prietorship of which he claimed to impound the HARDING, J.: If the owner disputes the legality animals, no one but a proprietor or person who of the impounding, he may, under sec. 39, release alleged himself to be a proprietor could be said to the animals, and if he gives notice to the pound"impound" within the meaning of the Act. A keeper, who may not thereafter pay over the person who assumed to act in that capacity, and damage. Hence notice is not a condition preby virtue of it, to place another's property in the cedent to the complaint; it only keeps the damage custody of the law, could hardly, I think, be heard in medio. If the owner disputes the impounding, to deny that he is a "proprietor" for the purpose and it appears to be illegal, the justices may, under of escaping the penal provisions attached to a sec. 40, award compensation. The summons does wrongful exercise of the powers conferred on a not ask damages, nor a return of the damages in proprietor. It was immaterial, therefore, whether the poundkeeper's hands or paid over. It would the word used was "proprietor" or "person." I seem, therefore, that the complaint was with the am, therefore, of opinion that the complaint dis-object of the punishment of the impounder under closed an offence against the provisions of sec. 36, sec. 36, and not for damages. If the animals were and that this objection fails. It is consequently trespassing on the proprietor's land, they were unnecessary to consider the objection, that giving rightly impounded under sec. 36. If they were notice to the poundkeeper under sec. 39 is a con-not, they were impounded in a manner contrary to dition precedent to a right to relief under sec. 40. its provisions, as sec. 36 only allows a proprietor, But I would observe that as that relief may be obtained whether the animals are released (in which case only is a notice of any use) or are left in the pound, it is difficult to see how giving the notice can be a condition precedent to obtaining it. It was also objected that there was no evidence to support the conviction. The complainant's evidence, standing alone, might, in our view of it, be consistent with the appellant's innocence, but as he himself was called as a witness and negatived that view of the evidence, I think that the justices might reasonably adopt the view which pointed to his guilt. This objection, therefore, also fails.

A further objection was made that evidence of deterioration of the cows, by reason of their impounding, was wrongly admitted. This evidence was, however, clearly irrelevant to the fact of a breach of the provisions of the Act having been committed, and could not have affected the justices' minds on that point. It might have influenced them as to amount of the penalty to be imposed, and I am disposed to think that they were justified in considering it for that purpose; but even if they were not, I do not think that its adoption is a ground for quashing the conviction in this case.

upon whose land any animals are found trespassing, to impound them. The conviction must be affirmed, and the rule discharged with costs.

:

REAL, J. It appears to me that, with regard to the question whether impounding animals not found trespassing is an offence under the Act, the section is clear. The words used are "any proprietor impounding." It would be a somewhat forced construction to say that the Legislature meant "any person." An examination of the preceding law leads me to the conclusion that the Legislature, in using the word "proprietor,” did so intentionally. It is a very apt expression. The word "proprietor," in my opinion, must be limited under the section to the ownership of the land where the offence is said to have been committed I do not think the section applies to the case of a mere trespasser, and consider that persons who are mere trespassers are not affected nor protected by sec. 36.

Solicitors for appellant: O'Shea & O'Shea.
Solicitors for respondent: Atthow & Stumm.

WOODS v. SHERIFF OF QUEENSLAND.

Woods, the person against whom the capias was issued, and the jury have found as a fact that the

Wrongful arrest - Representations of person plaintiff, being told by the bailiff that he had a arrested-Estoppel-Liability of sheriff-warrant for the arrest of Alfred Woods, and being

Detention-Reasonable time for inquiry.

A writ of capias ad respondendum was issued for the arrest of Alfred Woods. The plaintiff, his brother, on being asked whether he was Alfred Woods, answered in the affirmative. He was then arrested, but after his arrest he told the sheriff he was not the person mentioned in the writ of capias, but declined to say who he was. The sheriff then caused inquiries to be made, and the plaintiff was subsequently dis

charged.

asked if he was Alfred Woods, said that he was. The bailiff thereupon took him into custody. There can be no doubt that under these circumstances he cannot maintain an action for the arrest, which was brought about by his own representations. That is the well-known doctrine of estoppel. That disposes of the action so far as it is based on the arrest. The plaintiff also com

Held (affirming the judgment of Real, J.), that the plain-plains that he was wrongfully detained, inasmuch tiff, having represented himself to be Alfred Woods, was estopped from complaining of the arrest. Held further, that under the circumstances the sheriff was justified in detaining him for a reasonable time in order to make inquiries as to his identity, and that as it was not found that the plaintiff was detained for an unreasonable time during such inquiry, judgment

must be entered for the defendant.

"Who are

as that after he was arrested and taken to the sheriff's office he told the sheriff that he was not the person mentioned in the warrant. Both the sheriff and the bailiff then inquired, you?" and he refused to tell. The sheriff was then in this position: He was bound to arrest ACTION by Charles Woods against the sheriff Alfred Woods, if he could find him, and if he did for damages for wrongful arrest and imprisonment not he was liable to an action for damages at the on a writ of ca. re, to arrest Alfred Woods. The suit of the plaintiff in the action against Alfred plaintiff and Alfred Woods were brothers, and Woods. He was not justified in arresting anyvery like in appearance. The other facts appear in the judgment. The jury awarded the plaintiff £100 damages, but on the findings Real, J., gave judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff appealed.

body but Alfred Woods, and if he did he was liable to an action at his suit. Here the plaintiff said first that he was Alfred Woods and then that he was not. What was the duty of the sheriff under these circumstances? The plaintiff having Lilley, for appellant, contended that as soon as made contradictory statements, the sheriff was the plaintiff told the sheriff he was not the person not bound to believe his second statement, which named in the warrant, his arrest became illegal, was in his own favour, but his duty was to make and the sheriff detained him at his peril. He inquiries to satisfy himself which of the plaintiff's should have made immediate inquiries. (Dunstan two statements was true, and I think he was v. Paterson, 2 C.B.N.S., 495; 26 L J., C.P., 267.) entitled to a reasonable time to make those inByrnes, A. G., and G. W. Power, for respondent, quiries. In the meantime it was his duty to keep submitted there was a clear case of estoppel, and the plaintiff in his custody, and the plaintiff could that the detention was reasonable under the cir-not complain of that detention, because his being cumstances. in custody under such circumstances was the result of his own conduct. If the sheriff had kept the plaintiff in custody for a longer time than was GRIFFITH, C.J.: The appellant, Charles Woods, reasonable to enable him to make those inquiries, sues the sheriff for damages for wrongfully the detention would have become unlawful, and arresting him under a warrant of capias to arrest the plaintiff would have become entitled to damages, Alfred Woods. The sheriff says in defence that but no such case was made at the trial. The case the plaintiff represented to him that he was Alfredmade at the trial was, first, that the arrest was

The judgment of the Court (Griffith, C.J., Harding and Cooper, JJ.) was delivered by

unlawful, but the jury on that point disbelieved days before their marriage it was agreed that this the plaintiff; and, second, that the detention was property should be her separate property after unlawful. The argument on that was that the marriage. After the marriage the property was sheriff was bound to discharge the plaintiff as soon as the plaintiff told him he was not the man mentioned in the warrant. But, for the reasons which I have stated, the sheriff was first bound to inquire whether the plaintiff was the man wanted, and until a reasonable time for inquiries had elapsed the detention was lawful It has not been found that an unreasonable time elapsed before the plaintiff was discharged. It may be that the plaintiff might have established that the detention was unreasonably long, but no such case was set up at the trial. Under these circumstances, I do not think that a new trial ought to be granted for the purpose of raising the question. I think, therefore, that the judgment is right, and the appeal should be dismissed with costs.

sold, and the wife kept the money for her own separate use. In 1887 she and her husband came to Queensland, and in that year the husband, proposing to enter into business with his brother at Killarney, borrowed from her, on October 22, £1,071 in cash. Broomfield entered into partnership with his brother, and in January, 1891, his wife advanced him another £50. The appellant, however, abandoned her claim in respect to that sum. On November 30, 1891, the husband repaid £30 of the money he had borrowed from his wife, and on September 28, 1893, he repaid a further sum of £15, thus leaving a balance of £1,026, for which she claimed to prove. On October 3, 1894, Broomfield filed a petition for the liquidation of his affairs by arrangement, and on February 3 of

Solicitors for plaintiff: H. B. Lilley and the same year resolutions were passed liquidating Cowlishaw.

the estate by arrangement. The appellant fur

Solicitor for defendant: J. Howard Gill, Crown nished the trustee with a proof of the whole Solicitor.

Re BROOMFIELD. Insolvency-Wife's separate property in possession of husband-Marriage settlement made

in England―The Married Women's Property

Act, 1890 (54 Vic., No. 9), s. 5.

amount of money lent by her to her husband, but the trustee stated that, under sec. 5 of The Married Women's Property Act, 1890, he would have to postpone her claim to a dividend until the other creditors were satisfied. Harding, J, upheld the decision on the ground that the appellant,

being at the time she left England entitled there to the proceeds as her separate estate, with power, under sec. 11 of the English Act, to maintain an action in her own name for its recovery when she arrived here, as there was a marriage

A wife, who lent her husband separate property before the passing of The Married Women's Property Act, 1890, is not to be postponed in the proof of her debt n the estate of her husband, who has become insolvent since that Act, until the other creditors are satisfied. Sec. 5 of 54 Vic., No. 9, is not retro-contract, the terms of that contract determined spective. It applies in a case of liquidation by her rights with respect of the property here. arrangement as well as in insolvency.

APPEAL from an order of Harding, J., affirming a decision of the trustee in the estate of A. G. Broomfield, in liquidation, postponing the claim of the appellant to a dividend until the other creditors were satisfied.

The appellant was married to Alfred George Broomfield, in England, on April 12, 1875. Prior

Therefore, when she came here her rights were similar to those of any other married woman in Queensland having separate property. She therefore held it subject to the laws of the colony then existing and thereafter to be passed; that, consequently, her case was within sec. 5 of The Married Women's Property Act, 1890.

Rutledge, for the appellant, cited Re Sibeth, to her marriage she was possessed of certain lease-14 Q.B.D., 417; Macqueen's Husband and Wife, hold property, and by an agreement made two 411; Re Melbourn, L.R., 6 Ch., 64; Woodward v.

Woodward, 3 De. G., J. & S., 672; and Turnbull v. Forman, 15 Q.B.D., 234; and submitted sec. 5 did not apply to liquidation by arrangement.

husband in respect of this sum, which is in effect settled to her separate use; and that, as by the law of this country all creditors who have a right to prove are entitled to prove pari passu with the other creditors, she is in the same position, and is entitled to prove in the same manner." And,

to have been the practice. There is also a case of Ex parte Wells (2 Mont., D. & D., 504), which was a case in which a married woman proved, and

Lilley, for the respondent, contended that 54 Vic., No. 9, made no alteration in the law as regards the wife participating in dividends. She could not compete with other creditors. Her according to Robson's Bankruptcy, that appears right did not vest until after the Act came into force. There is no difference between insolvency and liquidation. Re Sparks, 4 Q.L.J., 59. GRIFFITH, C.J.: The appellant in this case trustees were appointed to receive the dividends. married the liquidating debtor in England in No doubt was suggested as to her right to prove. 1875. Before the marriage an antenuptial agree- A case was, however, referred to by Mr. Lilley ment or settlement was made, under which she was (Re Beale, 4 Ch.D., 246) which, he suggested, to hold certain property as her separate estate. threw doubt on a married woman's right to prove She afterwards sold that property and came with in respect of her separate estate against her husher husband to Queensland in 1887. In that band's estate in bankruptcy. That case, which year her husband went into business in partner- was decided by Vice-Chancellor Bacon, seems ship with his brother, and the appellant lent him entirely a decision on questions of fact. The £1,071, part of the separate estate in her hands. Vice-Chancellor came to the conclusion that the We must first consider what her rights were woman had not really constituted herself a at that time. The Married Women's Property creditor of the debtor, and that the relationship of Act had not been passed, but the money was her debtor and creditor did not exist between them. separate estate, and under the law in Queensland The cases referred to by him in support of his at that time she was entitled to lend the money to judgment were all cases in which that relationship her husband. Upon lending the money to him did not exist, and the view of the facts on which she became his creditor for that amount, and was he based his judgment showed that he thought it entitled to bring an action against him to recover did not exist in that case. No cases have been it, suing by a next friend, or without one, accord-brought before us which in my opinion in any ing to the practice of the Court, and in the event way weaken the authority of Ex parte Melbourn. of his becoming insolvent she was entitled to prove I therefore think that before The Married in his estate just as any other creditor. That, I Women's Property Act of 1890 was passed the think, is sufficiently decided to be the law by the present appellant was in the position of being a case of Ex parte Melbourn (L.R., 6 Ch., 64). creditor of her husband, and if he had become inIn that case a wife was a creditor of her husband. solvent, then she would have been entitled to prove He became bankrupt, and she sought to prove in his estate in the same way as any other against his estate. A question arose whether the creditor. If that is so, the only question is, does contract between her and her husband was valid The Married Women's Property Act make any under the law of Batavia, where they had been difference? Sec. 5 provides that "any money or residing when the contract was made. It was held other estate of the wife lent or entrusted by her that that law did not affect her right to prove, and to her husband for the purpose of any trade or that law being out of the way, Lord Justice business carried on by him or otherwise shall be Mellish said: “I am of opinion that it is simply a treated as assets of her husband's estate, in case question of priority of creditors inter se, and does of his insolvency, under reservation of the wife's not prevent the wife proving as creditor of her claim to a dividend as a creditor for the amount

make and maintain it. More especially would this seem reasonable, when the thing to be constructed is one of public advantage and utility, in which the public are to have rights. The maxim of good sense and law so stated becomes applicable with more or less stringency according to the scope of the Act of Parliament. On the other hand, the Legislature cannot fairly be supposed to

or value of such money or other estate after, but not before, all claims of the other creditors of the husband for valuable consideration in money or money's worth have been satisfied." By that section she is to be on the same footing as what is sometimes called a voluntary creditor, a creditor without valuable consideration. If that section is applicable to the present case, as has been decided by the order now under appeal, she was not intend, in the absence of clear words showing entitled to come into competition with the other such intention, that one man's property shall be creditors. That was what the trustee decided. confiscated for the benefit of others, or of the The trustee allowed her claim, but intimated that public, without any compensation being provided he would postpone it until the other creditors had for him in respect of what is taken compulsorily been paid in full. Now, the general rule in the from him. Parliament in its omnipotence can, of interpretation of statutes is that if possible a new course, override or disregard this ordinary prinlaw is to be considered as applying to the future ciple as it can override the former, if it sees fit to and not to the past. I do not know that that do so, but it is not likely that it will be found has ever been more forcibly stated than in the disregarding it without plain expressions of such words of Lord Justice Bowen in The London and a purpose. Those two maxims or principles North-Western Railway Company v. Evans (1893, 1 Ch., 27): "When we pass from private grants between individuals to titles and rights created by an Act of Parliament, the exact subject matter is altered, but similar rules of good sense and law obtain when we have to interpret sections which do not expressly decide the matter. These canons do not override the language of a statute where the language is clear; they are only guides to enable us to understand what is inferential. In each case the Act of Parliament is all powerful, and, when its meaning is unequivocally expressed, the necessity for rules of construction disappears and reaches its vanishing point. Where the intention of the Legislature has been left to be collected from principles of reason, there are one or two obvious principles which have to be borne in mind. One such maxim, similar to that which has been alluded to as governing the case of private grants, seems obvious also with regard to Acts of Parliament. Where an express statutory right is given in the event of his insolvency to prove and receive to make and maintain a thing necessarily requir-in the distribution of the estate an equal share ing support, the statute, in the absence of a contract implying the contrary, must be taken to mean that the right to necessary support of the thing constructed shall accompany the right to

appear to bear on the construction of statutes like the present, and may be called canons of construction, not because they are inflexible doctrines, but because they are doctrines of sound sense and obvious justice, to be borne in mind in dealing with legislation that cannot be supposed, unless it so explicitly states, to neglect what is reasonable and business-like on the one hand, or what is natural justice upon the other." Now, applying that principle to the present case, if the effect of The Married Women's Property Act is to postpone the wife's claim to a share of the proceeds of her husband's estate with the other creditors, in the words of Lord Justice Bowen, her property would be confiscated for the benefit of the other creditors. That is a thing which the Legislature could not be fairly supposed to have intended, in the absence of clear words showing such an intention. There is no doubt of her right before the passing of the Act to maintain an action against her husband, or

with the other creditors. That was a vested right. If the Act operated retrospectively it would have the effect of taking from her that right without any compensation. With respect to loans made