C. A. 1902 BAKER, regard to parliamentary taxation, the period being twelve months in one case and six in the other. In the case of the latter Acts the certificates of the Speaker and of the Clerk of LEES & Co., Parliaments respectively are final and conclusive, and operate as warrants of attorney to confess judgment, whereas under the Solicitors Act, 1843, there may be appeals up to the House of Lords. There are also other inconsistencies between the two sets of provisions. IN THE MATTER OF. [They cited on this point Daw v. Metropolitan Board of Works (1); O'Flaherty v. M'Dowell. (2)] The fact that the appellants are solicitors, as well as parliamentary agents, is an accident, and it does not follow, therefore, that they necessarily act as solicitors in respect of work which they do as parliamentary agents. There are parliamentary agents, who are not solicitors, and, with respect to their bills, the only provisions for taxation applicable are those of the House of Commons Costs Taxation Act, 1847, and the House of Lords Costs Taxation Act, 1849. The true test for determination of the question whether a bill of costs is taxable under the Solicitors Act, 1843, is laid down in Allen v. Aldridge. (3) In the case of In re Sudlow (4) the solicitors really assented to taxation of their bill provided it was taxed on the parliamentary scale. Cases such as In re Strother (5) are really cases in which a mixed bill had been delivered, including charges for work done by the respondent as a solicitor. [They also cited In re Oliver (6); In re Osborne (7); In re Jones. (8)] Warrington, K.C., and Tudor Howell, for the respondent. Taking the second point made for the appellants first, it is submitted that a solicitor who does work as a parliamentary agent is doing work which is undoubtedly solicitor's work. A man may, it is true, do parliamentary agent's work, though he is not a solicitor, or qualified as such, but it does not follow (1) (1862) 31 L. J. (C.P.) 223. (8) (1844) 5 Beav. 401. (5) (1857) 3 K. & J. 518. (6) (1867) 36 L. J. (Ch.) 261. from that that a solicitor employed by a client to act as a parliamentary agent for him is not acting as a solicitor. The House of Commons Costs Taxation Act, 1847, and the House of Lords Costs Taxation Act, 1849, both speak in the preamble of "costs and expenses to be charged by parliamentary agents, attornies, solicitors, and others in future sessions of Parliament in respect of bills subject to the payment of fees in Parliament, commonly called private bills," thereby shewing that they recognise it as part of the proper work of solicitors to act as parliamentary agents in relation to such proceedings in Parliament. When the Solicitors Act, 1843, was passed, the provisions of the Acts of George IV. with regard to parliamentary costs were in force, but there is no exception made in the Solicitors Act, 1843, such as one would expect to find, if it were intended to except from its operation the costs of solicitors in respect of parliamentary matters. Sect. 12 of the House of Lords Costs Taxation Act, 1849, really assumes that there is jurisdiction to tax such bills as this under the Solicitors Act, 1843, for it provides that the taxing officer of the House of Lords, or of the House of Commons, as the case may be, shall assist the officer of any Court who has to tax with regard to any costs, charges, and expenses incurred in respect of a private bill. This shews that the fact that the work done by a solicitor is that of a parliamentary agent does not oust the jurisdiction to order taxation of his charges in respect of the work under the Solicitors Act, 1843. In re Strother (1) and In re Sudlow (2) are distinct authorities in the respondent's favour. In Allen v. Aldridge (3) the solicitor acted only as steward of the manor. [ROMER L.J. It being admitted that a parliamentary agent need not be a solicitor, it does not appear to follow, from the fact that a parliamentary agent is also a solicitor, that he necessarily acts quâ solicitor in acting as a parliamentary agent. The true rule would seem to be that all the circumstances of the particular case should be considered in order to see whether he really acted in pursuance of the relation of solicitor and client existing between himself and his employer, in which case (2) 11 Beav. 400. (1) 3 K. & J. 518. (3) 5 Beav. 401. C. A. 1902 BAKER, taxation of his bill might be directed under the Solicitors Act, 1843, or in some other capacity than that of a solicitor ?] If the Court is against the respondent on the second point LEES & Co., taken by the appellants, it is of no use to argue the first point. Danckwerts, K.C., was not called upon to reply. IN THE MATTER OF. COLLINS M.R. The question which arises in this case is whether the bill of costs of parliamentary agents, who are also solicitors, relating exclusively to their costs as parliamentary agents, is subject to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court for the purpose of taxation. The master held that it was not, but Ridley J. reversed his decision, and directed that the bill should be referred to a master for taxation. From that decision the present appeal is brought. The contention for the appellants is that, there being special enactments which regulate the taxation of costs in relation to proceedings in Parliament, namely, the House of Commons Costs Taxation Act, 1847, and the House of Lords Costs Taxation Act, 1849, and the terms of these enactments being inconsistent with those of the Solicitors Act, 1843, s. 37, the provisions of that Act cannot be applicable to the taxation of such costs. On looking at those statutes, it certainly does appear that they respectively contain provisions with regard to the taxation of the costs of persons employed to conduct proceedings as parliamentary agents, which differ in most material points from the procedure laid down under the Solicitors Act, 1843. It is not immaterial to observe that, where a person so employed is not a solicitor, but only a parliamentary agent, there is no other mode of taxing his bill but that given by the two statutes to which I have referred. The appellants' counsel went through the provisions of the previous Acts relating to the taxation of parliamentary costs, but they are all really summed up in the provisions of those two Acts, the House of Commons Costs Taxation Act, 1847, and the House of Lords Costs Taxation Act, 1849. By those Acts the certificate of the Speaker in the case of proceedings in the House of Commons, and that of the Clerk of Parliaments in the case of proceedings in the House of Lords, are respectively made final and conclusive, whereas in the case of a taxation under the Solicitors Act, 1843, there may be appeals up to the House of Lords; and there are many other material differences between the provisions of these Acts and those of the Solicitors Act, 1843, as for instance with regard to the limits of time within which an order for taxation may be obtained. The appellants' counsel do not contend that the immunity from taxation by any other means than those given by the before-mentioned statutes with regard to parliamentary costs applies where a bill is delivered by a solicitor, who claims in that bill to make charges in respect of matters other than parliamentary proceedings as well as in respect of such proceedings. It is not disputed that this Court would have jurisdiction to order taxation in such a case; but, in respect of a bill, which consists exclusively of items within the provisions of the Acts relating to parliamentary costs, and which, if the person delivering the bill were not a solicitor, would be taxable only under those Acts, the appellants' counsel contend, and I think rightly contend, that the special jurisdiction given by those Acts must be taken to be, and is, incompatible with the existence, as regards that bill, of the jurisdiction given by the Solicitors Act, 1843, in relation to the taxation of solicitors' costs; and that the circumstance that the person, who has delivered the bill in respect of work done by him as a parliamentary agent, happens also to be a solicitor does not bring the bill within that jurisdiction. That contention appears to me to be sound, as a result of the comparison of the provisions of the Acts with regard to the taxation of parliamentary costs and those of the Solicitors Act, 1843. That being so, it remains for me to consider certain cases, which are said to have established a practice to the contrary. If there were a settled practice in regard to such a matter as the taxation of costs, one might hesitate to interfere with it. But, when one comes to analyze the cases, I think they may all be reconciled by the principle formulated by my brother Romer in the course of the argument; namely that, where the bill of costs relates to work which may be done by a person who is merely a parliamentary agent, and which has been done by a person who is both a parliamentary agent and also a solicitor, one must look C. A. 1902 ВАКЕВ, LEES & CO., IN THE MATTER OF. Collins M.R. closely at the circumstances of the particular case in order to |