Wright v. Wright, 59 Barb. 505; 54 N. Y. 437. If a woman assigns by delivery a note payable to her order, and afterward marries the maker, her indorsement after the marriage transfers the legal title to the note, and suit may be maintained thereon: Guptill v. Horne, 63 Me. 405. A woman who is divorced can maintain an action against her former husband for personal services performed for him before their marriage: Carlton v. Carlton, 72 Me. 115, 39 Am. Rep. 307. This case is in conflict with that of Matter of Callister, 153 N. Y. 294, 60 Am. St. Rep. 620, wherein it was held that such services, or a contract therefor, were not property, “and was merged and extinguished by the marriage of the parties." In Carlton v. Carlton, 72 Me. 116, 39 Am. Rep. 307, it is said, however, that "the word 'property' includes choses in action as well as choses in possession. It includes money due as well as money possessed. It includes money due for personal services as well as money due for anything else. In its broadest sense it includes everything which goes to make up one's wealth or estate." A judgment obtained by the wife against the husband before the marriage remains the separate property of the wife under the statute, and she may enforce its payment by execution after the marriage: Flenner v. Flenner, 29 Ind. 565. The husband may maintain an action against his wife, after their marriage, to recover money loaned by him to her, at her request, before their marriage: Clark v. Clark, 49 Ill. App. 163. Independent of statute, an administratrix marrying the obligor in a bond payable to her in her representative capacity, does not thereby extinguish the debt, but merely suspends the right of action during coverture and while she continues administratrix: King v. Green, 2 Stew. 183, 19 Am. Dec. 46. CASES IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS. WILLIAMSON v. STATE. [39 TEXAS CRIMINAL REPORTS, 60.] BURGLARY- "HOUSE" - WHAT IS NOT.-A PORTABLE "HEADER BOX," fourteen feet long, six feet wide, four feet high on one side, and eighteen inches on the other, such as is com monly used with a grain harvester, is not a "house" within the contemplation of a statute relating to burglary, although it has four sides and is covered over, for it has no permanency of location or fixedness of place, and is not used, or intended to be used, in any way or for any purpose connected with a habitation, or other purposes for which houses are ordinarily used. Frank P. McGhee, for the appellant. W. W. Walling and Mann Trice, assistant attorney general, for the state. 61 DAVIDSON, J. Appellant was convicted of burglary, and appeals. The indictment is in the usual form, and contains two counts. The first charges a burglary at night, and the second in the daytime. There are several questions presented by the record, but, under the view we take of the case, it is not necessary to discuss any of them, except the insufficiency of the testimony to support the judgment of conviction. The testimony is very brief, and shows without contradiction that the "house" alleged to have been burglarized was described as follows: "What is commonly known as a header box' herein described. . . . . The header box is the kind usually used in connection with the harvester to hold heads in, and the grain heads cut off are conveyed to a place where the grain is stacked or threshed as it is cut, and this particular box was about two ... hundred yards from where the oats had been threshed. The box was constructed of lumber, and the sides, ends, and bottom were closed, and substantially joined together." It was covered with a wagon sheet securely fastened, so that the oats could not be taken from the box without in some way forcibly removing the cover. "By actual measurement, the box was four feet high on one side and eighteen inches on the opposite side, with ends sloping from one side to the other; was sloping as such boxes usually are. It was fourteen feet long and six feet wide, and held about one hundred and fifty or two hundred bushels of threshed oats." The question here is, Was this a "house," within contemplation of the statute of burglary? We are of opinion that it was not. It is true that it had four sides, and was covered over, but it was nevertheless a box, and not a house. All boxes which contain goods-shoes, groceries, etc.-for shipment would be houses if this box is held to be one. The evidence excludes the idea of permanency of location or fixedness of place in regard to this house. It was portable, and made for the express purpose of being carried from place to place for the purpose of holding the heads cut from grain, or of grain after it was threshed; and was not used, or intended to be used, in any way or for any purpose connected with a habitation, or other purposes for which houses are ordinarily used. Some of our cases have gone to a considerable extent in holding certain character of structures houses, but in all such it will be found that they were fixtures: See Anderson v. State, 17 Tex. Cr. App. 306; Bigham v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. Rep. 244; Willis v. State, 33 Tex. Cr. Rep. 168. We would not be understood as holding that it is absolutely necessary that the structure, in order to be considered a house, should be fixed to the soil, or that because it is portable it would not be considered a house. But we do hold, under the proof in this case, that this was not a house, but a mere box, constituting a part of the outfit for the thresher. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded. BURGLARY.-A "HOUSE," in the sense of a statute relating to burglary, is any structure which has walls on all sides and is covered by a roof: See monographic note to People v. Richards, 2 Am. St. Rep. 389, on burglary. Compare Favro v. State, 39 Tex. Cr. Rep. 452, post, p. 950; and see Williams v. State, 105 Ga. 814, 70 Am. St. Rep. 82. TALBUTT V. STATE. [89 TEXAS CRIMINAL REPORTS, 64.] INTERSTATE COMMERCE-OCCUPATION TAX-UNCONSTITUTIONALITY.-A state statute which levies a tax upon the business and occupation of selling lightning rods, which are manufactured in one state and sold in another, upon orders taken by a traveling salesman, is violative of the federal constitution, as being a tax upon interstate commerce, and is therefore void. Conviction for pursuing the business or occupation of canvassing for the sale of lightning rods without paying the occupation tax and obtaining a license. The defendant appealed. Hazelwood & Smith, for the appellant. W. W. Walling and Mann Trice, assistant attorney general, for the state. 65 DAVIDSON, J. The offense was committed in January, 1898. The punishment was assessed at a fine of one hundred and fifty dollars. The evidence shows that the appellant was representing Cole Brothers, who resided in Greencastle, Putnam County, Indiana, and who carried on their business at that place. Cole Brothers have not, and never have had, a place of business within the limits of the state of Texas, and appellant is their agent and representative soliciting orders for the placing of lightning rods on houses in Grayson county, and, when the orders are secured, they are sent to the place of business of Cole Brothers, at Greencastle, Indiana. Lightning rods were then made in obedience to said orders, shipped to Texas, and, when required to do so, appellant assisted in placing these lightning rods at the places desired by the purchasers. For this he collected the money for the sale, or took notes, as the case might be. Without going into any discussion of the matter further than heretofore, we hold that the conviction was erroneous. This seems, under the decisions of the supreme court of the United States, to be a tax upon interstate commerce: See Ex parte Holman, 36 Tex. Cr. Rep. 255; Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U. S. 289; Asher v. Texas, 128 U. S. 129; Corson v. Maryland, 120 U. S. 502; Robbins v. Shelby Taxing Dist., 120 U. S. 489. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded. INTERSTATE COMMERCE-TAXATION OF, BY STATE.-No state has a right to lay a tax on interstate commerce in any form, and cannot tax the occupation or business of carrying it on: Note to Arnold v. Yanders, 60 Am. St. Rep. 756. SQUIRES V. STATE. [89 TEXAS CRIMINAL REPORTS, 96.] LIBEL-INNUENDO.-THE OFFICE of an innuendo, in an action for libel, is to aver a meaning of the language published. LIBEL-INDICTMENT FOR-SUFFICIENCY OF.-An indictment for libel, alleging that the publication of a certain instrument was libelous, under the statute, in two respects, namely, that the libelee, being a candidate for office was dishonest, and therefore unworthy of such office; and that he had been guilty of an act which, though not a penal offense, was disgraceful to him as a member of society, and which would naturally bring him into contempt among honorable persons, is sufficient, though it has no innuendo or explanatory allegations, if it contains allegations of inducement, and the instrument set out therein does not require any explanatory averment to ascertain its libelous character, or against whom directed. LIBEL-INDICTMENT FOR-CHARGE OF DISHONESTY AGAINST CANDIDATE FOR OFFICE-WHEN INSUFFICIENT. A publication concerning a candidate for office is not libelous unless there is an imputation of dishonesty such as goes to his personal integrity, and which renders him unfit to be trusted with official duties. Hence, an indictment for libel cannot be sustained where the matter charged is that the candidate was unfaithful to the party which had nominated him; and that, while he was such nominee, he was secretly conniving with an opposing party for its support, for this does not indicate such a want of personal honesty as would render him unworthy of holding an office, though it does suggest a want of such high moral principle as should actuate a party's standard bearer. LIBEL-INDICTMENT FOR-CHARGE OF DISGRACEFUL ACT BY CANDIDATE FOR OFFICE-WHEN SUFFICIENT. A charge, in an indictment for libel, that the prosecutor, who was a candidate for office, had written and signed a secret circular, abnegating the principles of his own party, and professing a belief in the principles of an opposing party, and had sent the same abroad to certain persons, thus treacherously seeking their support in his election, places him, if the circular was true, in the attitude of a hypocrite and a traitor. Such a charge is, therefore, a libel, for it is calculated to bring him into disgrace and reproach among gentlemen, and should justly subject him to the contempt of all horonable persons. WITNESSES-PLACING UNDER THE RULE.-The matter of placing witnesses under the rule is much in the discretion of the court, but, when the rule is invoked, the order of exclusion should apply to all of the witnesses, unless some good reason is shown for making an exception. LIBEL-INDICTMENT FOR-INSTRUCTIONS.-If an Indictment for libel contains two propositions, one libelous and the other not, the former should be submitted to the jury, under appropriate instructions, but they should be instructed to ignore or disregard the latter proposition. Conviction of libel. The defendant made a motion to quash the indictment on the grounds stated in the opinion, but the motion was overruled. The court, in its charge to the jury, |