dooah's presence. When he came to where Crown Stumm, for the prisoner: The arrest of the prisoner and the reading to him of the confession of his fellow-prisoner operated as a threat, and the confession was not a free and voluntary one. The whole policy of the law is against allowing a constable to obtain an admission from a prisoner by means of cross-examination. The evidence should have been rejected and the conviction ought therefore to be quashed. He cited R. v. Male and Cooper (17 Cox, 689), R. v. Thompson (1893, 2 Q.B., 12), R. v. Garin and others (15 Cox, 656), R. v. Bodkin (9 Cox, 403), R. v. Day (2 Cox, 209), R. v. Moore (2 Den. C.C., 522). understand that to be the point, although the statement or admission made in the present case was not made in answer to a distinct question. I suppose, however, that there was a standing invitation to him to assent to or contradict the confession of another of the accused, which was being read over to him. It is objected that an admission obtained in this way is not admissible in point of law. As I understand it, the general rule as to admissions made by parties is that they are admissible, and they have sometimes been said to be the best evidence. With respect to admissions made by a person charged with a criminal offence, however, the rule is that the confession must be free and voluntary, or-in terms which I understand to be synonymous—that it must not be induced by threats or promises, using these terms in their fullest sense. I take it that that is an exception to the general rule of admissibility. If that is so, the statute of last year merely affirms the common law, which is that prima facie an admission is admissible, but in the case of a criminal charge it is not admissible if it has been procured by means of threats or promises. But it is not inadmissible merely because it is made by a person in custody in answer to questions put to him by a constable. That was held to be the law in England in the case of R. v. Thornton, as long ago as 1824. It was held to be the law in Ireland by eight judges out of eleven in 1864, and it was held to be the law in New South Wales in 1870, in the case of R. v. Rogerson. It has been followed as the practice in this colony always, as far as I know, and has been expressly held to be the law here in the case of R. v. Many Many, tried at the last Bundaberg Assizes. It is true that in the case of R. v. Thompson, the latest case, which was decided by the Court for Crown Cases Reserved, it was said that, in order that an GRIFFITH, C.J.: The point raised in this case, admission may be admissible, it must be shown as I understand it, is whether evidence of an affirmatively that the confession was free and admission made by an accused person can be voluntary, that is, that it was not preceded by any received when that admission has been made inducement to make the statement held out by a whilst he was in custody and in answer to questions person in authority. That proposition, as applied put by a constable or a person in authority. I to the facts of that case, is no doubt perfectly GRIFFITH, C.J., referred to R. v. Johnston (15 Ir. C.L.R., 60) overruling R. v. Bodkin (ubi supra) and to R. v. Thornton (1 Moo. C.C., 27). V. Power, for the Crown: The whole question is whether an admission made by a prisoner to a constable after arrest is inadmissible within the terms of s. 10 of The Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1894. The practice in Queensland has always been to admit such statements, and the law was clearly laid down by Mr. Justice Harding in R. v. Many Many (6 Q.L.J., 229) at Bundaberg this year. He also cited R. v. Rogerson (9 Sup. Court Rep. (N.S.W.), 234). extremely improper. On the abstract question as to the manner in which constables should discharge their duty, I do not feel called upon to express any opinion. I think the conviction should be affirmed. COOPER, J. I am of the same opinion, and I do not wish to express it in other words. : REAL, J. I concur in the judgment of the learned Chief Justice. On the question as to the propriety of police-constables cross-examining prisoners I do not wish to offer an opinion. I can conceive of circumstances under which it might be the right thing to do, and on the other hand, I can conceive of circumstances under which it might be most objectionable. correct. There had been a distinct inducement, in the nature of a promise, held out indirectly to the accused, and it had come to his knowledge, and had operated upon him. It was clear that that inducement having been held out, the admission could not be received. I do not know whether it was intended by the court to dissent from the previous decisions or the previous practice of the English Court. Certainly the case was not one in which the question now under consideration really arose for decision. I do not think we can take this case as overruling the previous decisions or the practice of this court. The real question is in each case, Was the confession induced by a threat or promise? To my mind it is perfectly immaterial on whom the onus of proof restswhether on the prosecution to show negatively that the admission was not, or on the prisoner to show affirmatively that it was, induced by a threat GRIffith, C.J. or promise, because I think it is the duty of the learned judge to satisfy himself that it was not To D.'s will, found after his death, there were three codicils. induced by any threat or promise. That being so, the only question for our consideration in this case is, Is the fact that the statement is made to a constable, in answer to questions put by him, proof that it was induced by a threat or promise? I do not think it is. A confession may be made to a constable under the influence of a threat or fear, or terror, or it may be induced by a promise or by the expectation of benefit, or it may not. In the present case there is nothing but the mere fact that it was made to a constable after the arrest in the course of conversation. That is not sufficient to render it inadmissible. Prima facie I think it is admissible, and there is nothing to show that it was not admissible. As to the general question whether a constable should ask an accused person questions or not, I desire to express my concurrence with the observations made by Chief Justice Stephen in the case of R. v. Rogerson, in New South Wales, and with the similar observations made by Parke, B., long before. There may be cases in which it would be highly proper to put questions to a person in custody, and other cases where it would be GRIFFITH, C.J.: The conviction will be affirmed. IN CHAMBERS. 6th December, 1895. Re DAVENPORT'S WILL. The signatures to the first codicil were found to have been struck through, and the words "Revoked and replaced by another codicil dated 11th day of August, 1890," were written in testator's writing below the attestation clause, but were not attested. The third codicil was dated 11th August, 1890, but contained no formal revocation of the first codicil. Held that the first codicil was not revoked. APPLICATION by Emily J. Davenport, executrix of the will and codicils thereto of Ernest J. Davenport, deceased, and by the "Queensland Trustees" for a grant to the Queensland Trustees of letters of administration with the will and codicils. From the affidavits filed in support of the application, it appeared that the will of the testator was found after his death in his private safe in the state above set out. Morris, for the applicants, asked for a grant of letters of administration with the will and codicils in their entirety. GRIFFITH, C.J.: Merely striking through the name of the testator is not one of the modes of revocation allowed by law. The codicil has therefore not been revoked, and administration must go with the will and three codicils. Solicitors for applicants: Morris & Heiner. IN CHAMBERS. IN CHAMBERS. GRIFFITH, C.J. 9th December, 1895. GRIFFITH, C.J. QUEENSLAND BREWERY LTD. . CAMPBELL. Practice-Writ-Special endorsement-Promissory note payable on demand—Amendment of writ. In an action on a promissory note payable on demand, the demand was not alleged in the endorsement, but it appeared upon the evidence that a demand had been made. Leave was granted on the hearing of a summons for final judgment to amend the writ by alleging a demand. SUMMONS by Queensland Brewery, Ltd., to sign final judgment against A. L. Campbell for £50, amount of a dishonoured promissory note drawn by him and payable on demand, for interest thereon from date of demand, and for costs. The writ, which was specially endorsed, contained a claim for interest, but did not allege that a demand had been made. The evidence fi'ed on behalf of the plaintiffs showed that a demand had been made, and that plaintiffs had a prima facie case. The defendant's evidence disclosed no defence on the merits. Woolcock, for plaintiffs, asked for leave to sign final judgment for the amount claimed. Macdonnell, for defendant, submitted that the writ was defective, as failing to allege a demand, and asked that the summons might be dismissed with costs. Woolcock asked leave to amend the writ by alleging demand. GRIFFITH, C.J.: This is a case, I think, in which an amendment should be allowed. In the recent case of Roberts v. Plant (1895, 1 Q.B. 597), leave was given to amend under very similar circumstances. I shall therefore allow the writ to be amended by alleging a demand. The hearing of this summons will be adjourned. The costs of the adjournment will be reserved. On a subsequent application the defendant was allowed £2 2s. as his costs of the adjournment, which were ordered to be set off against the costs allowed to plaintiffs. Solicitors for plaintiffs: Macdonald-Paterson & Hawthorn. Solicitor for defendant: R. J. Leeper. 11th December, 1895. Re JESSOP'S WILL. Practice-Affidavit-Jurat. In an affidavit sworn by several persons and containing a separate jurat for each deponent, the first of the jurats was in order and began, "Signed and sworn by the said," etc., but the second and each of the following jurats did not contain the words "Signed and sworn," but began, "And by the said," etc. Held that the jurat was sufficient. APPLICATION by Sarah Ann Jessop, Jesse James Jessop, and John Stanley Jessop, the executrix and executors of the will of John Shillito Jessop, deceased, and by the Queensland Trustees, for a grant of letters of administration with the said will annexed to the said Queensland Trustees. It appeared that the jurats in two of the affidavits filed in support of the application were as above set out. W. F. Wilson, for the applicants, asked leave to read the affidavits. GRIFFITH, C.J.: I think the jurats are sufficient. Solicitors for applicants: I. H. Wilson & Hemming. Re GRACE, INSOLVENT. Transfer of work from Southern to Northern Court -Practice-Form of order. On an application to a judge at Brisbane to send matter for hearing before a Northern judge, it should be shown that the Northern judge has been consulted as to a date convenient to him for the hearing. The order fixing the hearing of any such matter should contain a request to the Northern judge to hear the matter. APPLICATION by T. Unmack, the trustee in the estate of James Grace, insolvent, for an examination under s. 114 of The Insolvency Act of 1874, before Mr. Justice Chubb, at Townsville, of J. H. Brown and other witnesses. Green for applicant. The trustee's solicitor read the application of the trustee, and asked that 18th December might be appointed for the examination. GRIFFITH, C.J.: You must communicate with Mr. Justice Chubb as to what date will be convenient for him to take the examination. Green Our agents in Townsville have communicated with Mr. Justice Chubb, and I have a telegram from them stating that he is willing to take the examination on the 18th December. GRIFFITH, C.J. (after referring to Re Lowry, 4 Q.L.J., 78): I will fix the examination for that date before Mr. Justice Chubb at Townsville. The order fixing the examination must, however, contain a request to Mr. Justice Chubb to take the examination. 1895. The order was drawn up in the following form :— UPON HEARING the application of the Trustee of the property of the abovenamed insolvent filed herein on the day of AND upon it being made known that the Honourable Mr. Justice Chubb was willing to take the examination hereinafter directed on the 18th day of December, 1895. IT IS ORDERED that A.B., of Townsville, in the colony of Queensland, wife of the said insolvent, and C.D., of Townsville aforesaid, contractor, do appear in their proper persons before the Honourable Mr. Justice Chubb, at the Supreme Court House, Townsville, on the 18th day of December, 1895, at the hour of ten o'clock in the forenoon of the same day, and that they respectively bring with them and produce at the time and place aforesaid, all books, deeds, papers, and writings in their possession or control relating to the insolvent, his dealings or property. AND THIS COURT doth hereby request the Honourable Mr. Justice Chubb to take the said examination and to cause the evidence taken (if any) to be transmitted to the Supreme Court at Brisbane. IN THE LANDS OF JOHN EATON. Will-Construction-Devise for life or in fee. Gift by will of "all my messuages, lands, tenements, and hereditaments, all my household furniture, ready money, securities for money, money in banks, money secured by life assurance, goods and chattels, and all other my real and personal estate and effects whatsoever and wheresoever, unto my wife, H. E., to and for her own absolute use and benefit during the term of her natural life, subject to the payment of my just debts, funeral and testamentary expenses, and the charges of proving this my will." The testator then appointed H. E, sole and absolute executrix" of the will. Held that H. E. took an estate in fee. Groom, for J. H. Eaton, next of kin, moved for a grant of administration of the lands of John Eaton, deceased. The testator's wife survived him, and was now dead. He cited Kenrick v. Beauclerk (3 B. & P., 175), Jarman (1146), Moor v. Denn (2 B. & P., 247), Burton v. Powers (3 K. & J., 170). GRIFFITH, C.J.: This is a motion for a grant of administration of the lands of John Eaton, deceased. Eaton made a will in the following terms: "I give, devise, and bequeath all my messuages, lands, tenements, and hereditaments, all my household furniture, ready money, securities for money, money in banks, money secured by life assurance, goods and chattels, and all other my real and personal estate and effects whatsoever and wheresoever, unto my wife Hannah Eaton, to and for her own absolute use and benefit during the term of her natural life, subject to the payment of my just debts, funeral and testamentary expenses, and the charges of proving this my will. I hereby appoint the said Hannah Eaton as the sole and absolute executrix of this my will." Testator's widow survived him, but is now dead. The present application is made by Eaton's eldest son, and is based on the assumption that the devise of the land by the will was a devise for the life of Hannah Eaton only, and that there was an intestacy as to the estate in remainder after her death. Although the court, in dealing with applications for grants of probate or administration, does not ordinarily act as a Court of Construction, it is, I think, proper, when a will has been made by a deceased person, to consider whether it deals with the property as to which a grant of administration is sought. If, therefore, upon the true construction of this will, it contains a valid devise of the land in fee, I do not think I ought to grant administration as upon an intestacy. Every case of this sort depends upon its own circumstances. But it is an established rule that in construing a will the intention of the testator is to be collected from all parts of it. It is also a rule of construction that when a will casts any duty upon a person named in it, for the performance of which duty the legal estate is requisite, that person is to be taken to have the legal estate. (Anthony v. Rees, 2 Cr. & J., 83 ; Davies to Thomas, 24 Ch.D., 190). Turning to the will now in question, it is contended that the words " during the term of her natural life" operate as a limitation of the legal estate devised by the will. On the other hand the words are, I think, as I intimated during the argument, open to the construction that they are intended only to limit the period of the wife's beneficial enjoyment of the property. Looking at the whole will, it is, I think, in the first place, impossible to resist the conclusion that the testator thought that he was making a complete legal disposition of all his property, which he carefully enumerated. He may, however, have failed to do so. It is to be observed, in the next place, that the gift of his whole estate is to his wife "for," &c., "during," &c., subject to the charge of debts. The subject of the disposition and the subject of the charge seem, therefore, intended to be identical. Now it is, I think, clear that the charge is a charge upon the corpus and not merely upon the life estate of the wife, for otherwise she might be a loser by the gift. These considerations point to the conclusion that the words "for her own absolute use and benefit during the term of her natural life," should be read parenthetically, and not as limiting the quantity of the estate devised by the will (Burton v. Powers, 3 K. & J., 170). This conclusion is confirmed by the concluding sentence, in which the testator appoints his wife "absolute executrix" of his will-words to which the court is bound to give some effect. This, I think, can only be done by holding them to mean that the testator intended his wife to have absolute authority to give effect to all the provisions of his will, including the implied direction to apply his lands, if necessary, in payment of his debts. She could only have that authority by taking the legal estate. The case of Doe v. Haslewood (6 A. & E., 167), and Doe v. Pratt (Ib. 180), in which the effect of an appointment of a person as "executor" of lands was considered, tend to the same result. The 62nd section of The Succession Act, so far as it is applicable, affords an additional argument in favour of this conclusion. That section provides that "where any real estate shall be devised to any trustee or exec tor, such devise shall be construed to pass the fee simple or other the whole estate or interest which the testator had power to dispose of by will in such real estate, unless a definite term of years absolute or determinable, or an estate of freehold, shall thereby be given to him expressly or by implication." The effect seems to be to raise, in cases of doubt or ambiguity, a presumption in favour of the |