Mr. Justice Miller delivered the opinion of the court:

"The action does not accrue while the fraud is concealed."

Among the cases cited by Judge Curtis are: First Mass. Turnpike Corp. v. Field, 3 Mass., 201; Homer v. Fish, 1 Pick., 435; Welles v. Fish, 3 Pick., 74; Sherwood v. Sutton, 5 Mason, 143; Mitchell v. Thompson, 1 McLean, 96.

The language of Parson, Ch. J., in the first case cited, is very emphatic: "If this knowledge is fraudulently concealed by defendant, we should violate a sound rule if we permitted him to avail himself of his own fraud."

In Sherwood v. Sutton, supra, Justice Story held, that "Every statute is to be expounded reasonably, so as to suppress and not to extend the mischief it was designed to cure. The Statute of Limitations ought not to be construed so as to become an instrument to encourage fraud, if it admits of any other reasonable interpretation; and cases of fraud, therefore, form an implied exception, to be acted on by courts of law and equity according to the nature of their respective jurisdictions. Such, it seems to me, is the reason on which the exception is built, and not merely that there is an equity binding upon the conscience of the party which the statute does not reach or control."

"The bar of the statute may also be avoided by proof of fraud committed under such circumstances as to conceal from the plaintiff all knowledge of the fraud, and thus prevent him from asserting his right until a period beyond the time limited by the statute."

Greenl. Ev., § 448.

"Nevertheless, the prevailing rule in this country prevents the statute from beginning to run until the fraud is discovered by the plaintiff." 2 Pars., p. 378.

Mr. S. J. Cumming, for appellees:

The bill makes a very clear case of fraudulent conspiracy to defraud the only creditor of the bankrupt named in the petition. The mode of perpetrating this fraud was by conveying all his property, of which the bankrupt possessed a large amount, beyond what was necessary to pay his debts, to Hugh Weir, his father-in-law, Nathaniel Glover, his son, and Elenora Glover, his wife.

These conveyances were made without consideration, and with intent to take the benefit of the Bankrupt Law, which he did very soon after these transactions and procured his discharge.

At that time he was indebted to John A. Winston & Co. in the sum of $10,000 or $12,000, for which judgment had been obtained against him, and his only purpose was to evade the payment of this debt. The bill further alleges that said Benjamin Glover, the bankrupt, and said Elenora Glover and Nathaniel Glover and Hugh Weir, kept secret their said fraudulent acts, and endeavored to conceal them from the knowledge of the assignee and of the said John A. Winston & Co., whereby they were prevented from obtaining any sufficient knowledge or information thereof, until within the last two years, and even up to the present time they have not been able to obtain full and particular information as to the fraudulent disposition made by the said Benjamin of a large part of his property. This bill was filed January 20, 1873; the complainant was appointed assignee December 1, 1869; and the bankrupt received his discharge April 11, 1870. W. Jones, surviving partner of John A. Winston & Co., in December, 1871, filed a petition in the district court against the bankrupt, in order to have his discharge set aside for this fraud; but before process could be served on Glover, he died. These are the material allegations of the

First. That complainant does not, by the allegations of his bill, bring the case within the exception to the ordinary Statute of Lim

itations.

Ang., Lim. sec. 25-31; Kane v. Bloodgood, 7 Johns. Ch., 122; Bank of U. S. v. Daniel, 12 Pet., 56; Moore v. Greene, 19 How., 69, 15 L. ed., 533; Harwood v. Railroad Co., 17 Wall., 78, 21 L. ed., 558; Buckner v. Calcote, 28 Miss., 595; Stearns v. Page, 7 How., 819; Carr v. Hilton, 1 Curt., 390.

Second. This statute is imperative, admitting of no exceptions as to any tribunals, and consequently sets aside the rule invoked, as to bankruptcy cases under the Act.

See, 4th par, of § 2 of the Act, and the cases referred to under the first head of this brief.

fraud, concealed by the defendants from the knowledge of the assignee and from Winston & Co., against whom the fraud was perpetrated. It also shows that this suit was brought three years and a few weeks after the complainant became vested with the rights of an assignee in bankruptcy in the case.

The 2d section of the Bankrupt Act reads as follows:

"The circuit court shall have concurrent jurisdiction of all suits at law or in equity, brought by the assignee against the person claiming an adverse interest; or by such person against the assignee, touching the property of the bankrupt transferable to or vested in the assignee; but no suit at law or in equity shall in any case be maintainable by or against such assignee, or by or against any person claiming

an adverse interest touching the property or rights of property aforesaid in any court whatsoever, unless the same shall be brought within two years from the time of the cause of action accrued for or against such assignee.”

Counsel for appellant argues that this provision of the statute (14 Stat. at L., 526) has no application to the present case because it is not shown that the defendants have set up or asserted any claim to the property now sought to be recovered adverse to that of the assignee. It is rather difficult to see exactly what is meant by this proposition. The suit is brought to be relieved from some supposed claim of right or interest in the property on the part of the defendants. If no such claim exists, it does not stand in the way of complainant, and he does not need the aid of a court of equity to set it aside. If it is intended to argue that until some one asserts in words that he claims a

right to property transferred to the assignee by virtue of the Act, which is adverse to the bankrupt, the statute does not begin to run, though such person is in possession of the property, acting as owner, and admitting no other title to it, we think the construction of the proviso entirely too narrow.

This is a Statute of Limitation. It is precisely like other statutes of limitation and applies to all judicial contests between the assignee and other persons touching the property or rights of property of the bankrupt transferable to or vested in the assignee, where the interests are adverse and have so existed for more than two years from the time when the cause of action accrued, for or against the assignee. Such is almost the language in which the provision is expressed in section 5057 of the

Revised Statutes.

It is obviously one of the purposes of the Bankrupt Law, that there should be a speedy disposition of the bankrupt's assets. This is only second in importance to securing equality of distribution. The Act is filled with provisions for quick and summary disposal of questions arising in the progress of the case, with out regard to usual modes of trial attended by some necessary delay. Appeals in some 347*] *instances must be taken within ten days; and provisions are made to facilitate sales of property, compromises of doubtful claims, and generally for the early discharge of the bankrupt and the speedy settlement of his estate. It is a wise policy, and if those who administer the law could be induced to act upon its spirit, would do much to make the statute more acceptable than it is. But in stead of this, the inferior courts are filled with suits by or against assignees, each of whom as soon as appointed retains an attorney, if property enough comes to his hands to pay one, and then instead of speedy sales, reasonable compromises, and efforts to adjust differences, the estate is wasted in profitless litigation and

the fees of the officers who execute the law.

To prevent this as much as possible, Congress has said to the assignee: you shall commence no suit two years after the cause of action has accrued to you, nor shall you be harassed by suits when the cause of action has accrued more than two years against you. Within that time the estate ought to be nearly settled up, and your functions dis

charged, and we close the door to all litigation not commenced before it has elapsed. But appellant relies in this court upon another proposition which has been very often applied by the courts under proper circumstances, in mitigation of the strict letter of general statutes of limitation, namely: that when the object of the suit is to obtain relief against a fraud, the bar of the statute does not commence to run until the fraud is discovered or

becomes known to the party injured by it.

This proposition has been incorporated in different forms in the statutes of many of the States, and presented to the courts under several aspects where there were no such statutes. And while there is unanimity in regard to some of these aspects, there is not in regard to others. In suits in equity where relief is sought on the ground of fraud, the authorities are without conflict in support of the doctrine that where the ignorance of the fraud has been produced by affirmative acts of the guilty party in concealing the facts from the other, the statute will not bar relief provided suit is [*348 brought within proper time after the discovery of the fraud.

We also think that, in suits in equity, the deproposition that where the party injured by the cided weight of authority is in favor of the fraud remains in ignorance of it without any fault or want of diligence or care on his part, the bar of the statute does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered, though there be of the party committing the fraud to conceal no special circumstances or efforts on the part it from the knowledge of the other party. Sea Co. v. Wymondsell, 3 P. Wms., 143; HovBooth v. Warrington, 4 Bro. P. C., 163; So. enden v. Annesley, 2 Sch. & L., 634; Stearns v. Page, 7 How., 819; Moore v. Greene, 19 How., 69, 15 L. ed., 533; Sherwood v. Sutton, 5 Mas., 143; Snodgrass v. Bk., 25 Ala., 161.

On the question as it arises in actions at law there is in this country a very decided conflict of authority. Many of the courts bold that the rule is sustained in courts of equity only on the ground that these courts are not bound by the mere force of the statute as courts of common law are, but only as they have adopted its principle as expressing their own rule of applying the doctrine of laches in analogous cases. They, therefore, make concaled fraud an exception on purely equitable principles. Troup V. Smith, 20 Johns., 33; Callis v. Waddy, 2 Munf., 511; Miles v. Berry, 1 Hill (S. C.) 296; York v. Bright, 4 Humph., 312.

On the other hand, the English courts and the courts of Connecticut, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and others of great respectability, hold that the doctrine is equally applicable to cases at law. Bree v. Holbech, 2 Doug., 655; Clark v. Haugham, 3 Dowl. & R. 322; Granger v. George, 5 Barn. & C., 149; Turnpike Co. v. Field, 3 Mas., 201; Welles v. Fish, 3 Pick., 75; Jones v. Conoway, 4 Yeates, 109; Rush v. Barr, 401; Mitchell v. Thompson, 1 McLean (C. C.), 1 Watts, 110; Pennock v. Freeman, 1 Watts 96; Carr v. Hilton, 1 Curtis (C. C.), 230.

As the case before us is a suit in equity, and as the bill contains a distinct allegation that the defendants kept secret and concealed from the parties interested the fraud which is *sought to be redressed, we might rest [*349

title of the claimant. As against the government, this record, so long as it re mains unvacated and it can only be vacated by a judicial tribunal (U. S. v. Stone, 2 Wall., 535, 17 L. ed., 767), is conclusive, and it is equally conclusive upon those claiming under government by titles subsequent.

Beard v. Federy, 3 Wall., 492, 18 L. ed., 92. In Hines v. Greenlee, 3 Ala. (N. S.), 73, the court says: "The law provides that, on certain things being done, the citizen shall acquire a title to a portion of the public lands, and that a patent therefor shall issue, which shall be recorder. The patent is not the title, but merely the evidence that, according to law, a portion of the public domain has been transferred to a citizen. Its efficacy proceeds from the law which authorizes certain officers to issue and record it."

In Peralta v. U. S., 3 Wall., 440, 18 L. ed., 223, the court says: "The record was the grant."

In McCauley v. State, 21 Md., 572, the court, in discussing the legal effect of an official copy made evidence by statute, says: "Such copies are prima facie evidence of all that is necessary to authorize their registration, when it appears they have been duly recorded."

To the same effect, Mayo v. Mazeaux, 38 Cal., 449.

"The general rule is, that a patent takes effect upon its being issued, and it is not necessary to show a delivery to or acceptance by the patentee."

Chipley v. Farris, not reported (since reported 45 Cal., 527).

The doctrine of delivery, as applied by us to private grants, has no application to grants made by goverment.

Donner v. Palmer, 31 Cal., 513. Delivery of patent is not necessary. Ex parte Kuhtman, 3 Rich. Eq., 257. Entry of payment by W., to whom patent issued, proof of issue of patent, though not produced.

Willis v. Bucher, 3 Wash. (C. C.), 375.

In Stark v. Starrs, 6 Wall., 402, 18 L. ed., 925, the court says: "The right to a patent once vested is equivalent, as respects the government dealing with the public lands, to a patent issued."

In Johnson v. Towsley, 13 Wall., 72, 20 L. ed., 485, the court says that a bill could be maintained to control the title though only a patent certificate had been issued.

The defendants, having no title, could not question the title of plaintiffs.

Satarpy v. Papin, 7 Mo., 506; Parmlee v. Oswego & Syracuse R. Co., 7 Barb., 621; Crommelin v. Minter, 9 Ala. 594; Cooper v. Roberts, 18 How., 173, 15 L. ed., 338; Bissell v. Penrose, 8 How., 317; West v. Cochran, 17 How., 413, 15 L. ed., 114; Bryan v. Forsyth, 19 How., 334, 15 L. ed., 674; Ballance v. Papin, 19 How., 343, 15 L. ed., 678; Waterman v. Smith, 13 Cal., 413; People v. Mauran, 5 Den., 398; Sutton v. Menser, 6 B. Mon., 438; Taylor v. Fletcher, 7 B. Mon., 83.

acts, and officers have been appointed for the ascertainment of these matters in advance, who have ascertained them and given their judgment, then the patent, although the judg. ment of the officers be in fact erroneous, cannot be attacked collaterally by parties showing title subsequent from the same source, much less by those who show no color of title in themselves.

Doll v. Meador, 16 Cal., 325.

Messrs. William Lawrence, E. R. Hoar, Robert H. Bradford, J. R. Webster and L Crounse, for defendant in error:

A patent issued for lands not authorized to be sold, or reserved from sale, is not only voidable but void, and may be attacked collaterally and defeated in an action at law.

This is so clearly true on all principle, that it would seem axiomatic. It is deemed sufficient to state it, and refer without comment to comclusive authorities.

1 Ops. Attys.-Gen., 420. Saline Springs, in Ill., 2 Ops. Attys.-Gen., 186, Concerning Land Patents; 5 Ops. Attys.-Gen., 9, Patents to Pre empters; Stoddard v. Chambers, 2 How,. 284; Kissell v. St. Louis Schools, 18 How., 19, 15 L ed., 324; Easton v. Salisbury, 21 How., 431, 16 L. ed., 183; Minter v. Crommelin, 18 How., 87, 15 L. ed., 279, 9 Ala. 594; Brown v. Clements, 3 How., 650; U. S. v. Stone, 2 Wall., 525, 17 L. ed. 765; Hale v. Gaines, 22 How., 144, 16 L. ed., 264; Wilcox v. Jackson, 13 Pet., 498; Reichart v. Felps, 6 Wall., 160, 18 L. ed. 849; State of Ind. v. Miller, 3 McLean, 151; Hunter v. Hemphill, 6 Mo., 106; Jackson v. Law ton, 10 Johns., 26; Railroad Co. v. Smith, 9 Wall., 96, 19 L. ed., 599.

This, in fact, is determined by Congress in the Acts providing for the return of purchase money in the case of unauthorized sales.

Acts, March 3, 1819; May 21, 1824; January 12, 1825; May 24, 1828; 1 Lester, 34, 36, 38, 40, 667.

Then, if in this case, it is shown that the lands were not subject to private entry be cause they were saline, this fact, shown by parol, will defeat a patent, even if the plaintiffs had produced it, and no proceeding to cancel it is necessary.

It was the duty of the deputy-surveyor who surveyed these lands, to note in his field-book the true situations of all mines, salt-licks, salt-prings and mill-seats, which came to his knowledge.

Acts, May 18, 1796, 1 Stat. at L., 465; May 10, 1800, 2 Stat. at L., 73; Rev. Stat., 441, §§ 2, 395.

This duty he did.

The purpose of Congress may readily be seen by a comparison of this with other statutes. The Preemption Act of September 4, 1841, 5 Stat. at L., 456, declares that:

"No lands on which are situated any known salines or mines, shall be liable to entry."

But when the reservation is made in the Acts of 1796 and 1854, it is not of the known salines, but "every salt-spring," and the salines.

The record shows, and it was not denied on trial, that when the lands were entered, the locator knew their saline character. But, independently of this, the fact was noted on the deputy-surveyor's field-notes in the SurveyorGeneral's office. This was a public record and notice to all the world.

But the laws in relation to Nebraska went further, and designed to reserve salines, no matter when or how discovered.

This question is decided in principle by this court in Railroad Co. v. Smith, 9 Wall., 96,

19 L. ed. 599.

The same view is supported by many other authorities collected in Bates v. Herron, 35 Ala., 123, where it is applied in all cases of patents, not merely voidable, but void, as issued without authority of law, or for lands

not authorized to be sold.

1 Ops. Attys. Gen., 420, Saline Springs of Ill.; Minter v. Crommelin, 18 How., 87, 15 L.

ed., 279.

The question of reservation is the hinge of this case, in volves the history of saline reservations. Those reservations began with the Act of May 18, 1796, creating the office of Surveyor-General and deputy-surveyors, and organizing our present rectangular system of surveys, and prescribing the mode of selling the domain. The statute is the mud-sill of our land system. On March 1, 1784, Thomas Jefferson, Samuel Harding, Arthur Lee and James Monroe delegates from the Commonwealth of Virginia, in the Congress of the United States of America, under the Articles of Confederation, signed and delivered a deed conveying to the United States all the right of the Commonwealth to the Territory northwest

of the River Ohio.

Public Land Laws, Opinions and Instructions, Part 1, p. 585, ed. of 1838.

The Act of Congress of May 18, 1796, was the first Act providing a system for the survey and sale of any part of that great region. It is entitled "An Act Providing for the Sale of the Lands of the United States, in the Territory Northwest of the Ohio River and above the Mouth of the Kentucky River."

Section 2 requires the land to be subdivided into townships and sections, and prescribes the mode of measuring the lines and marking the lines and corners. "Every surveyor," says the section, "shall note in his field-book, both the true situation of all mines, salt-licks, saltsprings and mill-seats, which shall come to his knowledge; all water courses, over which the line he runs shall pass; and also the quality of the lands." The section then requires these field-books to be returned to the Surveyor-General, and requires him to cause a plat of every township to be made, and to send a description of the land, with a copy of every map, to the places appointed for the sale of the lands.

Section 3 enacts, "That a salt-spring, lying upon a creek which empties into the Scioto River, on the east side, together with as many contiguous sections as shall be equal to one township, and every other salt-spring which may be discovered, together with the section of one mile square, which includes it, and also four sections at the center of every township, containing each one mile square, shall be reserved for the future disposal of the United States; but there shall be no reservation except for salt-springs, in fractional townships, where the fraction is less than three fourths of a township."

Section 4 enacts, "That, whenever seven ranges of townships shall have been surveyed, and the plats made and sent, conformably with the provisions of the Act, the said sections of 640 acres (excluding those hereby reserved), shall be offered for sale, at public vendue, at Cincinnati or Pittsburgh; and that the townships remaining undivided shall be offered at the seat of Government of the United States, in quarter townships, excluding the four central sections, and the other reservations before mentioned."

This Act is now the law for all SurveyorsGeneral and their deputies. The Act of September 27, 1850, 9 Stat. at L., 496, declares "That a Surveyor-General shall be appointed for the Territory of Oregon, who shall have the same authority, perform the same duties respecting the public lands and private land claims in the Territory of Oregon, as are vested in and required of the surveyor of lands in the United States northwest of the Ohio, except as hereinafter provided."

Section 14 declares "That no mineral lands, nor lands reserved for salines, shall be liable to any claim under and by virtue of the provisions of this Act.”

And the Act of July 22, 1854, 10 Stat. at L., 308, section 4 of which, as we contend, preserved the salines in dispute here, declares in section 1, that a Surveyor-General shall be appointed for New Mexico, "Whose authority and duties shall be the same as those provided by law for the Surveyor-General of Oregon."

It declares, in section 10, that the President shall also appoint "A Surveyor-General for the Territories of Nebraska and Kansas, who shall locate his office at such place as the President of the United States shall from time to time

direct, and whose duties, powers, obligations, responsibilities and compensation shall be the same as those of the Surveyor-General of WisWisconsin Territory forconsin and Iowa." merly embraced the State of Iowa. 5 Stat. at

L., 235.

The office of public lands in Wisconsin Territory, was created by Act of June 12, 1838, 5 Stat. at L., 243, whose 1st section devolves upon him "The same duties respecting the public lands and private claims in the Territory of Wisconsin, as are now vested in and required of the Surveyor of the Lands of the United States in Ohio."

Thus it appears that the Act of May 18, 1796, so far as it prescribes the duties of Surveyors-General and their deputies, is the law of New Mexico, Kansas and Nebraska, and a more extended view of the statute would show that it is also the law governing every Surveyor-General and deputy-surveyor in the Union.