under their Standing Orders, the power to pass such a resolution as it passed in this case. It is enough to refer to Standing Order 166, and the Standing Order of the House of Commons, 21, as the Assembly may either rightfully or wrongfully have held that either or both of the Standing Orders applied to the present proceedings. Standing Order 166 gives the power to suspend from the

ance. We must, of course, face this supposition, and give our decision on the hypothesis of its truth. But it would be indecent and improper to make the further supposition that the House of Commons deliberately and intentionally defies and breaks the statute law. The more decent, and, I may add, the more natural and probable supposition is that, for reasons which are not before us, and of which we are therefore unable to judge, the House of Commons considers that there is no inconsistency between the Act and the resolution. They may think there is some implied exception to the Act. They may think that what the plaintiff proposes to do is not in compliance with its directions. With this we have nothing to do. Whatever may be the reasons of the House of Commons for their conduct, it would be impossible for us to do justice, without hearing and considering those reasons; but it would be equally impossible for the House, with any regard for its own dignity and independence, to suffer its reasons to be laid before us for that purpose, or to accept our interpretation of the law in preference to its own. It seems to follow that the House of Commons has the exclusive power of interpreting the statute, so far as the regulation of its own proceedings within its own walls is concerned; and that, even if that inte pretation should be erroneous, this court has no power to interfere with it directly or indirectly." Thus it is clear that the House has the exclusive right to regulate its own internal concerns, and that short of a criminal offence committed within the House, or by its order, no court will take cognisance of that which passes within its walls. An inspection of the Standing Orders shows that the Assembly had,

House may think fit."

Standing Order 21 limits the suspension on the first occasion to a week. The suspension in this case is for a week only, and is within both Standing Orders. The Votes and Proceedings of the sitting of the 12th September, 1894, were put in at the trial and marked exhibit 2. They show that "disorder arising" Mr. Browne was named, and that it was consequent thereon that the resolution in this case was passed. This is also spoken to in the plaintiff's evidence at folio 12 of the Chief Justice's notes. This power being shown to exist, it is not necessary or possible for this court to take cognisance of the mode in which it was passed within the walls of the Assembly, and it will not do so, because, under Standing Order 335, so much of this privilege of regulating its internal concerns as related to orderly conduct under section 8 of The Constitution Act of 1867 are part of the Standing Orders of the Assembly. The appeal is dismissed with costs.

Solicitors for appellant: J. N. Robinson & Co. Solicitors for respondent: Macpherson & Feez.

The Municipality of R. being the registered proprietors of certain land, demised it to the defendant for 21 years at a fixed rent. The lease contained, inter alia, a covenant in these words: "The said demised premises shall be liable to be rated and assessed in the same manner as if the said premises were not the property of the said municipality." The municipality sued the defendant for rates. Held that the land was "vested in the municipality" within the meaning of s. 176 of The Local Government Act of 1878, and s. 11 of The Valuation and Rating Act of 1890, notwithstanding that it was in the possession of the defendant.

The exemptions from rating contained in those Acts are not conditions for the benefit of individuals, but limitations of the statutory authority of the Local Authority. Such authority cannot be conferred by agreement inter partes. Held further, that reading the covenant as a covenant to pay a sum to be be assessed in the form of rates in respect of the property, the provisions of the Local Government Acts allowing an appeal from assessments to legal tribunals could not be applied to land not rateable under the Acts, and that, the conditions of assessment being consequently impossible of complete fulfilment, the covenant was invalid.

APPEAL from so much of an order of Harding, J., under O. XIV, r. 1, as gave leave to sign Final Judgment against the defendant for £82 10s., claimed by the plaintiffs as rates due under implied covenants contained in leases executed by the defendant under the Real Property Acts.

Feez and Shand for appellant.
Lilley for respondents.

The facts and argument appear fully in the judgment of the court (Griffith, C.J., Chubb and Real, JJ.), which was delivered by

GRIFFITH, C.J.: This is an appeal from an order of Harding, J., upon an application for final judgment under O. XIV, r. 1. The writ is indorsed with a claim for rent and rates due under covenants implied in leases under the Real Property Acts. The amount in question on this appeal is a sum of £82 10s. claimed as rates. The facts are not in dispute. The plaintiffs being the registered proprietors under the Real Property Acts of the lands in respect of which the rates are alleged to be due, demised them to the defendant for terms of twenty-one years at fixed rents. The leases, which were executed by the defendant, were

expressed to be made subject to certain covenants, conditions, and restrictions, one of which is in these Words: "The said demised premises shall be liable to be rated and assessed in the same manner as if the said premises were not the property of the said municipality." The defendent contends that this condition or covenant is illegal, or at any rate ineffectual, and imposes no obligation on him. Harding, J., allowed final judgment to be signed for the amount in question. The plaintiff's contend that although they are registered proprietors of the land, it is not vested in them within the meaning of s. 176 of The Local Government Act of 1878, which was in force when the leases were made, or of s. 5 of The Valuation Act of 1887, or of s. 11 of The Valuation and Rating Act of 1890, inasmuch as it is in the beneficial occupation of the defendant for a term of years, and their estate is an estate in reversion only. The language of these sections, so far as regards the matter now in question, is substantially identical. That of the Act of 1878 is: "All land shall be rateable property within the meaning of this Act, save as is next hereinafter excepted, that is to say (inter alia), land vested in or in the occupation of or held in trust for the municipality or the council thereof." That of the Acts of 1887 and 1890 is: "All land is rateable for the purposes of this Act with the following exceptions only, that is to say inter alia), land vested in or in the occupation of or held in trust for the local authority." The definition draws a plain distinction between land vested in the local authority and land in their occupation. We think that the word "vested" is used in a popular sense, and is intended to denote land of which the local authority is owner in fee, or for any lesser estate, whether their title arises from a deed of grant or any other instrument by which an estate in land can be lawfully vested in them. And we think it is none the less vested in them because they have granted a lease of it. It follows that the land was not, and is not, rateable land under the Local Government Acts. The Valuation and Rating Act contains, as did the earlier Acts, the provisions of which are re-enacted

in it with amendments, elaborate provisions for assessing, making, and enforcing rates. These include provision for valuation, for notice of the valuation to persons liable to pay the rates, for appeals by aggrieved persons to justices, with a final appeal to this court on questions of law, and for enforcing the rates by distress. The local authority is required to keep account of the rates collected, and is entitled to an endowment from the consolidated revenue, the amount of which is dependent on the amount of rates actually collected. We think that these provisions exclude the notion that the exceptions from rateability are in the nature of an exception introduced in a statute in favour of individuals, and the benefit of which may be waived by the persons for whose benefit it was enacted. The power of the local authority to make and collect rates on land within its local jurisdiction is purely statutory. As to land which is not included in the power, but falls within the exception, they have no statutory power at all relating to rates. This being so, we have no doubt that a covenant by parties cannot have the effect of making that rateable which by law is not rateable. The covenant in question cannot, therefore, have literal effect given to it, and the money sought to be recovered cannot be recovered as rates. No objection was, however, taken to the form of the indorsement on the writ. It was further contended for the plaintiffs that even if literal effect cannot be given to the covenant, it is susceptible of an interpretation that will give effect to the substantial intention of the parties which, it was said, was that the lessee should, in addition to his fixed rent, pay by way of rent or return to the lessors a further sum, which should be of equal amount to that which would be payable as rates if the land had been rateable. It is not unlikely that this was the intention of the parties, if they really applied their minds to the question from that point of view. For the defendant it was urged that the covenant is illegali.e., contrary to law, because if it took effect according to its terms, the plaintiff's income from rates would be apparently swelled by the amount paid

as rates in respect of their own property, by which means they would be entitled to claim a larger endowment than they were really entitled to, and that this would be a fraud on the public. No doubt this result would follow if moneys received by the plaintiffs from the defendant under the covenants were included in the verified account sent to the Treasurer upon which the amount of endowment is calculated. But it is not necessary to impute to the plaintiffs an intention to do this, or to do otherwise than to exclude the moneys so collected from their verified account. "If words have a double intendment, and the one standeth with the law and the other is against the law, they are to be taken in a sense which is agreeable to law." (Shep. Touch. 80, and per Martin, B., in Fussell v. Daniel, 10 Ex. 597.) This doctrine may be applied, we think, as well in considering the lawfulness or unlawfulness of a contract, as in considerieg its verbal construction. Moreover, even if an unlawful intention can be imputed to a municipal council as distinguished from an attempt to do an act which is ultra vires, the question of intention would be one of fact. The defendant further contended that the covenant if not unlawful, was inoperative. Assuming that the court ought, under the circumstances, to endeavour to construe it so as to give it some effect, we think it could not be put more favourably for the plaintiffs than as a covenant to pay, by way of additional rent, a sum of money to be assessed in the same manner, by the same persons, and subjeet to the same conditions, as are applicable to the assessment of rates. A covenant in those terms would import all the provisions of the Acts in force for the time being relating to the assessment of rates, including the right of appeal to justices and to this court. And the assessment of the amount in accordance with those conditions would be a condition precedent to the obligation to pay it. Such a condition would, however, be impossible of fulfilment; for the agreement of the parties would not confer jurisdiction on the justices or on this court to entertain an appeal from the valuation (Farquharson v.