1902 hospitals, using the word in the most limited sense, receive ORMSKIRK paying patients. UNION V. UNION. Brooke Little, for the respondents. In order that an instituCHORLTON tion can be a hospital within this section, it must fulfil two conditions. Its main object must be to provide medical treatment, and the greater part of the work must be done gratuitously. This home falls within neither branch of this definition. The fact that in this Act hospitals are grouped with places like prisons, barracks, and lunatic asylums shews that the reason of the Legislature in excluding residence in the places specified was that residence in them was involuntary. If it had been intended to include an institution like this home, residence in which is entirely voluntary, and is moreover paid for by the inmates, very different language would have been used. [He referred to St. Olave's Union v. Canterbury Union. (1)] LORD ALVERSTONE C.J. This case raises an important point, and one which in the absence of authority must be decided on principle. The question is whether the pauper has acquired a legal settlement in the appellant union by reason of his having resided in that union. The answer to that question depends on s. 1 of the Poor Removal Act, 1846, which, stated shortly, provides that the time during which a person resides in certain institutions, such as a prison, a lunatic asylum, or a hospital, shall be excluded from the computation of the period of residence which renders a person irremovable. I do not think that one can state exhaustively the reasons for this provision, but the section seems to contemplate an exemption, from the consequences of the ordinary rule, of that kind of residence which does not depend on the will of the person, and which causes him to reside in a particular place for a particular purpose. I think that the intention of the section was to include, amongst other places, institutions to which persons go for the purpose of medical or quasi-medical treatment, and which are in popular language called hospitals, and in my opinion this institution comes within the term "hospital." I (1) [1897] 1 Q. B. 438. 1902 ORMSKIRK v. UNION. Lord Alverstone C.J. was at first inclined to doubt whether a distinction ought not to be drawn between hospitals in the ordinary sense of the word and institutions where the bulk of the patients pay for the treatment which they receive; but one cannot but be CHORLTON aware that there are many undoubted hospitals in which paying patients are received, and I think that it would be drawing too narrow a distinction to say that the mere fact that payments are made by patients is sufficient to prevent an institution of the kind in question from being a hospital within the meaning of this section. I do not think that in legislation of this nature too narrow a construction ought to be put upon the word "hospital." For these reasons I think that there were no grounds for the order for the removal of this pauper to the appellant union, and the appeal will therefore be allowed. WILLS J. I am of the same opinion, and entirely concur in what my Lord has said. The section, in my opinion, points to a kind of residence entirely different from that of a man who is pursuing the ordinary course of life and one which is imposed upon the subject of it either by the will of others or by the necessities of sickness; nor, in my opinion, is a hospital the less one because some patients may make payments. It would be placing a great burden upon parishes in which institutions such as these are situated if the residence of patients in them were to have the effect of making the parish liable to support them. CHANNELL J. I am of the same opinion. Appeal allowed. Solicitors for appellants: Rowcliffes, Rawle & Co., for Alfred Dickinson, Ormskirk. Solicitors for respondents: Gibson & Weldon, for J. H. Wild, Manchester. F. O. R. 1902 Oct. 29. MCNAIR, APPELLANT v. CAVE, RESPONDENT. Adulteration - · Milk — Inspector of Nuisances - Powers Sample procured outside Inspector's District—Sale of Food and Drugs Act Amendment Act, 1879 (42 & 43 Vict. c. 30), s. 3. The power conferred upon an inspector of nuisances under s. 3 of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act Amendment Act, 1879, to procure at the place of delivery a sample of milk in course of delivery to the purchaser in pursuance of a contract of sale cannot be exercised by an inspector outside the district for which he is appointed. CASE stated by a metropolitan magistrate. An information was preferred by the appellant against the respondent under the Sale of Food and Drugs Acts, 1875 and 1879, for that on March 8, 1902, at the Midland Railway Company's Depot, Euston Road, in the borough of St. Pancras, the appellant did procure at the place of delivery a sample of certain milk in course of delivery by the respondent to the purchaser or consignee in pursuance of a contract for the sale to such purchaser, and that, suspecting the same to have been sold contrary to the provisions of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875, the appellant did submit the same to be analyzed, when the sample was found to have been sold by the respondent contrary to the provisions of the statute that is to say, the same was sold by him to the prejudice of the purchaser, inasmuch as it had been adulterated by the admixture of water to the extent of 21 per cent. over and above the normal quantity, so that the same was not of the nature, substance, and quality of the article demanded by the purchaser. On the hearing of the information the following facts were proved. The appellant was a sanitary inspector appointed for the city of Westminster, and the respondent was a farmer at Shottle Belper, in the county of Derby. A contract had been entered into between the respondent and a firm of dairymen, carrying on business in Westminster, whereby the respondent agreed to deliver to the firm at the Midland Railway Station, St. Pancras, twelve barn gallons of new, pure, and unskimmed 1902 milk daily. The appellant, acting under the directions of the council of the city of Westminster, and in pursuance of the provisions of s. 3 of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1879 (1), procured without payment a sample of milk from that supplied under the contract at the Midland Railway Station, in the borough of St. Pancras, being the place of delivery under the contract. The appellant, suspecting that the milk was sold contrary to the provisions of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875, duly divided the sample into three portions, one of which was submitted to the public analyst of the city of Westminster for analysis. The certificate of the analyst stated that the sample contained 21 per cent. of added water. On the part of the appellant it was contended that on the evidence of the certificate the offence charged had been committed by the respondent. On the part of the respondent, the admission of the certificate as evidence was objected to, and it was contended that the inspector for Westminster had no power to procure a sample outside the district for which he was appointed, and, therefore, had no legal power to go into the borough of St. Pancras and take the sample, and also that the analyst appointed for the city of Westminster had no legal power to analyze the sample and to give a certificate which would be evidence, and that the place of delivery being in the borough of St. Pancras and outside the city of Westminster, the proceedings and certificate were nugatory and in violation of the (1) By s. 3 of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act Amendment Act, 1879 (42 & 43 Vict. c. 30), “Any . . . . inspector of nuisances. . . . under the direction and at the cost of the local authority appointing such inspector .... or charged with the execution of this Act, may procure at the place of delivery any sample of any milk in course of delivery to the purchaser or consignee in pursuance of any contract for the sale to such purchaser or con signee of such milk; and such inspector. . . . if he suspect the same MONAIR v. CAVE. 1902 MONAIR v. CAVE. Sale of Food and Drugs Acts, the inspector and analyst being appointed only to act in respect of samples taken within the city of Westminster, and having power under the Acts to deal only with articles sold or procured within their own district; and in the case of the delivery in question a St. Pancras inspector was the proper person to procure the sample, and the St. Pancras analyst should have analyzed it. The magistrate dismissed the information on the grounds put forward by the respondent. The question for the opinion of the Court was whether upon the above facts the magistrate came to a correct determination and decision in point of law. Avory, K.C., and Bartley, for the appellant. The question is whether an inspector acting under s. 3 of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1879, has power to procure a sample of milk at a place outside his own district, and whether the certificate of an analyst who is not appointed for the district in which the sample was obtained is in such a case evidence of the offence. There can be no question but that in the present case an offence had been committed in the St. Pancras district, and that the magistrate had jurisdiction to deal with it, and if the certificate of the Westminster analyst was evidence the offence was proved. It is really immaterial to consider whether the Westminster inspector had power to take the sample: his doing so was merely a matter of procedure; a private person who had obtained a sample might prosecute if he chose. The certificate of the analyst is by s. 21 of the Act of 1875 made sufficient evidence of the facts stated in it, unless the defendant requires the analyst to be called as a witness. He did not so require in this case, and the offence was, therefore, as fully proved as it would have been if the analyst had given evidence in person. Secondly, it is submitted that under s. 3 of the Act of 1879 an inspector can take a sample outside his own district. No doubt under s. 10 of the Act of 1875 an analyst is appointed to act for a particular district; and it may be that in cases under that Act an inspector also cannot go outside his own district, though s. 13 does appear to contemplate |