny
General Equilibrium with Price-making Firms Thomas Andrew Marschak,Reinhard Selten Zobrazení fragmentů - 1974 |
General Equilibrium with Price-Making Firms T. Marschak,R. Selten Náhled není k dispozici. - 2014 |
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action variables assignment rule b₁ bounded Chapter choice choose compact set concept consider consumption sets continuous continuous function convex coordinates cube curve defined demand function denotes deviation economic games element equilibrium exists exactly zero excess demand excess supply existence theorem fixed point game G given H₁ hemicontinuous hence implies input intersection jointly stable points Lemma market potential market-clearing matching monopolistic equilibrium n-tuple Nash equilibrium Nash point nonempty nonnegative profit observed oligopolistic optimal P₁ pair passive variables payoff functions player prevailing price price vector price-taking firms primary commodity production sets profit function repeated game response function restabilizing S₁ satisfies seller selling sequence small economy stable set stable with respect supply functions T-goods total dividends total profits total subsidy visualized game weak convolution wealth yields zero profit