by simply turning to the ordinary European treatises on maritime law, or the codes or ordinances of any particular country. That we have a maritime law of our own, operative throughout the United States, cannot be doubted. The general system of maritime law which was familiar to the lawyers and statesmen of the country when the Constitution was adopted, was most certainly intended and referred to when it was declared in that instrument that the judicial power of the United States shall extend "to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." But by what criterion are we to ascertain the precise limits of the law thus adopted? The Constitution does not define it. It does not declare whether it was intended to embrace the entire maritime law as expounded in the treatises, or only the limited and restricted system which was received in England, or lastly, such modification of both of these as was accepted and recognized as law in this country. Nor does the Constitution attempt to draw the boundary line between maritime law and local law; nor does it lay down any criterion for ascertaining that boundary. It assumes that the meaning 575*] of the phrase "admiralty and maritime jurisdiction" is well understood. It treats this matter as it does the cognate ones of common law and equity, when it speaks of "cases in law and equity," or of "suits at common law," without defining those terms, assuming them to be known and understood. One thing, however, is unquestionable: the Constitution must have referred to a system of law co-extensive with and operating uniformly in the whole country. It certainly could not have been the intention to place the Rules and limits of maritime law under the disposal and regulation of the several States, as that would heve defeated the uniformity and consistency at which the Constitution aimed on all subjects of a commercial character affecting the intercourse of the States with each other or with foreign States. rule of court make it broader than the judicial power may determine to be its true limits. And this boundary is to be ascertained by a reasonable and just construction of the words used in the Constitution, taken in connection with the whole instrument, and the purposes for which admiralty and maritime jurisdiction was grant ed to the Federal Government." Guided by these sound principles, this court has felt itself at liberty to recognize the admiralty jurisdiction as extending to localities and subjects which, by the jealousy of the common law, were prohibited to it in England, but which fairly belong to it on every ground of reason when applied to the peculiar circumstances of this country, with its extended territories, its inland seas, and its navigable rivers, especially as the narrow restrictions of the English law had never prevailed on this side of the Alantic, even in colonial times. The question as to the true limits of maritime law and admiralty jurisdiction is, undoubtedly, as Chief Justice Taney intimates, exclusively a judicial question, and no state law or Act of Congress can make it broader, or (it may be added) narrower, than the judicial power may determine those limits to be. But what the law is within those limits, assuming the general maritime law to be the basis of the system, depends on what has been received as law in the maritime usages of this country, and on such legislation as may have been competent to affect it. To ascertain, therefore, what the maritime law of this country is, it is not enough to read the French, German, Italian and other foreign works on the subject, or the Codes which they have framed; but we must have regard to our own legal history, Constitution, legislation, usages and adjudications as well. The decis ions of this court illustrative of these sources, and giving construction to the laws and Constitution, are especially to be considered; and when these fail us, we must resort to the principles by which they have been governed. The question is discussed with great felicity But we must always remember that the court and judgment by Chief Justice Taney, deliver- cannot make the law; it can only de- [*577 ing the opinion of the court in the case of The clare it. If, within its proper scope, any change St. Lawrence, 1 Black, 526, 527, 17 L. ed., is desired in its rules, other than those of pro183, where he says: "Judicial power, in all cedure, it must be made by the Legislative Decases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, partment. It cannot be supposed that the is delegated by the Constitution to the Fed- framers of the Constitution contemplated that eral Government in general terms, and courts the law should forever remain unalterable. of this character had then been established Congress, undoubtedly, has authority under the in all commercial and maritime nations, differ- commercial power, if no other, to introduce ing, however, materially in different countries such changes as are likely to be needed. The in the powers and duties confided to them: scope of the maritime law, and that of comthe extent of the jurisdiction conferred de-mercial regulation are not coterminous, it is pending very much upon the character of the true, but the latter embraces much the largest government in which they were created; and this circumstance, with the general terms of the portion of ground covered by the former. Under it Congress has regulated the registry, enrollgrant, rendered it difficult to define the exact limits of its power in the United States. This ment, license and nationality of ships and vesdifficulty was increased by the complex charac- sels; the method of recording bills of sale and ter of our government, where separate and dis-mortgages thereon; the rights and duties of tinct specified powers of sovereignty are exerseamen; the limitations of the responsibility of cised by the United States and a State inde-ship-owners for the negligence and misconduct pendently of each other within the same territorial limits. And the reports of the decisions of the court will show that the subject has often been before it, and carefully considered, without being able to fix with precision its definite boundaries; but certainly no state law can en576*] large it, nor can an Act of Congress or of their captains and crews; and many other things of a character truly maritime. And with regard to the question now under consideration, namely: the rights of material men in reference to supplies and repairs furnished to a vessel in her home port, there does not seem to be any great reason to doubt that Congress might adopt a uniform rule for the whole country, though, plies, repairs or other necessaries, was in force of course, this will be a matter for considera- until May 6, 1872, when the new Rule was protion should the question ever be directly pre-mulgated. Now, this case was commenced in the sented for adjudication. same. As to the recent change in the Admiralty Rule referred to, it is sufficient to say, that it was simply intended to remove all obstructions and embarrassments in the way of instituting proceedings in rem in all cases where liens exist by law, and not to create any new lien, which, of course, this court could not do in any event, since a lien is a right of property, and not mere matter of procedure. district court a year previous to this, and final On this subject the remarks of Mr. Justice judgment in the district court was rendered two Nelson, in delivering the opinion of the court months previous. It is true that the judgment in Bk. v. Smith, 7 Wall., 655, 656, 19 L. ed. of the circuit court, on appeal, was not rendered 213 (which established the validity and effect until the 3d day of June, 1872; but if the new of the Act respecting the recording of mort- Rule had at that time been brought to the attengages on vessels in the custom house), arction of the court, it could hardly have been appertinent. He says: "Ships or vessels of the plied to the case in its then position. All the United States are creatures of the legislation of proceedings had been based and shaped upon Congress. None can be denominated such, or other grounds and theories, and not upon the be entitled to the benefits or privileges thereof, existence of that rule. It would not have been except those registered or enrolled according to just to the other parties to apply to them a rule the Act of September 1, 1789; and those which, which was not in existence when they were after the last day of March, 1793, shall be regis- carrying on the litigation. tered or enrolled in pursuance of the Act of 31st December, 1792, and must be wholly owned by 578*] a citizen or citizens of the United* States, and to be commanded by a citizen of the Congress having created, as it were, this species of property, and conferred upon its chief value under the power given in the Constitution to regulate commerce, we perceive no reason for entertaining any serious doubt but that this power may be extended to the security and protection of the rights and title of all persons dealing therein. The judicial mind seems to have generally taken this direc tion." This case was subsequently affirmed by Aldrich v. Etna Co., 8 Wall., 491, 19 L. ed., 473. Be this, however, as it may, and whether the power of Congress is or is not sufficient to amend the law on this subject (if amendment is desirable), this court is bound to declare the law as it now stands. And according to the maritime | law as accepted and received in this country, we feel bound to declare that no such lien exists as is claimed by the appellees in this case. The adjudications of this court before referred to, which it is unnecessary to review, are conclusive on the subject; and we see no sufficient ground for disturbing them. This disposes of the principal question in the case. But it is alleged by the appellees that by the law of Louisiana they have a privilege for their claims, giving them a lien on the vessel and her proceeds; and that the court was bound to enforce this lien in their behalf, though not strictly a maritime lien. Had the lien been perfected, and had the Rule not stood in the way, the principles that have heretofore governed the practice of the district courts exercising admiralty jurisdiction, and which have been repeatedly sanctioned by this court, would undoubtedly have authorized the material men to file a libel against the vessel or its proceeds. The General Smith, 4 Wheat., 438; Peyroux v. Howard, 7 Pet., 324; The Orleans v. Phœbus, 11 Pet., 175; The St. Lawrence, 1 Black, 522, 17 L. ed. 180. It seems to [*580 be settled in our jurisprudence that so long as Congress does not enterpose to regulate the subject, the rights of material men furnishing necessaries to a vessel in her home port may be regulated in each State by state legislation. State laws, it is true, cannot exclude the contract for furnishing such necessaries from the domain of admiralty jurisdiction, for it is a maritime contract, and they cannot alter the limits of that jurisdiction; nor can they confer it upon the state courts so as to enable them to proceed in rem for the enforcement of liens created by such state laws, for it is exclusively conferred upon the District Courts of the United States. They can only authorize the enforcement thereof by common law remedies, or such remedies as are equivalent thereto. But the On examining the record, however, it appears that the appellees never caused their lien (if they had one) to be recorded according to the require-District Courts of the United States having ments of the state law. By the 123d article of the Constitution of Louisiana, adopted in 1869, it is declared that no "mortgage or privilege shall hereafter affect third parties, unless recorded in the parish where the property to be affected is situated," And an Act of the Legislature, passed since that time, adopts the very terms of the constitutional provision. And a further Act provides that if the privilege be not in writing, the facts on which it is based must 579*] be stated in an affidavit, which must be recorded. Rev. Civ. Code, Arts. 3273, 3274, 3093. None of these requisites having been performed, no lien can be claimed under the state law. But if there were any doubt on this subject, the case of the appellees is met by another difficulty. The Admiralty Rule of 1859, which precluded the district courts from entertaining pro. ceedings in rem against domestic ships for sup jurisdiction of the contract as a maritime one, may enforce liens given for its security, even when created by state laws. Cases supra. The has existed from the origin of the government practice may be somewhat anomalous, but it and, perhaps, was originally superinduced by the fact that prior to the adoption of the Constitution, liens of this sort created by state laws had been enforced by the state courts of admiralty; and as those courts were immediately succeeded by the District Courts of the United States, and in several instances the judge of the state court was transferred to the district court, it was natural, in the infancy of federal legislation on commercial subjects, for the latter courts to entertain jurisdiction over the same classes of cases, in every respect as the state courts had done, without due regard to the new relations which the States had assumed towards the maritime law and admiralty jurisdiction. For example: in 1784, the Legislature of Pennsylvania passed a law allowing persons concerned in building, repairing, fitting out and furnishing vessels for a voyage, to sue in admiralty as mariners sue for wages. Two cases, those of The Collier and The Enterprise, arising under this law, and coming before the Admiralty Court of Pennsylvania, are reported 581*] in Judge Hopkinson's works, Vol. 3, pp. 131, 171 [8. C., Bee., 345]. No doubt other cases of the same kind occurred in the courts of other States. But, whatever may have been the origin of the practice, and whether or not it was based on the soundest principles, it became firmly settled, and it is now too late to question its validity. It is true that the inconveniences arising from the often intricate and conflicting state laws creating such liens, induced this court in December Term, 1858, to abrogate that portion of the 12th Admiralty Rule of 1844 which allowed proceedings in rem against domestic ships for repairs and supplies furnished in the home port, and to allow proceedings in personam only in such cases. But we have now restored the Rule of 1844, or, rather, we have made it general in its terms, giving to material men in all cases their option to proceed either in rem or in personam. Of course this modification of the Rule cannot avail where no lien exists; but where one does exist, no matter by what law, it removes all obstacles to a proceeding in rem, if credit is given to the vessel. It would, undoubtedly, be far more satisfactory to have a uniform law regulating such liens, but until such a law be adopted (supposing Congress to have the power) the authority of the States to legislate on the subject seems to be conceded by the uniform course of decisions. Indeed, there is quite an extensive field of border legislation on commercial subjects (generally local in character) which may be regulated by state laws until Congress interposes, and thereby excludes further state legislation. Pilotage is one of the subjects in this category. So far as Congress has interposed, its authority is supreme and exclusive; but where it has not done so, the matter is still left to the regulation of state laws. And yet this exercise by the States of the power to regulate pilotage has not withdrawn the subject and, indeed, cannot 582*] withdraw it from the admiralty *jurisdiction of the district courts. Cooley v. War dens, 12 How., 299; Ex parte McNiel, 13 Wall., 236, 20 L. ed., 624. And, of course, as before intimated, this jurisdiction of the State Legislatures in such cases is subject to be terminated at any time by Congress assuming the control. In some cases this is not so desirable as in others, but in the one under consideration, if Congress has the power to intervene, it is greatly to be desired that it should do so. It would be better to have the subject regulated by the general maritime law of the country than by differing state laws. The evils arising from conflicting lien laws passed by the several States are forcibly set forth by Chief Justice Taney, in the case of The St. Lawrence, before cited. It may be added that the existence of secret liens is not in accord with the spirit of our commercial usages, and a uniform law by which the liens in question should be required within a reasonable time to be placed on record in the custom-house like mortgages, and otherwise properly regulated, would be of great advantage to the business community. But there is another mode in which the appellees, if they had a valid lien, could come into the district court and claim the benefit thereof, namely: by a petition for the application of the surplus proceeds of the vessel to the payment of their debts, under the 43d Admiralty Rule. The court has power to distribute surplus proceeds to all those who can show a vested interest therein, in the order of their several priorities, no matter how their claims orig. inated. Schuchardt v. Babbage (The Angeli que), 19 How., 239, 15 L. ed., 625. The propriety of such a distribution in the admiralty has been questioned on the ground that the court would thereby draw to itself equity jurisdic tion. The Neptune, 3 Knapp, P. C., 111. But it is a wholesome jurisdiction very commonly exercised by nearly all superior courts to distribute a fund rightfully in its possession to those who are legally entitled to it; and there is no sound reason why admiralty courts should not do the same. If a case should be so [*583 complicated as to require the interposition of a court of equity, the district court could refuse to act, and refer the parties to a more competent tribunal. See cases reviewed in 1 Conkl. Adm., pp., 48-66, 2d ed. In this case the appellants themselves have no maritime lien, but merely a mortgage to secure an ordinary debt not founded on a maritime contract. They, therefore have no standing in court, except under the 43d Admiralty Rule, and in the manner above indicated. Their libel was inadmissible, even under the Admiralty Rule as recently modified. Bogart v. The John Jay, 17 How., 399, 15 L. ed. 95. But before the final decree they filed a petition for the surplus proceeds, and, as there is no question in the case about fraudulent preference under the Bankrupt Law, they are entitled to those proceeds towards satisfaction of their mortgage. The decree of the Circuit Court is reversed, and it is ordered that the record be remanded, with instructions to enter a decree in favor of the appellants, in conformity with this opinion. Mr. Justice Clifford, dissenting: Controversy, sometimes of an embittered character, existed in the courts of the parent country respecting the jurisdiction of the admiralty court for a century before the American Colonies separated from that country and proclaimed their independence. Differences of opinion also have existed here as to the proper extent of that jurisdiction ever since the adop tion of the Federal Constitution, as evidneced by the decisions of the Supreme Court at different periods in our judicial history. Attempt was made at an early period to limit the jurisdiction of the admiralty courts to tidewaters, and to exclude its exercise altogether from waters within the body of a county, whether the waters were or were not affected by the ebb and flow of the tide. Express decision to the effect that the admiralty had no obviate the embarrassment were also attempted by the courts, all of which were equally unsuc cessful, until the Supreme Court was brought face to face with the question whether the rule of decision that the jurisdiction of the admiralty was limited to the ebb and flow of the tide could be upheld as a correct exposition of that clause of the Constitution which provides that the judicial power of the United States shall extend to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. 584*] jurisdiction even in a suit for seamen's | furnish a remedy for the difficulty, which was wages, was made in the case of The Jefferson, 10 by no means satisfactory, and expedients to Wheat., 428, except in cases where the service is substantially performed upon the sea or upon waters within the ebb and flow of the tide. Jurisdiction of the admiralty courts at that period in the parent country did not extend to any case where the common law courts could give the parties a remedy in a trial by jury, and the theory here for a long time was that the clause of the 9th section of the Judiciary Act which saves to suitors the right to a common law remedy, where the common law is competent to give it, excluded all cases from the jurisdiction of the admiralty courts if the cause of action arose or accrued infra corpus comitatus. Protracted acquiescence in that theory gave it for a time the force of law, until the question was presented directly to the Supreme Court, when the whole theory was completely over turned in all cases where the cause of action, whether tort or contract, had respect to acts done or service performed upon tide-waters. Waring v. Clarke, 5 How., 452. Doubts of a perplexing character arose in some of the circuits whether affreightment contracts were cognizable in the admiralty, which ultimately culminated in an absolute denial of the jurisdiction in all such cases. Wide differences of opinion upon the subject existed, and in order to its final settlement the question was presented to the Supreme Court in its whole length and breadth. Nav. Co. v. Bk. [The Leaington], 6 How., 392. Nothing was left undone in that case, on either side, which could be accomplished by a skillful argument and indefatigable research. Two of the propositions, one selected from each side, will serve to illustrate the nature of the contention and the wide range of the discussion. By the appellants it was insisted that the district courts had no jurisdiction over such a contract, because it was made on land, within the body of a county, for the transportation of 585*] goods in a described route over inland waters landlocked the whole way, and because the contemplated voyage terminated infra fauces terræ. Opposed to that, the appellees contended that in all cases of contract the question is, whether the contract or service to be performed is in its nature maritime, and that in all cases of maritime contract the proceeding may be in rem or in personam, at the option of the libelant. Elaborate discussion followed, but the Supreme Court silenced forever all well founded doubts upon that subject. Such jurisdiction, however, was in the united view of the Supreme Court at that time, limited to tide-waters, nor did either of the learned justices who delivered the opinions of the court in those cases even intimate that the court could entertain appellate jurisdiction in such a case if the cause of action consisted of acts done or service performed on waters not affected by the ebb and flow of the tide. Admiralty jurisdiction, by virtue of those decisions, continued in our jurisprudence to be limited to the ebb and flow of the tide for more than a quarter of a century, in spite of the deep sented dissatisfaction which existed in all parts of the country interested in Western commerce or in the navigation of the great lakes and rivers of that portion of the Union. Subsequent attempt was made by Congress to 21 WALL. U. S., Book 22. Opposition to change induced the cry of stare decisis, just as when the argument was presented that the admiralty jurisdiction followed the tide even within the body of a county. Such a cry proved to be insufficient to restrain the advance of admiralty jurisdiction or [*586 to prevent it from entering even into the acknowledged limits of States having tide-waters within their borders, and it was again destined to a still greater defeat when it was invoked as the means of perpetuating the great error that the admiralty jurisdiction did not extend to the great lakes and fresh water rivers of our country. Public duty required the court to review the former case, and the great magistrate presiding over the court did not hesitate to reverse the rule of decision there established and to determine to the effect that the admiralty jurisdiction is not limited to tide-waters, and that it extended to all public lakes and rivers used for the purpose of commerce and navigation between the States or for foreign trade. Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 12 How., 454. Strenuous effort was subsequently made to induce the court to qualify the rule there laid down, or to restrict its application so that the jurisdiction of the admiralty courts should not extend to acts done or service performed within the body of a county, if the waters were above the flux and reflux of the tide, but this court refused to adopt any such qualification, and reaffirmed, in the most authoritative manner, the rule previously announced in the two leading cases upon those subjects. Jackson v. The Magnolia, 20 How., 298, 15 L. ed., 910; Waring v. Clarke, supra; Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 12 How., 454. Unquestionably, the jurisdiction of the admiralty is, by those cases, made to depend upon the navigable character of the water, and not upon the ebb and flow of the tide, and the court say, in the case last cited, if the water is navigable, it is deemed to be public, and if public, it is regarded as within the legitimate scope of the admiralty jurisdiction of the Constitution. Except for one or two expressions contained in the opinion of the Chief Justice, which are much intensified in the head note of the case, and which are repeated in the opinion in the case of The Magnolia, those two decisions would, in all probability, have settled [*587 the general question of admiralty jurisdiction under the Constitution, free from several perplexing embarrassments which presented themselves in subsequent litigations. Considerable weight is given, in those opinions, to the circumstance that the great lakes and fresh water rivers are the theater of extended commerce between different States and with foreign na 665 tions, and this court subsequently fell into the error that the admiralty jurisdiction of the district courts was limited by the commercial power of the Constitution, and decided in two cases that an affreightment contract for the transportation of goods from one port in a State to another port in the same State, or that a contract for necessary repairs and supplies furnished to trade, is not within the admiralty jurisdiction of the Federal Courts. Allen v. Newberry, 21 How., 245, 16 L. ed., 111; Maguire v. Card, 21 How., 250, 16 L. ed. 118. a vessel in such a Such an error was too palpable not to attract the attention of the court as soon as a case was presented involving the same question, and two or three years later, such a question was presented in the form of a libel for a collision, and the court unanimously decided that the admiralty jurisdiction was conferred by the Constitution; that in cases of tort the question is wholly unaffected by the consideration that the ship was not engaged in foreign commerce or in commerce between the States; that the jurisdiction whether the cause of action is contract or tort, does not depend on the regulations of commerce; that the two matters of jurisdiction are entirely distinct things, and that they were conferred by separate and distinct grants; that locality is the test of jurisdiction in cases of tort, and that, consequently, if the wrongful act is done on navigable waters, the case is one properly cognizable in the admiralty courts. The Commerce, 1 Black, 578, 17 L. ed., 109. Attention was again called to those two cases in an affreightment suit, when they were both distinctly overruled without hesitation, and the whole court decided that contracts, claims or service purely maritime and touching 588*] *rights and duties appertaining to commerce and navigation, are of admiralty connizance and properly cognizable in the district courts. The Belfast, 7 Wall., 637, 19 L. ed. 270. Pending these difficulties and before the Supreme Court decided that the Judiciary Act extended the admiralty jurisdiction over all our navigable waters, the restriction that it did not extend to voyages from a port in one State to another port in the same State had become incorporated into the Act of Congress passed professedly to extend such jurisdiction to the great lakes and the rivers connected with the same; but the Supreme Court, in view of the constant and perplexing embarrassment growing out of that restriction, did not hesitate to decide that the Act of Congress in that regard had become obsolete and inoperative, and that the admiralty jurisdiction created by the Constitution and conferred by the Judiciary Act was the same everywhere within the United States, and that every distinction between tidewaters and other navigable waters was in that regard obliterated and overruled. The Eagle, 8 Wall., 20, 19 L. ed. 368. Erroneous theories also became prevalent in certain quarters in respect to the true nature of the liability of the owners of ships and vessels for necessary repairs and supplies furnished to the master on the credit of the ship, that the burden of proof was in all cases upon the merchant to show both that the ship needed such necessaries and that the master was justified in resorting to the credit of the vessel. Decrees to that effect were rendered in the circuit courts, but on appeal to this court the error was corrected and the true rule applied in the case. The Lulu, 10 Wall., 197, 19 L. ed. 907; The Grapeshot, 9 Wall., 129, 19 L. ed., 651. Where it appears that the repairs and supplies are necessary to enable the ship to proceed on her voyage the presumption is, if they are furnished in good faith, that the ship as well as the master and owner is responsible to those who supplied such necessaries unless it appears that the master had funds which he ought to have applied to those objects, [*589 and that the furnishers knew or ought to have known those facts. The Kalorama, 10 Wall., 205, 19 L. ed. 941; The Custer, 10 Wall., 215, 19 L. ed. 944. Sufficient has been remarked to show that the several decisions referred to had the effect to remove every stumbling-block in the way of the full legitimate exercise of admiralty jurisdiction except two-the one arising from the long acquiescence of the legal profession in the opin ion that the admiralty courts could not take cognizance of suits founded upon marine policies of insurance, and the other growing out of an early decision of this court which it is supposed prohibits the admiralty courts from tak ing jurisdiction of a libel in rem filed by a material man to enforce a contract for necessary repairs and supplies furnished to a ship in her home port. Happily, the first of the two obstructions mentioned is removed by a more recent decision of this court, and it is much to be regretted that the majority of this court have decided not to remove the other until they "have" a more "convenient season" to accomplish that great purpose. Ins. Co. v. Dunham, 11 Wall., 21, 20 L. ed. 96. Promptitude in correcting such an error, when it is discovered, is very desirable, as the longer it is suffered to prevail the greater is the danger that the correction will impair vested rights. Justice is slow but sure, and it is not doubted that sooner or later the cor rection will come, as the rule of decision which prohibits the exercise of jurisdiction in such a case is manifestly founded in mistake. Enough of the facts of the case appear in the opinion of the court without reproducing to much extent the details of the evidence. Suffice it to say, that the controversy has respect to the balance of a fund in the registry of the district court, derived from the sale of a steamer seized and sold for the payment of seamen's wages. Both parties in this court were inter veners in the district court. Appellants claim what remains of the proceeds of the sale as mortgagees by virtue of a mortgage of the steamer executed to them by the owner. [*590 On the other hand, the appellees make claim to the same by virtue of the lien which they insist they have for repairs and necessary supplies furnished to the master on the credit of the vessel. Proofs were taken and the parties heard, and the district court ultimately determined that the mortgagees were entitled to the balance of the fund. Due appeal was taken by the interveners who furnished the repairs and supplies, to the circuit court, where the parties were again heard, and the circuit court reversed the decree of the district court and en |