The German Ambassador in a letter to the Secretary of State dated May 21, 1925, stated that Germany agreed to the Senate reservations.] EFFORTS OF THE UNITED STATES TO ASSIST IN THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEMS OF GERMAN REPARATIONS " 700.0011 R 34/10 Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a Conversation with the French Ambassador (Jusserand), January 5, 1923 The Secretary said that he had been informed at the Department press conference this morning, by one of the correspondents, that M. Poincaré in answer to an inquiry had categorically denied that he had received any suggestion from the American Government along the line of the Secretary's statement in his New Haven speech.1 The Secretary said he was very much surprised at this and could not credit such a report; that of course he had not sent a formal note on the subject, as he desired to deal with the matter in a manner most welcome to the French Government, but that he had presented the matter and it had been discussed and he had received through the Ambassador M. Poincaré's replies to his suggestion.15 The Secretary said he hoped that the statements made at Paris would not compel him to state here exactly what had taken place. The Ambassador said he could not understand such reports; that of course it had been talked over with the Secretary and the Ambassador referred to the circumstances, to the telegrams he had brought in, and to M. Poincaré's comments. He said that perhaps M. Poincaré had said that he had not officially received a suggestion. The Secretary said he did not care to enter into any discussion of mere matter of form, but the French Government certainly had the suggestion before it, and the Secretary could not be put in a position before the American people of contenting himself with making a speech at New Haven and supposing that that was a way to address the French Government; that he had taken the matter up with the Ambassador and if it were questioned he would have to make this clear. The Ambassador asked whether the Secretary thought it necessary that there should be a correction in Paris and said he could not 13 Continued from Foreign Relations, 1922, vol. II, pp. 160–203. 14 See telegram, Dec. 29, 1922, to the Ambassador in France, ibid., p. 199. 15 See memoranda of conversations held Dec. 14 and Dec. 21, 1922, ibid., pp. 187 and 195. credit the report. The Secretary said he would not ask for any correction but possibly it would be well, if the Ambassador were willing, to state the situation to the French Government, so that there would not be statements coming out of Paris which would give a wrong impression here. The Ambassador indicated that he would do this. 862T.01/506% Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a Conversation with the French Ambassador (Jusserand), January 8, 1923 The French Ambassador called at the Secretary's request. The Secretary informed the Ambassador that he had confidential advices. to the effect that the French intended to occupy the Ruhr within six days. The Secretary spoke of the Senate Resolution calling for the withdrawal of the American troops 16 and said that he would be glad, if the Ambassador were free to inform him, whether the report to which he had referred was accurate. The Secretary said that if the French started to go into the Ruhr, our troops would be withdrawn at once. The Ambassador said he had no information on the subject. He expressed the hope that the American troops would not be withdrawn. The Ambassador said he would cable for information but he intimated that all the plans would be made for the occupation of the Ruhr in order to impress Germany and in the hope that some better offer would be made by Germany and that it was not likely that the Government would say they did not intend to go into the Ruhr; that all preparations would be made as if they were going in. The Ambassador did not know what had been decided upon. The Secretary said that he had informed the press that the matter of the Secretary's suggestion for an impartial examination of the reparations question for the development of a financial plan by a body of experts, had been discussed with the French Government;17 that the two governments had exchanged their views upon the question. The Secretary said that he had discussed the matter with the Ambassador, who had reported it to his Government, and M. Poincaré had made replies, and of course it had been presented as fully as it could be except it were the subject of a diplomatic note, and that 10 S. Res. 395, Jan. 5, 1923, 67th Cong., 4th sess.; see Congressional Record, vol. 64, pt. 2, pp. 1276, 1349, and 1361. 17 See telegram, Jan. 6, 1923, to Ambassador in France, Foreign Relations, 1922, vol. II, p. 202. if the French Government desired the Secretary to send a formal note to that effect he was ready to do so; that he did not care to be put in the position of not having presented a matter to the French Government when he had done so fully. The Ambassador said that he thought it was better to let the matter rest and not to take it up further. The Ambassador again expressed the hope that nothing would be done at the moment with regard to the troops, for fear it would give a wrong impression abroad. The Ambassador said he would cable for information as to the plans of his government with regard to the occupation of the Ruhr, but intimated that he could hardly expect that he would be authorized to make a definite statement. 862T.01/514: Telegram The Ambassador in Germany (Houghton) to the Secretary of State [Paraphrase] BERLIN, January 10, 1923-4 p.m. 5. Cuno 18 just told me that he will make no appeal for support either to the United States or any other country. He intends to let history take its course. In case France occupies the Ruhr, Germany will summon her Ambassador at Paris to Berlin. Germany will not break off diplomatic relations but will issue a statement saying that he has been called to Berlin. Afterwards Cuno will send a note to all governments protesting against the invasion and the violation of the Treaty of Versailles. He stated that during the occupation of the Ruhr he will not, because he cannot, pay reparations or even discuss them. He said that the situation was still uncertain as troops are evidently being held back. The French Ambassador has requested an appointment with Minister for Foreign Affairs for this afternoon in order to make a statement. Cuno seems anxious that American forces should be retained for the present. He says that Allen's presence on the Rhine will make treatment of Germans much less severe and possibly avert more serious trouble. If France should attempt to divert coal a serious situation will immediately develop. At the present time the fuel supply in Germany is quite inadequate. HOUGHTON 18 Chancellor of the German Reich. 862T.01/512: Telegram The Ambassador in France (Herrick) to the Secretary of State PARIS, January 10, 1923-5 p.m. 16. General Buat personally informed military attaché as follows: The French divisions totalling 10,000 men move into the Ruhr tomorrow. No North African troops whatever in this force. All composed of Frenchmen. If any further troops required to be sent they will be Frenchmen. All arrangements under direction of General Degoutte who will place troops about Essen as he deems best for the protection of engineers. General Buat added that he had originally intended to send two sections of French railway troops to assure this movement but since the German railway men are carrying out the movement with the greatest efficiency he has countermanded the order. The two divisions withdrawn from the army of the Rhine are being drafted from the troops from the eastern frontier garrisons. HERRICK 862T.01/151⁄2 Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a Conversation with the Belgian Ambassador (Cartier), January 11, 1923 The Ambassador said that he had no special matter to present but wished to say that he hoped that it was understood by the American Government that the Belgian Government felt it was necessary to participate with the French in the Ruhr movement. He said that Ambassador Fletcher was entirely in the confidence of the Belgian Government and undoubtedly had been fully advised and in turn had reported to the Department the position which the Belgian Government had taken. The Ambassador intimated that they had not desired such action but did not see their way clear to disassociate themselves from it. The conversation then turned generally to the effects of the occupation. The Secretary expressed his regret that this action should have been taken, his belief that it was not a way to obtain substantial reparations, and that serious consequences might ensue. The Belgian Ambassador did not intimate any difference in the point of view. 862T.01/524 Statement for the Press Handed by the German Ambassador (Wiedfeldt) to the Under Secretary of State (Phillips), January 11, 1923 WASHINGTON, January 10, 1923. The French Ambassador and immediately afterwards the Belgian Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin have this afternoon informed the German Minister for Foreign Affairs in writing and orally that France and Belgium because of the defaults declared by the Reparations Commission as committed by Germany in execution of the deliveries of wood and coal, have decided immediately to send into the Ruhr control missions, composed of engineers and accompanied by the troops necessary, to control the management of the Coal Syndicate, to guarantee the strict execution of the program of the Reparations Commission and to enforce the payment of reparations. The Control Missions will be placed under General Degoutte, who will have full dictatorial powers. Any local disturbances will be punished with the most severe coercive measures and penalties. The German Minister for Foreign Affairs has lodged a protest with the two foreign representatives against the action contemplated because this action represents a breach of the Treaties and of international law. Owing to the declarations made by France and Belgium there is no longer any doubt that tomorrow at the latest a Franco-Belgian army will occupy Essen and parts of the Ruhr territory. This happens four years after the signing of the Peace Treaty and is directed against a defenceless and peaceful nation. The reason given for the procedure is that Germany is in default in her deliveries of wood and coal in 1922. The default in the case of coal represents a deficit amounting to less than 4% of the deliveries of coal to the Entente Powers since the signing of the Armistice. Of the deliveries of wood to France for 1922 only 20,000 cubic metres sawnwood and 135,000 telegraph-poles are missing. France and Belgium justify their action by asserting that Germany is in voluntary default and that this voluntary default justifies onesided coercive measures directed against Germany on the part of these two powers. The existence of such a default on the part of Germany is not only denied by Germany alone. But entirely apart from that the FrancoBelgian action represents a breach of the Treaty of Versailles in a threefold manner: 1. Germany's defaults in her deliveries of wood and coal would, according to the note of the Reparations Commission of March 21, 1922, always only justify demands for subsequent payments. |