CORPORATION v. BARCLAY. C.J. decide that, as between two innocent parties, one of whom had 1902 innocently and without negligence handed in a forged transfer, SHEFFIELD upon which forged transfer the company were asked to act, the loss was to fall upon the person who handed in the transfer, or, in other words, they brought that case within the rule to which Lord Alverstone I have referred that where one of two innocent parties must suffer, the party who has innocently put forward the request upon which the other one has acted must bear the burden. If I am right in this view, then the opinion of Lord Lindley does not solve the question in this case, because he did not consider the case from the point of view of deciding which of two innocent parties must suffer the loss occasioned by the act done. It is to be noted in this case, as pointed out by Mr. Bankes in the course of his argument, that the damage occasioned to the defendant was not damage caused so much by the forged transfer having been sent in as by the defendants having themselves acted upon it and sent in the subsequent transfers to Young and Macdonald and to Cockayne. Simm's Case (1) decides that Messrs. Barclay could not have claimed to be registered (see the judgment of Bramwell L.J. (2)); so that the company were not estopped from denying that Messrs. Barclay were tranferees until they had issued fresh certificates to Young and Macdonald and Cockayne: see In re Bahia and San Francisco Ry. Co. (3) and Hart v. Frontino, &c., Gold Mining Co. (4) I therefore come to the conclusion that in this case, as between the two innocent persons, the plaintiffs and the defendants, the loss should be borne by the defendants, who innocently caused the plaintiffs to act upon an instrument which turned out to be invalid. Reliance was placed by Mr. Danckwerts upon the terms of the letter of April 15. In my opinion the express terms of that letter do not afford any special ground on which the plaintiffs can rely. It seems to me no more than an ordinary request to register; and in the same way the expression "duly executed" in s. 29, sub-s. 4, of the Sheffield Corporation Act does not carry the case any further. With regard to s. 30, (1) 5 Q. B. D. 188. (2) 5 Q. B. D. at p. 203. VOL. I. 1903. C (3) L. R. 3 Q. B. 584. 2 1902 sub-s. 1, relied upon by Mr. Haldane, I do not think it affords SHEFFIELD the defendants any defence for the reasons given, and except as bearing on the question of negligence that section does not seem to me to affect the point which I have to decide. CORPORATION V. BARCLAY. Lord Alverstone My attention was called by Mr. Danckwerts to two American cases-Boston and Albany Railroad Co. v. Richardson (1) and Brown v. Howard Fire Insurance Co. (2) The first of these cases is an undoubted decision in favour of the view presented by the plaintiffs; but I have not sufficient information as to the American law to say whether it is a direct authority, because it may be that the law as to innocent misrepresentation laid down by the House of Lords in Derry v. Peek (3) does not apply in the State of Massachusetts. The case of Oliver v. Bank of England (4) does not appear to me to afford me much assistance. That case was based entirely upon implied warranty, and the rule in Collen v. Wright (5) is undoubtedly left untouched by Derry v. Peek. (3) Speaking for myself, I should not have decided in favour of the plaintiff if it had been necessary to rely upon the doctrine of Collen v. Wright. (5) For the above reasons my judgment must be for the plaintiffs. Judgment for the plaintiffs. Solicitors for plaintiffs: R. F. & C. L. Smith, for H. Sayer, Sheffield. Solicitors for defendants: Maples, Teesdale & Co. (1) 135 Mass. 473. (2) 42 Maryland Rep. 384. (3) 14 App. Cas. 337. (5) 8 E. & B. 647. J. F. C. THE GUARDIANS OF THE POOR OF THE ORMS- Poor Law Settlement Irremovability Residence -"Hospital" - Poor Removal Act, 1846 (9 & 10 Vict. c. 66), s. 1. An institution partially endowed by a private person and founded with the object of providing a home and medical treatment, together with suitable employment and recreation, for persons suffering from epilepsy, the main part of the expenses being defrayed by payments of the inmates, is a "hospital" within the proviso to s. 1 of the Poor Removal Act, 1846. SPECIAL CASE stated by consent and by order of a judge in pursuance of 12 & 13 Vict. c. 45, s. 11. On January 10, 1902, the respondents obtained an order of two justices of the peace in and for the city of Manchester adjudging the settlement of Harold Coxon, a pauper, to be in the township of Maghull, in the appellant union. On February 8, 1902, the appellants gave notice of appeal against the order to the general quarter sessions of the peace for the city of Manchester, and the appeal was at the said quarter sessions entered and respited. Coxon was about twenty-four years of age, and was admitted as a patient into an institution called the Home for Epileptics at Maghull on April 4, 1893, suffering from the disease of epilepsy, for the purpose of receiving care and treatment, and, if possible, of obtaining a cure of such disease, and he remained, continuously receiving care and treatment in the home from the date of his admission until January 8, 1902, when he was discharged as incurable. Thereupon he became an inmate of the workhouse of the respondents. Whilst Coxon was in the home his relations paid 7s. 6d. a week for his maintenance and treatment therein. Coxon never resided or dwelt in the appellant union for any period of time whatever during which he could acquire a settlement therein except during the period and for the purpose above mentioned. 1902 Oct. 27. 1902 UNION V. UNION. The Home for Epileptics was established in 1888 by Henry ORMSKIRK COX, deceased, of Liverpool, and was partially endowed by him with the sum of 2000l. It consisted of buildings, farm buildCHORLTON ings, and five acres of land farmed by the committee which governed the home. It was supported by donations, annual subscriptions, and payments made on behalf of the patients under care and treatment therein. Its object was the care and treatment of persons suffering from the disease of epilepsy. The home was situate at Maghull, a village in the country about seven miles from Liverpool. The site was chosen so as to permit the patients to have the benefit of the hospital treatment in combination with healthy outdoor life, regular habits, suitable employment, and recreation. There was attached to the home a medical staff, a lady superintendent, three matrons, and twelve nurses. The number of patients on December 31, 1901, receiving care and treatment for the disease of epilepsy was 123. Annexed to the case was a pamphlet relating to the history and constitution of the home and the annual report and balance-sheet for 1901. It was stated in the pamphlet that it was considered necessary that each patient should be paid for, so as to make the institution as far as possible self-supporting. The patients were, therefore, divided into three classes, paying two guineas, one guinea, and 7s. 6d. a week respectively, with the intention that while the third class of patients paid only for their food, the charge for the first and second class would leave a profit to defray the expenses of the establishment, nursing, &c. It appeared from the balance-sheet for 1901 that the income of the institution was 50751., of which 41571. was derived from payments by patients, and 2381. from donations and subscriptions. The appellants asserted and the respondents denied that the home was a hospital within the meaning of s. 1 of the Poor Removal Act, 1846 (1), and that during the time Coxon (1) The Poor Removal Act, 1846 (9 & 10 Vict. c. 66), s. 1: "No person shall be removed nor shall any warrant be granted for the removal of any person from any parish in which such person shall have resided for five years (reduced to one year by 28 & 29 Vict. c. 79) next before the resided in the home he was confined as a patient in a hospital, 1902 so that the residence was not computable for settlement ORMSKIRK purposes. The question for the opinion of the Court was whether or not, on the facts above set out, Coxon acquired a legal settlement in the township of Maghull aforesaid, under the provisions of s. 1 of the Poor Removal Act, 1846, and s. 34 of the Divided Parishes Act, 1876 (1), by reason of his continuous residence for three consecutive years and upwards in the Home for Epileptics. If the Court should be of opinion in the affirmative, the order of the justices was to stand; otherwise the same was to be quashed. T. F. Byrne, for the appellants. The question in the case turns on whether this Home for Epileptics is a hospital within s. 1 of the Poor Removal Act, 1846. If it is, then the period during which the pauper resided there does not count for the purpose of rendering him irremovable, and consequently he acquired no settlement in the appellant union. The term "hospital" is not defined in this Act, and there is no authority on the point; but it is submitted that a hospital includes any institution in which sick persons are received for the purpose of treatment. This institution is clearly within that definition. It was founded for the purpose of treating a particular disease, and it is none the less a hospital because it is partially, or even mainly, supported by payments by the patients. It is notorious that many application for the warrant: Provided always, that the time during which such person shall be a prisoner in a prison, or shall be serving Her Majesty as a soldier, marine, or sailor, or reside as an in-pensioner in Greenwich or Chelsea Hospitals, or shall be confined in a lunatic asylum or house duly licensed or hospital registered for the reception of lunatics, or as a patient in a hospital, . . . shall for all purposes be excluded in the computation of time herein before mentioned. . . .” (1) The Divided Parishes and Poor Law Amendment Act, 1876 (39 & 40 Vict. c. 61), s. 34: "Where any person shall have resided for the term of three years in any parish in such manner and under such circumstances in each of such years, as would in accordance with the several statutes in that behalf render him irremovable, he shall be deemed to be settled therein until he shall acquire a settlement in some other parish by a like residence or otherwise; UNION V. CHORLTON |