PRACTICE-Appeal-Order whether Final or Interlocutory-Order to try Preliminary Question of Liability-Action dismissed-Contract, Breach of.
An order was made in an action, brought to recover damages for breach of contract, that the questions of liability and breach of contract only were to be tried, and that the rest of the case, if any, was to go to an official referee. At the trial the judge held that there was no binding contract between the parties, and made an order dismiss ing the action, from which order the plaintiff appealed:-
Held, that the appeal was from a final order. Shubrook v. Tufnell, (1882) 9 Q. B. D. 621, followed. Bozson v. ALTRINCHAM URBAN DISTRICT COUNCIL - C. A. 547 Charging Order-Interest in Shares charged with Judgment Debt Application to enforce Charge by Order for Sale of Shares- Jurisdiction-Judicature Act, 1873 (36 & 37 Vict. c. 66), s. 24—Rules of Supreme Court, Order XLVI., r. 1-Leave for Service out of Jurisdiction—Action to enforce Charging Order – Rules of Supreme Court, Order XI., r. 1 (e)—Judgments Act, 1838 (1 & 2 Vict. c. 110), 88. 14, 15.
Where an order has been made charging a judgment debtor's interest in shares with the amount due on the judgment under the Judg ments Act, 1838, that order cannot, under s. 21 | of the Judicature Act, 1873, be enforced by an order made in the original action.
Leggott v. Western, (1884) 12 Q. B. D. 287, followed.
Leave cannot be given for service of a writ out of the jurisdiction under Order XI., r. 1 (e), in an action to enforce such a charging order. KOLCHMANN r. MEURICE
3. Cost-Detinue-Action founded on Tort-Return during Progress of Case of Articles claimed—Rights of Parties at Date of Writ— County Courts Act, 1888 (51 & 52 Vict. c. 43), 8. 116, sub-s. 2.
The plaintiff brought an action in the High Court to recover from the defendants certain drawings that had been deposited with them as agents for sale, and damages for their detention, I and he claimed also an account in respect of such of the drawings as had been sold, and the amount' that might be proved to be due on the taking of the account. The defendants pleaded that they had always been ready and willing to return the drawings in their possession, and offered to return them forthwith on obtaining a proper receipt. - The plaintiff replied accepting the offer to return the drawings, and they were accordingly returned to him. They were of the value of 201 and | upwards. The action went to trial on the question of the amount due from toe defndants in respect of the drawings that had been sell, and resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff for 334.:—
Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to casts on the High Court scale on the grounds (1) that he had recovered the drawings tarongh the exi- gency of the writ, and that the return of them during the progress of the case did not affect the rights of the parties at the date of the writ; and
4. · Costs-Tico Defendants jointly repre- sented-Judgment for one Defendant and against the other-Plaintiff liable to pay half the Costs of the Defence.
Where two defendants are jointly represented by the same solicitor, and judgment with costs is given in favour of one defendant and against the other, the successful defendant is, in the absence of any agreement between him and his co-defendant as to how their costs are to be borne inter se, entitled to recover from the plaintiff half the costs of the defence. BEAUMONT - Div. Ct. 282
Clay- Compulsory purchase - Mines and minerals See MINES.
Mortgages of policies-Equitable interests RAIN WATER-Sewer-Drain receiving drain-
age from more than one building 829 See LONDON. 1.
RATES-Appeal - Special Sessions - Notice of Appeal-Parish Council-Poor-rate Parochial Assessment Act, 1836 (6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 96), 8. 6— 417 Local Government Act, 1894 (56 & 57 Vict. c. 73), 8. 6, sub-s. 1, and s. 52, sub-8, 5.
Where, upon a poor-rate being made in a rural parish having a parish council, an appeal against the rate is brought to special sessions under s. 6 of the Parochial Assessment Act, 1836, it is now, since the passing of the Local Government Act, 1894, a condition precedent to the jurisdiction of the justices to hear the appeal that the appellant should have given notice of appeal to the parish council. THE KING v. TEWKESBURY JUSTICES Div. Ct. 39 Arrears of gas rate-Right to recover from incoming tenant See GAS.
Streets-Execution of works by local autho- REAL PROPERTY LIMITATION ACT-Rever-
RAILWAY-Contract of Carriage-Conveyance of Goods by Passenger Train-Collection and Deli- very-Inclusive Charge for Carriage and Collection of Goods-Special Act-Railways Clauses Con- solidation Act, 1845 (8 & 9 Vict. c. 20), 8. 90.
A schedule of the statutory maximum rates and charges authorized to be taken by a railway company for the conveyance of goods contained a provision that the company should not be under obligation to carry non perishable goods by pas- senger train. The company announced to the public their willingness to carry tailors' clothing by passenger train at a "collected and delivered" rate specified in a scale of charges which they published. The plaintiffs, who were common carriers at Bristol, sent parcels of tailors' clothing from Bristol to Southampton by the company's passenger train, having themselves collected the goods at Bristol and handed them over to the
REHEARING - Costs of rehearing petition- "Costs of petitioning creditor" 735 See BANKRUPTCY. REINSURANCE-Constructive total loss-"To pay as may be paid thereon"-Salvage charges
See INSURANCE, MARINE. 4.
therein mentioned. The Duchess and the Ditton estate during her lifetime were in fact kept fully indemnified against the mortgage debt and inte- rest. The Duchess died on March 28, 1895:—
Held, reversing the judgment of Phillimore J., [1902] 1 K. B. 429, that, in calculating the value of the estate which passed upon the death of the Duchess for the purpose of estate duty, the mort- gage debt of 27,000l. must be dedueted from the principal value of the Ditton estate. ATTORNEY- GENERAL v. LORD MONTAGU C. A. 483
3. Estate Duty-Succession Duty-Gift to a Charitable Society-Reservation of Annuity to Renewal "at costs of Donor-Bonâ fide Purchase-Partial Considera- 349 tion-Finance Act, 1894 (57 & 58 Vict. c. 30), 8. 2, sub-8. 1 (c); 8. 3, sub-8. 2-Succession Duty Act, 1853 (16 & 17 Vict. c. 51), 8. 7.
- Lease lessee"-Award See LANDLORD AND TENANT. 6. RES JUDICATA-Streets-Private street works -Estoppel
See STREETS. 3. REVENUE-Estate Duty-Gift of Personal Pro- perty—Finance Act, 1894 (57 & 58 Vict. c. 30), 8. 2, sub-s. 1 (c).
In view of the approaching marriage of the defendant it was agreed between his father and the bride's father that the latter would settle 20,000l. on his daughter, on condition that the defendant's father would give to the defendant 10,000. That sum was accordingly paid to the defendant by his father, and a settlement of the 20,000l. was executed, and the marriage subse- quently took place. The defendant's father died within twelve months of the date of payment:- Held, that estate duty was payable by the defendant on the 10,000l. under s. 2, sub-s. 1 (c), of the Finance Act, 1894.
Attorney-General v. Worrall, [1895] 1 Q. B. 99; Attorney-General v. Johnson, [1903] 1 K. B. 617, followed. ATTORNEY-GENERAL v. HOLDEN Ridley J. 832
Estate Duty Property passing on Death-Principal Value - Mortgage in Fee by Tenant for Life and Remaindermen-Tenant for Life indemnified against Mortgage Debt-Finance Act, 1894 (57 & 58 Vict. c. 30), s. 1; s. 2, sub- 8. 1 (b); s. 7, sub-88. 1, 7.
In May, 1888, the Ditton estate stood limited to the Dowager Duchess of Buccleuch for life, and, after her death, to such uses as Lord Montagu and his eldest son should jointly appoint, and, in default of and subject to such appointment, to Lord Montagu for life, with remainders over. By deed of May 29, 1888, the Dowager Duchess, Lord Montagu, and his eldest son concurred in granting and appointing the fee by way of mort- gage to secure payment with interest of 27,000l., advanced by the mortgagees to Lord Montagu and his eldest son, who alone covenanted to repay the principal and interest. By a further deed of the same date Lord Montagu and his eldest son covenanted to indemnify the Duchess and the Ditton estate during her lifetime against the mortgage debt and interest, and they conveyed and assigned to trustees a yearly sum of 1500l. charged on other estates, in which they had a sufficient interest upon trust to keep down the interest on the mortgage, and otherwise to effectu- ate the indemnity of the Duchess in the manner
In 1889 500l. was paid to the directors of an unincorporated charitable society, in lieu of a legacy, and upon the terms of a resolution of the directors of the society that the trustees of the society should be authorized to pay to the person from whom the 500l. was received, and to his wife if she survived him, an annuity of 251. The annuity was not charged upon or secured by the property of the society, and was paid by the directors as one of the ordinary outgoings of the society. The commercial value of the annuity in the year 1889 was 2101. The payer of the 500l. and his wife, who survived him, died after the date of the Finance Act, 1894. The Crown claimed that on his death estate duty became payable by the society on the 5001. under s. 2, sub-s. 1 (c), of the Act; and that on her death succession duty became payable on the 5001. under 8. 7 of the Succession Duty Act, 1853:—
Held, that the transaction was a gift and not a bonâ fide purchase of an annuity, and that con- sequently estate duty was payable on the full sum of 500l., without any deduction in respect of the value of the annuity:
Held, also, that, the disposition of the 5001. not being a bonâ fide sale, succession duty was payable under s. 7 of the Succession Duty Act,
Judgment of Phillimore J., [1902] 1 K. B. 416, reversed. ATTORNEY-GENERAL T. JOHNSON C. A. 617
4. House Duty School Buildings "Other Offices' -48 Geo. 3, c. 55, Sched. B- House Tax Act, 1851 (14 & 15 Vict. c. 36).
The appellant was the occupier of a dwelling- house and premises, which he used for the pur- poses of a boarding school. He also occupied adjacent buildings, which were separated from the first-mentioned premises by a wall. There was a door in the wall through which, by means of a covered-in passage, there was communication between the premises on each side of the wall. The adjacent buildings were respectively used as a chapel, a gymnasium, class-rooms, fives court, and for such like school purposes in con- nection with the boarding-school, other than the ordinary purposes of a dwelling-house :—
Held (reversing the judgment of Phillimore J.), that the adjacent buildings must be included in the valuation of the premises for the purposes of inhabited house duty, as being offices belonging
ever attempted to control or interfere with the management of the foreign company, or had any power to do so otherwise than by voting as share-
Held, that the foreign company was not carried on by the English company, nor was it the agent of the English company, and that the English company was not, therefore, assessable
to income tax under the first case of Sched. D of 5 & 6 Vict. c. 35, s. 100, upon the full amount of the profits of the foreign company. Judgment of Phillimore J., [1902] 2 K. B. 450, affirmed. KODAK, LIMited v. Clark
Income Tax Deductions — Premium on Life Insurance-Income Tax Act, 1853 (16 & 17 Vict. c. 34), s. 54.
to and occupied with the dwelling-house within the meaning of rule 2 of Sched. B of 48 Geo. 3, BROWNE v. FURTADO C. A. 723 5. Income Tax-"Annuity”—Purchase-holder:- money-Payment by Annual Instalments with In- terest-Income Tax Acts, 1842, 1853 (5 & 6 Vict. c. 35; 16 & 17 Vict. c 34), Scheds. C. and D. By a contract, made in 1849, between the Fast India Company and the Great Indian Peninsula Railway Company, it was agreed that at the expiration of fifty years therefrom it should be lawful for the East India Company, on notice to the railway company, to purchase from them their railway at a price representing the full amount of the value of all the shares or capital stock of the railway company, and that if and when the East India Company should become liable under the contract to pay for the purchase of the railway it should be lawful for them, instead of paying a gross sum therefor, to declare, by notice to the railway company, their option to pay an "annuity," to commence from the time when the gross amount would be payable and to continue during the residue of a term of ninety- nine years, the rate of interest to be used in calculating the annuity to be determined as therein specified. At the expiration of the fifty years the Secretary of State for India, in whom the powers exercisable by the East India Com- pany under the contract had become vested, gave notice to the railway company of his intention to purchase the railway, and the price was deter- mined and became payable. The Secretary of State thereupon duly declared his option to pay an annuity, and the rate of interest to be used in calculating the annuity was duly fixed. The annuity was paid half-yearly, each payment representing, as to a part of it, an instalment of the price paid for the railway, and, as to the residue, interest on the amount of the price for the time being unpaid. This arrangement was sanctioned by a local Act, which provided that the Secretary of State should pay the annuity to certain trustees appointed on behalf of the share- holders of the railway company :-
Held, that so much or each instalment as represented payment of the purchase-money was not within the term "annuity" in Sched. C of the Income Tax Acts, and, therefore, that income tax was not payable upon the whole amount of each half-yearly payment, but only upon so much of it as represented interest.
Judgment of Phillimore J., [1902] 2 K. B. 413, reversed. SCOBLE v. SECRETARY OF STATE IN COUNCIL FOR INDIA
C. A. 494 6. Income Tax Company resident in United Kingdom Holding Preponderating Majority of Shares in Company Abroad-Control -Income Tax Act, 1842 (5 & 6 Vict. c. 35), 8. 100, Sched. D, Case 1.
An English Company carrying on business in the United Kingdom owned 98 per cent. of the shares in a foreign company, which gave it a preponderating influence in the control, election of directors, &c., of the foreign company. The remaining shares in the foreign company were, however, held by independent persons, and there was no evidence that the English company had
The suppliant effected an insurance on his life for 15001. upon the terms that the annual premium should be 667. 178. 6d., and that the insurers should in each year advance to him by way of loan the amount of 331., and that he should pay interest annually upon amounts so advanced and be personally liable to repay the same, and that the advances and interest thereon should be a first charge upon the policy. In each year the suppliant paid 331. 178. 6d. in cash in respect of the premium, and was debited with the remaining 331. as a loan, and he paid interest annually in respect of those loans:-
Held (reversing the judgment of Phillimore J., [1902] 2 K. B. 255), that the above-mentioned transaction did not amount to payment of an annual premium of 661. 178. 6d. by the assured within the meaning of s. 54 of the Income Tax Act, 1853, and therefore that the suppliant was only entitled under that section to deduct from the amount of his assessment to income tax the sum of 331. 178. 6d. which he had paid in cash. HUNTER V. THE KING C. A. 514 Deductions
8. Income Tax-Salary Contribution to Thrift Fund-Sum payable or chargeable by virtue of Act of Parliament-Income Tax Act, 1842 (5 & 6 Vict. c. 35), 8. 146- Manchester Corporation Act, 1891 (54 & 55 Vict. c. covii.).
A municipal corporation were by a local Act empowered to establish a fund for the encourage- ment of thrift among their officers and servants, and with a view to providing a sum of money which, in the event of the retirement or death of any person in the service of the corporation, who had contributed to the fund, should be available for himself or his representatives, and to frame a scheme for that purpose. By a scheme framed by the corporation in pursuance of the Act, it was provided that persons in the service of the corporation should respectively contribute to the fund a certain percentage of their salaries, to be from time to time deducted from those salaries by the corporation. In accordance with the requirements of the Act, the scheme provided that the amount so contributed by each con- tributor should be repaid with interest to him, upon his retirement from the service of the cor- poration, or, in the event of his death in that service, to his personal representatives :-
Held, that amounts deducted in pursuance of the scheme from the salaries of persons in the
service of the corporation did not come within the words "sums payable or chargeable on the same by virtue of any Act of Parliament where the same have been really and bonâ fide paid and borne by the party to be charged," in the first rule of s. 146 of the Income Tax Act, 1842, and therefore they could not be deducted from the amounts of the salaries for the purpose of assess- ment to income tax under Sched. E.
Beaumont v. Bowers, [1900] 2 Q. B. 204, not followed. HUDSON v. GRIBBLE. BELL v. GRIBBLE C. A. 517
9. Stamp-Mortgage -Trust Deed for securing Debenture Stock-Security auxiliary or by way of further Assurance-Stamp Act, 1891 (54 & 55 Vict. c. 39), s. 86, sub-s. 1; First Schedule," Mortgage, &c." (2).
RULES OF SUPREME COURT-continued. Order LIV., r. 8 (c)-Applications and Pro- ceedings at Chambers 184
See INSURANCE, LIFE. 1. Supreme Court of Judicature (Officers) Rules of January, 1902, pursuant to Supreme Court of Judicature (Officers) Act, 1879
See LANDS CLAUSES ACTS. 2.
See under ADULTERATION. Forfeited shares-Call unpaid-Power to make fresh call on purchaser See COMPANY. 1. Intoxicating liquor to children
See CRIMINAL LAW. 3.
chaser-Warranty of Fitness—Sale of Goods Act, 1893 (56 & 57 Vict. c. 71), s. 14.
A limited company, upon the issue of deben- ture stock, by deed entered into with trustees for the holders of the stock, acknowledged that the company was indebted to the trustees to the amount of the stock, and agreed to convey to the SALE OF GOODS-Negligence-Dangerous Goods trustees certain freehold property, not at the time-Knowledge of Vendor-Duty of Vendor to Pur- in the possession of the company, and power was given to the trustees to enforce payment by fore- closure. The company subsequently acquired the property and conveyed it to the trustees upon the trusts and purposes and subject to the pro- visions of the trust deed. Stamp duty was paid on the trust deed under the 1st schedule to the Stamp Act, 1891, title "Mortgage, &c.," clause 2, on the amount of the debenture stock. The Commissioners assessed the duty on the second deed under the same schedule, clause 2, at 6d. per cent. on the amount of the debenture stock. On appeal:-
Where the vendor of a tin containing disin- fectant powder knew that it was likely to cause danger to a person opening it, unless special care was taken, and the danger was not such as presumably would be known to or appreciable by the purchaser, unless warned of it:-
Held, that, independently of any warranty, there was cast upon the vendor a duty to warn the purchaser of the danger.
Where one of the rules of a co-operative society stated that no warranties were given with goods sold by the society, except on the written authority of one of the managing directors or the assistant manager.
Query, whether the rule had the effect of excluding the implied warranty that an article sold for a particular purpose is fit for that purpose. CLARKE AND WIFE v. ARMY AND NAVY Co-OPERATIVE SOCIETY, LIMITED C. A. 155 Warranty-Beer sold by Retail—Fit- ness for Consumption-Implied Warranty-Breach -Damages-Sale of Goods Act, 1893 (56 & 57 Vict. c. 71), s. 14.
By s. 14, sub-s. 2, of the Sale of Goods Act, 1893, "Where goods are bought by description from a seller who deals in goods of that des- cription (whether he be the manufacturer or not), there is an implied condition that the goods shall be of merchantable quality: provided that if the buyer has examined the goods, there shall be no implied condition as regards defects which such examination ought to have revealed."
The defendant kept a beerhouse in which the beer supplied to customers, for consumption on the premises, was that of a particular firm of brewers only. This fact was known to the plaintiff, who frequented the beerhouse for the purpose of buying the beer of that firm. The beer contained arsenic, by reason of which the health of the plaintiff was injured. In an action to recover damages for breach of warranty:-
Held, that the beer had been bought by
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