The Cambridge Companion to William James
William James (1842-1910) was both a philosopher and a psychologist, nowadays most closely associated with the pragmatic theory of truth. The essays in this companion deal with the full range of his thought as well as other issues, including technical philosophical issues, religious speculation, moral philosophy and political controversies of his time. New readers and nonspecialists will find this the most convenient and accessible guide to James currently available. Advanced students and specialists will find a conspectus of recent developments in the interpretation of James.
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Pragmatism and introspective psychology
Consciousness as a pragmatist views it
John Deweys naturalization of William James
James Clifford and the scientific conscience
Religious faith intellectual responsibility and romance
The breathtaking intimacy of the material world William Jamess last thoughts
James aboutness and his British critics
Logical principles and philosophical attitudes Peirces response to Jamess pragmatism
Interpreting the universe after a social analogy Intimacy panpsychism and a finite god in a pluralistic universe
Moral philosophy and the development of morality
Some of lifes ideals
A shelter of the mind Henry William and the domestic scene
The influence of William James on American culture
Pragmatism politics and the corridor
James and the Kantian tradition
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absolute action appears argues argument belief brain called causal claim Clifford cognitive conception consciousness criticism culture Dewey Dewey's distinction doctrine domestic dualism Elizabeth Stoddard empiricist ence essay ethical evidence existence experienced F. C. S. Schiller fact feeling Gramsci Hilary Putnam human idea ideal insists intellectual intimacy introspection James writes James's account James's pragmatism Jamesean judgments Kallen Kant kind lecture lives logical meaning ment mental metaphysical mind moral properties Morgesons nature neutral monism notion object one's panpsychism panpsychist Peirce Peirce's phenomenological philoso philosophy physical pluralism Pluralistic Universe possible practical pragmatist Principles Principles of Psychology problem psychology pure experience question radical empiricism rational reality reason relation religion religious experience response Royce Royce's RUTH ANNA PUTNAM scientific seems sense significant skepticism social sort theory of truth things thinkers thought tion tism true verified William James
Strana 4 - To be radical, an empiricism must neither admit into its constructions any element that is not directly experienced, nor exclude from them any element that is directly experienced. For such a philosophy, the relations that connect experiences must themselves be experienced relations, and any kind of relation experienced must be accounted as 'real' as anything else in the system.