And in fact inspection will not be allowed to tiff to the East India Company in pursuance of an award, whereby reciting he had sustained several injuries by the Company's agents, particularly the deputy-governor, therefore they award him 1,000l., and order him to give a general release. The defendant being no party to that release could not plead it, but the Chief Justice allowed him to give it in evidence in mitigation of damages; and these not being private papers, consented on behalf of the.. Coinpany that they should be produced. 4. CREW V. BLACKBURN. Cited H. T. 1748. K. B. 1 Wils. 240; S. C. 2 Stra. 1005. Actions qui tam against the defendant as a clerk in the Post-Office, for a penalty of 501. for interfering in the election of the member to serve in parliament; a motion was made by the plaintiff for leave to inspect the books of the any public Post-Office, alleging, that those books were touching the public revenue, in books for in which every subject has a right and interest; but the Court refused to grant direct pur the motion, and confined themselves to this, viz. that the question in the cause not concerning any transaction in the Post-Office (for which transaction only those books are kept), denied to grant the rule, (E) OF COURT rolls. poses. Court rolls are liable to 1. ROE V. ALMYER. H. T. 1753. C. P. Barnes, 236. ADLINGTON V. CLODE 2 Black. 1030. This ejectment was brought on the demise of the lord of a manor against inspection; the defendant his tenant, to recover possession of a copyhold estate, which the lord insisted was forfeited by reason of tenant's not rebuilding a cottage. Defendant moved for leave to inspect and take copies at his own expense of the court rolls of the manor; but the motion was denied for want of an affidavit that a previous application had been made on defendant's part to the lord or bis steward for an inspection and copies, which were denied. Though this is a dispute merely between the lord and his copyhold tenant, touching a forfeiture, yet the same previous application is necessary as in other cases. The tenants of a manor are the only persons who have a right to inspect the court rolls; the Court always expected an affidavit that the person on whose behalf the motion is made is a tenant of the manor, and has applied and been denied [6] as above mentioned. At least as regards the tenants. In trover by bank rupt's assig nees, the question be ing whether the bank rupt sold the goods, 2. TALBOT V. VILLEBOYS. Cited 3 T. R. 142. In an action of trespass, where the question was, whother the place in which the trespass was alleged to have been committed was within the manor of the plaintiff or part of a manor claimed by the defendant, the Court held that the defendant, who, as it appeared from his affidavit, was not a tenant of the plaintiff's manor, nor claimed any interest under him, could not be enti tled to an inspection. (F) CORPORATION BOOKS. See ante, vol. vi. tit. Corporation. WHITTER AND OTHERS V. CAZALES. M. T. 1788. K. B. 2 T. R. 683, In trover for goods by the assignees of a bankrupt, where the defence was, the defend that they were sold by the plaintiff, and the defendant moved for leave to inspect the bankrupt's sale books, the Court granted the application, and gave, leave to in him time to plead, in order that he might gain time to obtain a discovery from the Court of Chancery in the mean while. ant had spect his sale books. Formerly the courts were very strict in granting a copy of an indict ment; * In fact they would in one case on II. RELATIVE TO CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS. 1. GROENVOLT V. BARWELL. 1 Lord Raym. 253. Lord Holt has laid it down as a general rule of law, that if a person be indicted for felony and acquitted, and means to bring an action (without sufficient cause) the judge will not permit him to have a copy without leave. 2. VANDERCOME V. ABBOTT. 2 Leach, C. L. 821. In this case, the prisoners after their acquittal applied for copies of the several indictments for the purpose of assisting them in their plea of auterfois acquit; the Court, however, refused to grant them copies, but ordered the off* But see 7 & 8 Geo. 4. c. 28. See ante, vol. 10, p. 501. cer to read over the indictments slowly and distinctly, which was accordingly ly allow it done. S. LLGALL V. TOLLERREY. 14 East, 302. to be read. But if a co On the part of the plaintiff in this case, the clerk of the court of quarter py be obtai sessions before which the indictment had been tried produced a copy, which, ned with for want of an order, was not allowed to be read, and the plaintiff was in con- out an order sequence nonsuited. But the Court of King's Bench were of opinion that it cannot, it the evidence ought to have been received, and set aside the nonsuit. It is seems, be very clear, said Lord Ellenborough, C. J., that it is the duty of the rejected on that ground. officer charged with the custody of the records of the court not to pro- [ 7 ] duce a record but upon competent authority, which at the Old Bailey is obtained upon application to the Court, pursuant to the order that has long prevailed there, and, with respect to the general records of the realm, upon application to the Attorney-General. But if the officer, even without authority, shall have given a copy of a record or produce the original, and that is proply proved in evidence, I cannot say that such evidence shall not be received. He may incur the penalty of his contempt of the Court, and may be warned at the time of his peril in so doing; and a discreet officer placed in such a situation would, before he produced the record, or gave a copy of it, apply to the Court and state the circumstances, and it cannot be doubted that he would be saved harmless in doing what, after such disclosure, the Court should order him to do. But still I cannot help thinking that the rule laid down by Lord Ch. J. Lee, in the case of Jordan v. Lewis, is the correct rule. The order made at the Old Bailey was there read by way of objection to the evidence offered; but the Chief Justice in that case said, that he could not refuse to let the plaintiff read the copy of the indictment, though obtained without any order of the Court for that purpose. nies and The preced 4. MONSON V. KELLY. T. T. 1761. K. B. 1 Blac. 385. ing cases This action came on to be tried for a malicious prosecution, in indicting the are applica plaintiff for keeping a disorderly house. To prove the fact, the clerk of the ble to felo peace for Westminster attended with the original record of the acquittal. It not misde was by counsel objected, that there ought to be a copy of the record granted meanors, by the Court before which the acquittal is had, in order to ground an action and there for a malicious prosecution. But it was ruled by Lord Mansfield, that though fore as to this is necessary where the party is indicted for felony, yet the practice is the latter, it otherwise in case of misdemeanours. is demanda ble; 5. REX V. MIDLAM T. T. 1765. K, B. 3 Burr. 1721. The counsel on behalf of the prosecutor showed cause against a rule which As the copy had been made upon him to show cause why he should not be directed by the of the con Court to forbear, and not to proceed to tax the prosecutor his costs in these viction be causes, relative to the affirmance of the convictions against the defendant in fore a ma these causes; and also why the bond entered into by or on the behalf of the gistrate; defendant, on allowing the certiorari, should not be delivered up to the said defendant, or his clerk in court, cancelled. This certiorari was brought for removing a conviction upon the game laws, and the present rule was grounded on an affidavit of hardship and oppression upon the defendant, namely, that, although the defendant had paid the forfeiture upon the conviction, yet an action had been brought against him for the same offence; and when he wanted to plead this conviction in bar of the action, the justice had refused to give him a copy of it, and he was obliged to remove it by certiorari, and the prosecutor set it down in the paper and got it affirmed, and then the prosecutor became nonsuited in the action. Per Cur. The justice ought to have given the defendant a copy of the 8 ] conviction, for it was a record, and the defendant was entitled to it. And he ought to have been allowed the expense of his necessarily bringing a certiorari in costs upon the nonsuit; for it was necessary to his defence in the action. 6. REX V. HOLLAND. T. T. 1792. K. B. 4 T. R. 691. But the per An information was filed against an officer of the East India Company, on son has no charges of delinquency, founded upon the report of a board of inquiry in India. right to in spect the The Court of King's Bench were of opinion, that the defendant had no right positions of to have an inspection of that report, and that the Court had no discretionary the witnes ses who are power to grant it. The practice on indictments at common law, and on inforto appear mations upon particular statutes, (said Mr. Justice Buller, on that occasion,) against him. shows it to be clear, that the defendant is not entitled to inspect the evidence on which the prosecution is founded till the hour of trial. The applica tion for the right to in spect must be support ed by an affidavit stating the grounds. And that III. RELATIVE TO THE APPLICATION FOR. 1. ROE v. AYLMAR. H. T. 1753. C. P. Barnes, 236. Per Cur. The application for the right to inspect must always be supported by an affidavit, to show the person on whose behalf it is made and the general grounds for the application. 2. MORROW V. SAUNDERS. T. T. 1819. C. P. 1 B. & B. 318; S. C. 3 Moore, 671. This was a motion to obtain a rule for the inspection of certain partnership the applic deeds, founded on an affidavit, stating that this action was brought for not comant has no plying with a stipulation therein contained; and after stating that this deponent copy or verily believes that the defendant has them in his possession, it alleged that counterpart this deponent cannot prosecute his action unless he obtains a copy, and that he never had the original deed, or any counterpart thereof, in his possession. On showing cause against this application, it was contended that this affidavit was not tenable, as it does not specify what species of action the plaintiff intends to bring, and relied on the case of Street v. Brown, 1 Marsh, 410. thereof; Which, if stance. Per Cur. Had there been more than one instrument, we should not have interfered; but now it is compulsory on us, for it would be impossible that the plaintiff can have no remedy. Here the affidavit is sufficient; for it was unnecessary to state the cause of action, some alleging that the plaintiff had not the deed, or any copy thereof, in his hands. Therefore the rule must be absolute. 3. REX V. SHELLEY. H. T. 1789. K. B. 3 T. R. 141. A rule to show cause why an information in the nature of quo warranto should satisfactory not be filed against the defendant, to show by what authority he claimed to to the court be a burgess of the borough of Horsham; afterwards motion was made for anis a ground other rule on behalf of the three relators, who were burgage tenants of the mafor making the rule a nor, and entitled to be summoned to the court-leet and court-baron, (and which solute in the was also a sort of corporate court) to inspect the court-rolls and books of the first in manor, (leave having been refused by the lord,) alleging, that burgage tenures gave title, and that evidence relating to these would be found by such an in9spection; and cited Wood v. Whitcomb, E. 6 Ann. C. B. 12 Vin. 146. where it was considered as a matter of course to grant an inspection of the court-rolls in a question between two tenants. Buller, J. said, that he remembered before he came to the bar it was the constant practice to grant these motions as of course; and soon after he came upon the bench there were one or two cases of this sort, wherein he thought that it would be going too far to grant an inspection, but the rest of the court overruled him, and there the matter had rested ever since. That the three persons making this application having all of them burgage tenures had an interest in knowing who besides themselves had the same rights. Rule absolute in the first instance. The motion should, it seems, be made after issue joined 4. HODGES V. ATKIS. H. T. 1773. K. B. 3 Wils. 398; S. C. 2 Blac. 877. Trespass for taking the plaintiff's goods; the defendant, as servant to the corporation of Shrewsbury, justifies taking the plaintiff's goods as a distress for toll through the streets of Shrewsbury, which the plaintiff refused to pay. And before the plaintiff had replied, or any issue was joined, it was moved on the behalf of the plaintiff for a rule to have liberty to inspect the public books and records of the corporation of Shrewsbury. For the defendant it was objected, that the plaintiff being a stranger to the corporation, has no right to inspect the books thereof; that issue not being joined, it is not known what will be the point to be tried; that the plaintiff has not yet applied to the corporation and been refused the liberty of inspecting the books; this motion is pre mature, and is the first of the kind, for it is a motion to furnish the plaintiff Per Cur. Bye-laws affecting strangers interest them therein; the rule there was made absolute for the defendant to inspect the company's books and take copies. Lord Chief Justice. Do you lay it down in general, that a stranger has a right to inspect the books of a corporation? How has a stranger to a corporation more right to inspect their books than the books of a private per- son? While Lord Camden sat here, there was the like motion in the like ac- tion of trespass, where the defendant justified (under the corporation of Ips- wich) for distraining for a toll for repairing the quay there, and the motion was refused, the plaintiff there being a stranger to the corporation; and I am sure, in many cases like the present, the motion has been refused; however, I shall give no absolute opinion upon the present motion, because issue is not yet joined, nor has the plaintif applied to be permitted to inspect the books of the corporation and been refused, and that is a sufficient reason for not granting Application for a mandamas. Lord Ellenborough, C. J. I do not know be pending, why there should be any cause depending, in order to found an application of if there be this sort. This is not the impertinent intrusion of a stranger, but the applica- no action, tion of one who is clearly entitled to the copyhold, unless there be some con- the inspec veyance of it by those under whom he claims: he may therefore well require tion must 1st. Of the stamp, p. 95. 2nd. Description of the persons insured, p. 104. 3rd. Description of the master and ship, p 109. 4th. Description of the (a) On ship. p. 110. (b) On freight, p. 115. (c) On goods, p. 117. (d) On lien or special interest, p. 119. (e) On respondentia, p. 122. (ƒ) Oá 5th Description of the place at which the vessel is laden or bound to, p. 123. 6th. Description of the commencement and termination of the risk, p. 124. 7h. Description of the perils and risks insured against, p 124. 8th. Description of the premium, p. 121. 9th. Description of the sum insured, p. [ 11 ] agents, p. 127. 12th. Memorandum at the end of the policy, p. 127. 126. (E) RELATIVE TO THE LEGALITY OF THE TRADE OR VOYAGE. Trading to the East Indies and South Seas, p. 133. (d) Trading contrary to the revenue laws, p. 131. (e) Trading contrary to royal proclamation, p. (a) Valued and open policies, p. 148. (b) Wagering policies, p. 157. WHAT IS A DEVIATION FROM THE VOYAGE DES- CRIBED IN THE POLICY, AND ITS EFFECT. (a) Of what constitutes a deviation, p. 200. (b) what will justify a de- viation, p. 211. (c) the duty of the master, in case of deviation, p, 216. THE NATURE AND EFFECT OF LIBERTY BEING GIVEN BY THE POLICY TO TOUCH, &C. AT PARTICULAR PLACES. (a) License to touch, p. 217. (b) 1. What constitutes such a loss, p. 232 2. When such a loss is presumed, (b) By capture, p. 244. (c) jettison, p. 259. tion, and detention of princes and people, p. 259. (a) What is, p. 282. (b) Construction of, p. 285. 2. In particular. - (a) Of seaworthiness, p. 288. (b) neutrality, p. 292. license, p. 309. (d) · the number of the crew, p. 310. (e) ty, p. 311. (f) To sail on or before a particular day, p. 312. THE PREMIUMS. (a) Of the party liable for, p. 489. (b) Return of, p. 492. (A a) RELATIVE to double anD RE-INSURANCE, p. 513. (Ba) (a) Form of action, p. 538. (b) When sustainable, p. 538. (c) Parties 1st. Venue, p. 542. 2nd. Setting out policy, p. 542. 3rd. Aver- |