C. A. 1903 SIMPSON v. TEIGNMOUTH BRIDGE COMPANY. The section was intended to include every description of carriage. A bicycle is a carriage: Cannan v. Earl of Abingdon (1); see also Plymouth Tramways Co. v. General Tolls Co. (2), where a tramcar was held to be a carriage. The section cannot apply only to carriages drawn by horses; the AND SHALDON expression "for each horse" merely imposes a toll on the horses, if there are any, as well as on the carriage. As the plaintiff was riding the bicycle, he was not chargeable as a person on foot, and will escape toll altogether unless he comes within this sub-section. A bicycle is hung on springs, for (a) the seat is placed on springs, and (3) the tyres are springs within the Act. Macmorran, K.C., in reply. Either the plaintiff was a passenger on foot, or he was not within the Act at all. The only carriages intended to be paid for are those drawn, or at any rate capable of being drawn, by horses or other beasts. A bicycle is not a carriage for the purposes of a turnpike Act: Williams v. Ellis. (3) WRIGHT J. I do not think that the Plymouth Tramways Case (2) helps much in the determination of the present case; it is easy to understand that a tramcar drawn by horses was a coach drawn by horses. Neither is Cannan v. Earl of Abingdon (1) much in point, for the language of the section in that case, "or other carriage whatsoever," is much wider than that of the present statute; the judgment in that case proceeds on those words, and there are no such words here. Williams v. Ellis (3) is perhaps the case most in point, though it is not easy to reconcile it with Cannan v. Earl of Abingdon. (1) But, after all, it is necessary to consider the words used in this Act of Parliament, and to say whether it is consistent with the rules of common sense and grammar to say that a bicycle comes within them. No doubt in some of the sections the language used is very general, and, if they are not limited by the toll section, there is much to be said for the contention of (1) [1900] 2 Q. B. 66. (2) (1896) 75 L. T. 467; 13 Times L. R. 74; 14 Times L. R. (3) (1880) 5 Q. B. D. 175. C. A. 1903 SIMPSON v. TEIGNMOUTH BRIDGE the defendants that no limitation should be put on the word "carriage," but that everything which for any ordinary purpose could be held to be a carriage would be within the Act. But the language of the toll section is different: "Every person on AND SHALDON foot and if with a wheelbarrow or such like carriage, the sum COMPANY. of one penny"; these words seem to include a person on foot whether with or without a wheelbarrow or such like carriage. Then after an enumeration of certain animals not drawing carriages come the words, "For every coach, chariot, hearse, chaise, &c.," and for every other carriage hung on springs, the sum of sixpence for each wheel, and for each horse or other beast of draught drawing the same the sum of twopence." Wright J. The last part of the description in the section does not apply to the present case, and if a bicycle comes within the section at all it must fall within the words "other carriage hung on springs." If I am to determine this case on a consideration of the question whether a bicycle falls within the description of a carriage hung on springs, I shall require further facts or further information, for at present I am not in a position to say how this bicycle was constructed; I think, therefore, that I must determine this case without reference to that point for the present. It seems to me that I cannot, without doing violence to the meaning of the section, consider that this paragraph of the section is concerned with any carriages except such as are drawn by horses or other beasts of draught. There must be some limit to the adaptation of the language used in old Acts of Parliament to modern circumstances. It is impossible that they can be stretched so as to meet everything that invention may produce in modern days. The remedy is by legislation. In any reasonable sense of the words, the last two paragraphs of the section deal only with vehicles drawn by horses or other beasts of draught; I could not hold otherwise without doing violence to the ordinary rules for the construction of statutes. I am not asked to say whether the plaintiff was a person on foot, nor whether he was a person on foot with a wheelbarrow or other such like carriage, so that those questions do not arise; if they did, there would be a good deal to be said on both sides. I think that the toll of twopence has not been justified, and there must be judgment for the plaintiff. Judgment for the plaintiff. C. A. 1903 SIMPSON v. TEIGNMOUTH AND SHALDON 1902. Jan. 16. Foote, K.C., for the defendants, having COMPANY. submitted that the bicycle was a carriage within the decision in Cannan v. Earl of Abingdon (1), and that it was "hung on springs" within the meaning of the section, evidence was called by the defendants. Shortly summarized, it was to the effect that the saddle was borne by springs, and that under ordinary conditions the weight of the rider was borne by the saddle; that the springs were attached to the saddle, and also to the rigid framework of the machine above the wheel; that the expression "hung on springs" was, in the coach-builders' trade, considered to include all carriages whether borne on springs or suspended from them, and that all carriages having springs were properly described as hung on springs. Chester Jones, for the plaintiff, contended that a bicycle was merely a carriage with a spring-seat or spring-saddle attached, and called evidence to that effect. WRIGHT J. It is frequently almost impossible to apply the language of old statutes to modern inventions not contemplated at the time the Acts were passed, but I must deal with the case as well as I can, endeavouring to place a reasonable construction on the old statute, so as to give effect as far as possible to its object-that of taxing vehicles crossing this bridge. I have already held that the last two provisions of the section are limited to vehicles which are adapted or intended to be drawn by horses or other beasts of draught, although not necessarily drawn by them in fact. I have now to say whether a bicycle is a carriage, and whether it is a carriage hung on springs, within the meaning of the Act. The particular section treats a wheelbarrow as a carriage, and in my opinion a bicycle is as much a carriage as a wheelbarrow; apart, therefore, from the difficulty which I dealt with on the last occasion, I must (1) [1900] 2 Q. B. 66. C. A. 1903 SIMPSON TEIGNMOUTH BRIDGE Wright J. hold, having regard to the authorities cited, that this bicycle would have been a carriage within this particular section. Then, is it a carriage hung on springs within the section? In my opinion this particular bicycle, as distinguished from AND SHALLON Others as to which I have no information, is hung on springs: COMPANY. its saddle is supported entirely by springs, which form an essential part of the structure, and do not in any way represent such a thing as a spring-cushion, on which a person riding in a carriage may rest if he pleases. These springs are an integral part of the structure, and as such serve to distribute the weight. There is no question that the rider and his saddle are at all times mainly supported by the springs; sometimes they are entirely so supported; and the springs, according to the evidence, serve the same purpose as the cee springs of a carriage. If I am wrong in my view that the section applies only to carriages intended for animal draught, I find that this particular bicycle is within the meaning of the section a carriage hung on springs, and is liable to pay toll as such. It must not be supposed that this judgment is intended to deal with bicycles in general. W. J. B. The defendants appealed from so much of the judgment of Wright J. as held that they were not justified in charging the plaintiff the toll of twopence (1) 1903. Feb. 9. Duke, K.C., and A. B. Shaw, for the appellants. The toll was justified. The purpose of the Act was the taxation of all vehicles or persons using the bridge, and it is a reasonable construction of the section to make it apply. The appellants have reduced the toll in the case of bicycles, and do not insist on the sum of sixpence for each wheel which the Act would enable them to charge. A bicycle is a carriage: Taylor v. Goodwin (2); Cannan v. Earl of Abingdon (3); for it is a mechanical apparatus for the conveyance of persons over (1) The plaintiff appealed against for the plaintiff on the defendants' that part of the judgment of Wright J. appeal, this appeal was not argued. which held that the particular bicycle (2) (1879) 4 Q. B. D. 228. in question was a "carriage hung on (3) [1900] 2 Q. B. 66. springs," but, as judgment was given C. A. 1903 SIMPSON V. TEIGNMOUTH BRIDGE the ground. The method of propulsion is immaterial, and a vehicle does not cease to be a carriage because it is propelled by a man's muscles any more than it does if propelled by steam or electricity. If the view taken by Wright J. be correct, motor cars could not be charged under this Act, because they AND SHALDON are not drawn by horses or other beasts of draught. Williams COMPANY. v. Ellis (1) turns on the construction of different sections from those now under consideration, and is no authority. The intention of the Legislature was to include all carriages using the bridge: Plymouth Tramways Co. v. General Tolls Co. (2) It is a carriage hung on springs, because the saddle is supported on springs resting on a solid frame which in turn rests on pneumatic tyres. Chester Jones (Macmorran, K.C., with him), for the respondent. A bicycle is not chargeable under this Act, or, if it is, it comes under the first clause, "for every person on foot, or with a wheelbarrow or other such like carriage." The charge of twopence was therefore unjustifiable. In Taylor v. Goodwin (3) a bicycle was held to be a carriage only for the purpose of the Highway Acts. This is made plain in the judgment of Lush J. in Williams v. Ellis (1); and now, by s. 85 of the Local Government Act, 1888 (51 & 52 Vict. c. 41), bicycles are declared to be carriages within the meaning of those Acts. In the ordinary sense of the word, a bicycle is not a carriage. [He was stopped.] EARL OF HALSBURY L.C. I do not see my way to differ from my learned brother Wright on this question. It appears to me that we have the decision of Lush and Bowen JJ. in Williams v. Ellis (1) on words which, for this purpose, I cannot distinguish from the words with which we have to deal, and certainly I feel great difficulty in saying that I entertain any different view from that which they have expressed. The truth is that, when you are dealing with a question of this sort and endeavouring to find out whether a thing is taxable or not under Acts of this character, the first thing to do is to find out whether (1) 5 Q. B. D. 175. (2) 75 L. T. 467; 13 Times L. R. 74; 14 Times L. R. 531. (3) 4 Q. B. D. 228. |