1903 SMITH v. GOLD COAST AND ASHANTI EXPLORERS, LIMITED. C.J. would commence on December 8-that is to say, that the year would exclude December 7, 1901, and would include December 7, 1902. If that is the contract, then it is clear, on the authority of Britain v. Rossiter (1), that the contract is within the statute, for it was there decided that where the service is to commence on the second day after that on which the con- Lord Alverstone tract is made, the contract is one which is not to be performed within a year. But if the contract in this case was for a year's service commencing on December 7, 1901—that is, on the day next after that on which the contract was made-and terminating on December 6, 1902, there is authority for holding that such a contract is not within the statute. In Cawthorne v. Cordrey (2) it had been ruled at the trial that an agreement made on a Sunday for a year's service to commence on the Monday was not within the statute. In the course of the argument on a rule for a new trial Willes J. said: "If a builder undertakes to build a house within a year, that means a year from the next day"; and Byles J. said: "If you adopt the reasonable rule which excludes fractions of a day, taking the receipt to define the duration of the contract, there would be only three hundred and sixty-five days." These dicta are an expression of opinion in favour of the view that the statute does not apply where the service is to commence on the day next after the agreement. Then Brett L.J. in Britain v. Rossiter (1), referring to Cawthorne v. Cordrey (2), said: "There was however a dictum of Willes J., which seems to be supported by the opinion of Byles J.; these are great authorities; and that dictum seems to have been that if a contract is made on a day, say Monday, for a service for a year, to commence on the following day, say a Tuesday, the service is to be performed within 365 days from the making of the contract; but that inasmuch as the law takes no notice of part of a day, and the contract was made in the middle of the Monday, the service to be performed within 365 days after that, the law did not count that half-day of the Monday, and therefore the contract was to be performed within 365 days after it was made, and that was within a year. This view was (1) 11 Q. B. D. 123. (2) 13 C. B. (N.S.) 406. 1903 SMITH GOLD COAST EXPLORERS, LIMITED. C.J. founded upon a fiction, namely, that the law does not take notice of part of a day. I am not prepared to say that under like circumstances one might not follow that dictum, and carry AND ASHANTI it to the length of a decision. It is not necessary to say so here, because the case has not arisen." The case has now Lord Alverstone arisen for our decision, and I cannot regard that passage from Brett L.J.'s judgment as being intended to express disapproval of the dicta in Cawthorne v. Cordrey. (1) On the contrary, I think that these cases shew that a contract for a year's service to commence on the day next after the day on which the contract was made is not an agreement which is not to be performed within the space of one year from the making thereof, within the meaning of s. 4. The contract set up by the plaintiff is, therefore, not of necessity within the statute, and the case must go down for a new trial. WILLS and CHANNELL JJ. concurred. New trial ordered. Leave to appeal. Solicitor for defendants: H. R. Newson. (1) 13 C. B. (N.S.) 406. F. O. R. [IN THE COURT OF APPEAL.] THE KING ON THE PROSECUTION OF A. W. COBHAM v. Solicitor-Treasury Solicitor-Direction to appear for Subject-Matter in On a rule for a mandamus to the defendant, in a matter in which the Crown had an interest, the Treasury Solicitor was directed to appear for the defendant, and he accordingly became the solicitor on the record. The rule was discharged with costs. Objection was taken on taxation that the defendant was not entitled to recover costs : Held, that the Treasury Solicitor is entitled to act, by direction of the Crown, for a subject, in any matter in which the Crown has an interest, and that the defendant was therefore represented by a duly qualified solicitor, and was entitled to recover his costs from the prosecutor. APPEAL from an order of Lord Alverstone C.J. on objections taken to the taxation of the defendant's costs by a master. In the case of Rex v. Archbishop of Canterbury (1) a rule nisi was granted, at the instance of the prosecutor Cobham, calling on the Archbishop of Canterbury to shew cause why a prerogative writ of mandamus should not issue, in a matter that affected the rights of the Crown. Cause was shewn by the law officers appearing on behalf of the Crown and by counsel on behalf of the archbishop. The solicitor of the Treasury had been directed to take up the case of the archbishop, and he became the solicitor on the record, and instructed counsel on behalf of the archbishop. After argument the rule was discharged, costs being allowed to the archbishop. The master accordingly taxed the costs, and, on objection being taken to the taxation, the Lord Chief Justice refused to refer the matter back to the master. The prosecutor appealed. Danckwerts, K.C., and Morton Smith, for the prosecutor. After the intervention of the Crown the costs were incurred on behalf of the Crown, and not of the archbishop, since the only authority for intervention is that the Crown is interested. As (1) [1902] 2 K. B. 503. X VOL. I. 1903. 2 C. A. 1902 Dec. 2. C. A. 1902 REX v. ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY. was pointed out on the argument of the writ of mandamus (Rex v. Archbishop of Canterbury (1)), the Crown does not in such a case give or recover costs. A further objection to the order as to costs is that the solicitor of the Treasury is not a solicitor who is entitled to appear for an individual, and, therefore, the archbishop was not represented by a solicitor, and cannot recover costs: Irvin v. Sanger. (2) By 9 Geo. 4, c. 25, a person appointed solicitor to a Revenue department need not be enrolled as a solicitor, but may practise as such solicitor in all Courts in the United Kingdom; but the words "as such solicitor" limit the right to the conduct of business of the department. This is in accordance with the prior Act of 2 Geo. 2, c. 23, s. 28, which expressly limits the right to acting "in their respective offices only." The Solicitors Act, 1843 (6 & 7 Vict. c. 73), by s. 2 enacts that no person is to act as an attorney or solicitor unless admitted and enrolled; but by s. 47 that Act is not to extend to solicitors of branches of Her Majesty's Revenue, the solicitor of the City of London, the assistant of the Admiralty, or to the solicitor to the Board of Ordnance. It could hardly be contended that if the City solicitor were directed by the corporation to take up the case of an individual that he would be the solicitor of that person, so as to entitle him, if successful, to costs. By the Attorneys and Solicitors Act, 1874 (37 & 38 Vict. c. 68), s. 12, a penalty is imposed for wrongfully acting as attorney or solicitor—that is, without a stamped certificate-but appointment as solicitor to a number of public departments is to be treated as a qualification. By the Treasury Solicitor Act, 1876 (39 & 40 Vict. c. 18), the Treasury Solicitor is constituted a corporation sole, with certain powers and [duties in respect of public matters. A consideration of these statutes indicates that the Treasury Solicitor can only act in his official capacity, and cannot act as solicitor for a private individual. [They cited Dixon v. Farrer (3); Reg. v. Buchanan (4); Fowler v. Monmouthshire Canal Co. (5); Moore v. Smith. (6)] (1) [1902] 2 K. B. 503. (2) (1888) 58 L. J. (Q.B.) 64. (3) (1886) 17 Q. B. D. 658; 18 Q. B. D. 43. (4) (1846) 8 Q. B. 883. C. A. 1902 REX v. CANTERBURY. Sir E. H. Carson, S.-G., and H. Sutton, for the defendant. The Crown was interested in the application against the archbishop; but the interests of the Crown and the archbishop were not necessarily identical. The Crown intervened to sup- ARCHBISHOP port the archbishop's case and undertook to conduct the OF defence. Without such intervention the archbishop would have been entitled to his costs, and it is difficult to see on what principle he should be in a worse position because the Crown, in exercise of its right to do so, has intervened on his behalf. Certainly no principle exists that a person to be entitled to his costs must shew that he is personally liable to his solicitor for them. The argument must come to this-that the Treasury Solicitor cannot recover the costs because he is not certificated; but this is directly opposed to the statutes that have been cited, which make his appointment a qualification to act as a solicitor. The statute 9 Geo. 4, c. 25, expressly gives power to act "as such solicitor" under the orders and directions of the Commissioners of the Treasury. Danckwerts, K.C., in reply. The prosecutor is not seeking, as suggested, to deprive the archbishop of his costs, which would be paid out of public moneys, but is raising an objection to paying costs to the Crown. The Crown was under no obligation to intervene, and if it does so its intervention is subject to the privileges and disabilities attaching to its position. The case of an indemnity is not in point, because here the Crown took the case out of the hands of the archbishop. The expression "such solicitors" in the Act 9 Geo. 4, c. 25, is governed by the antecedent words, " on behalf of His Majesty," and does not give any other right than that of appearing for the Crown. COLLINS M.R. This is an appeal from a decision of the Lord Chief Justice in chambers, whereby he refused to entertain certain objections to costs allowed by a master. The question arises in this way: One Captain Cobham obtained a rule for a mandamus to the Archbishop of Canterbury. The Crown, being interested in the matter, appeared to shew cause on its own behalf, and also exercised the right, which has been |