tablish an exclusive definition based upon it. The language of § 1176 conclusively negatives such an intention. It follows that § 1177 is not controlled by the definition to be found in the act of 1871. Even if it were assumed that the condemnation contained in § 1176 of the transactions particularly described in the act of 1871 was too sweeping, and that Congress went beyond its power in giving the prohibition so wide a scope, this would not affect the provision of § 1177, relating, as we have seen, to a recognized category of offenses for which it was within the power of Congress to prescribe punishment. Whether it be read alone or in the light of its context, § 1177 cannot be adjudged invalid. And it is upon this section that the information in question was based. We have then a statute with valid operation. This being established there can be no question that it conferred upon the Police Court, by its express terms, jurisdiction of the offense, and that court tried and convicted the petitioner. But it is insisted that the facts do not support the conviction. The argument ignores the nature of this proceeding, unless it be meant that no colorable question was presented; that on the agreed statement of facts and viewing the statute as prohibiting transactions involving the element of chance, there was such an obvious and palpable want of criminality that the judicial judgment cannot be said to have been invoked, and that therefore the court had no jurisdiction to determine whether or not the statute had been violated. Such a contention is without merit. It is by no means manifest that the scheme or enterprise in which the petitioner was engaged lay outside the range of judicial consideration under the statute. On the contrary, the agreed statement of facts presented questions requiring the exercise of judicial judgment, and the case falls within the well-established rule. Given a valid enactment, the question (assuming it to be one demanding judicial examination) whether a particular case falls within the prohibition is for the determination of the court to which has been confided jurisdiction over the class of offenses to which the statute relates. As said by Chief Justice Marshall in Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 193, on p. 203: "The judgment of such a tribunal has all the obligation which the judgment of any tribunal can have. To determine whether the offence charged in the indictment be legally punishable or not, is among the most unquestionable of its powers and duties. The decision of this question is the exercise of jurisdiction, whether the judgment be for or against the prisoner. The judgment is equally binding in the one case and in the other; and must remain in full force unless reversed regularly by a superior court capable of reversing it." And in Ex parte Parks, 93 U. S. 18, on page 20, the court said: "Whether an act charged in an indictment is or is not a crime by the law which the court administers (in this case the statute law of the United States), is a question which has to be met at almost every stage of criminal proceedings; on motions to quash the indictment, on demurrers, on motions to arrest judgment, etc. The court may err, but it has jurisdiction of the question." In hearing this application, this court does not sit to review the correctness of the conclusion of the Police Court as to the violation of the statute by the petitioner, or of the decision of the Court of Appeals of the District as to the sufficiency of the information filed against him. The question here is not one of guilt or innocence, but simply whether the court below had jurisdiction to try the issues. And as we find that the statute conferred that jurisdiction the application for a writ of habeas corpus must be denied. Rule discharged and petition dismissed. 219 U.S. Syllabus. BAILEY v. STATE OF ALABAMA. ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALABAMA. No. 300. Argued October 20, 21, 1910.—Decided January 3, 1911. Prima facie evidence is sufficient to outweigh the presumption of innocence, and, if not met by opposing evidence, to support a verdict. Kelly v. Jackson, 6 Pet. 632. The validity of a statute that authorizes a jury to convict on prima facie evidence must be judged by the fact that the jury may convict even if it is not made the duty of the jury to do so. Although a state statute in terms be to punish fraud, if its natural and inevitable purpose is to punish for crime for failing to perform X contracts of labor, thus compelling such performance, it violates the Thirteenth Amendment and is unconstitutional. A constitutional prohibition cannot be transgressed indirectly by creating a statutory presumption any more than by direct enactment; and a State cannot compel involuntary servitude in carrying out contracts of personal service by creating a presumption that the person committing the breach is guilty of intent to defraud merely because he fails to perform the contract. While States may, without denying due process of law, enact that proof of one fact shall be prima facie evidence of the main fact in issue, the inference must not be purely arbitrary; there must be rational relation between the two facts, and the accused must have proper opportunity to submit all the facts bearing on the issue. While its immediate concern was African slavery, the Thirteenth Amendment was a charter of universal civil freedom for all persons of whatever race, color, or estate, under the flag. The words "involuntary servitude" have a larger meaning than slavery, and the Thirteenth Amendment prohibited all control by coercion of the personal service of one man for the benefit of another. While the Thirteenth Amendment is self-executing, Congress has power to secure its complete enforcement by appropriate legislation and the peonage act of March 2, 1867, and §§ 1990 and 5526, Rev. Stat., are valid exercises of this authority. Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207. A peon is one who is compelled to work for his creditor until his debt Argument for the United States. 219 U.S. is paid, and the fact that he contracted to perform the labor which is sought to be compelled does not withdraw the attempted enforcement from the condemnation of the peonage acts. The Federal anti-peonage acts are necessarily violated by any state legislation which seeks to compel service or labor by making it a crime to fail or refuse to perform it. Although this court may not impute to a State an actual motive to oppress by a statute which that State enacts, it must consider the natural operation of such statute and strike it down if it becomes an instrument of coercion forbidden by the Federal Constitution. Section 4730 of the Code of Alabama as amended in 1907, in so far as it makes the refusal or failure to perform labor contracted for without refunding the money or paying for property received prima facie evidence of the commission of the crime defined by such section, and when read in connection with the rule of evidence of that State, that the accused cannot testify in regard to uncommunicated motives, is unconstitutional as in conflict with the Thirteenth Amendment and of the legislation authorized by it and enacted by Congress. Quare, and not necessary now to decide, whether such section is, under the Fourteenth Amendment, an unconstitutional deprivation of property without due process of law or denial of equal protection of the laws. 161 Alabama, 78, reversed. THE facts, which involve the constitutionality of § 4730 of the Code of Alabama as construed by the courts of that State and the validity of a conviction thereunder, are stated in the opinion. Mr. Fred S. Ball, Mr. Edward S. Watts and Mr. Daniel W. Troy for plaintiff in error, submitted. Mr. Assistant Attorney General Harr, with whom The Attorney General was on the brief, by leave of the court, on behalf of the United States as amicus curiæ: The judgment, and the statute upon which it is based, conflict with the Thirteenth Amendment and §§ 1990, 5526, Rev. Stat. See Clyatt v. United States, 197 U. S. 219 U.S. Argument for the United States. 207, 216, which settled the question, left in doubt by Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U. S. 275, 280. A state penal statute will be construed by this court as though a rule of evidence announced by the highest court of the State as being applicable thereto was incorporated therein. Freund, Police Power, § 448. The act, as amended, is the result of efforts to enforce labor contracts. See act of March 1, 1901, declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of Alabama, Toney v. The State, 141 Alabama, 120; and by the Federal court, Peonage Cases, 123 Fed. Rep. 671, 691. That act failing, resort was had to the statute here in question. But first the statute, found ineffective under Ex parte Riley, 94 Alabama, 82, upon the subject of intent, was amended by adding the prima facie clause. Bailey v. The State, 158 Alabama, 18, 24. The statute was further amended by the act of August 15, 1907 (Gen. Act, Ala., 1907, p. 636), so as to cover expressly tenants of land, and by changing the penalty so as to make it peculiarly applicable to contracts with agricultural laborers. For history of this legislation and the position of the Supreme Court of Alabama in regard thereto, see Bailey v. State, 158 Alabama, 18, 22; Banks v. State, 124 Georgia, 15; State v. Thomas, 144 Alabama, 77; Vann's Case, 150 Alabama, 66. Even if the legislature can punish fraudulent practices in obtaining property by false pretenses under contract for the performance of an act or service, such object is clearly distinguishable from one punishing a mere breach of contract. Freeman v. United States, 217 U. S. 539. In whatever language a statute may be framed, its purpose must be determined by its natural and reasonable effect. Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U. S. 268. In Florida and Mississippi, similar statutes have been declared void under the Thirteenth Amendment by United States judges in charges to grand juries; and see |