acts and by subsequent court decisions. The principle remains, nevertheless, as one of the tenets of American federalism—namely, that no state can control interstate commerce until articles have entered the state and have been mingled with the general property of the state.

Dartmouth College vs. Woodward. One of the most important decisions of the Supreme Court dealt with the question as to whether a private corporation when it had secured a charter from a state was protected under the form of that charter by the section of the Constitution providing that no state shall impair the obligation of contracts. The Supreme Court, in a notable opinion asserted the doctrine that when a charter is granted by a state the charter becomes a contract and the terms of the contract cannot be changed by a subsequent act of the legislature, unless an express provision for such change is included in the charter itself. The effect of this decision was to take from the states the control of private corporations, particularly corporations which had secured long-term charters or perpetual franchises, and which could then claim the protection of the Supreme Court from any interference by state legislation. This decision has rendered extremely difficult the regulation by the state of corporate franchises, and was the beginning of a long line of Supreme Court decisions protecting property interests and vested rights.

Gibbons vs. Ogden.2-In the case of Gibbons vs. Ogden the Supreme Court was called upon to decide the meaning of the term commerce-i.e., whether commerce was intended to cover intercourse between states and the extent to which Congress has the right to regulate such commerce. A New York statute had granted to Livingston and Fulton the exclusive right to navigate the waters of the state by steamboat for a period of years. This right was contested as an interference with the constitutional powers of Congress over interstate commerce. Commerce was defined by the court to include commercial intercourse, and navigation 1 4 Wheaton 518.

29 Wheaton I.

and the exclusive right granted by the state was declared void. The doctrine of liberal construction was again defended by Marshall as follows:

This instrument [the Constitution] contains an enumeration of the powers expressly granted by the people to their government. It has been said that these powers ought to be construed strictly. But why ought they to be so construed? Is there one sentence in the Constitution which gives countenance to this rule? In the last of the enumerated powers, that which grants, expressly, the means for carrying all others into execution, Congress is authorized "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper" for the purpose. But this limitation on the means which may be used is not extended to the powers which are conferred; nor is there one sentence in the Constitution which has been pointed out by the gentlemen of the bar, or which we have been able to discern, that prescribes this rule. We do not, therefore, think ourselves justified in adopting it. What do gentlemen mean by strict construction? If they contend only against that enlarged construction which would extend words beyond their natural and obvious import, we might question the application of the term, but should not controvert the principle. If they contend for that narrow construction which, in support of some theory not found in the Constitution, would deny to the government those powers which the words of the grant, as usually understood, import, and which are consistent with the general views and objects of that instrument-for that narrow construction which would cripple the government and render it unequal to the objects for which it is declared to be instituted, and to which the powers given, as fairly understood, render it competentthen we cannot perceive the propriety of this strict construction, nor adopt it as the rule by which the Constitution is to be expounded. As men whose intentions require no concealment generally employ the words which most directly and aptly express the ideas which they intend to convey, the enlightened patriots who framed our Constitution and the people who adopted it must be understood to have employed words in their natural sense, and to have intended what they have said. If, from the imperfections of human language, there should be serious doubts respecting the extent of any given power, it is a well-settled rule that the objects for which it was given, especially when those objects are expressed in the instrument itself, should have great influence in the construction.1

By the time this decision was rendered the Supreme Court had asserted its authority as superior to and independent 19 Wheaton I, at 187-188.

of Congress with the right to declare acts of Congress invalid when regarded as contrary to the Constitution. It had also pronounced and effectively maintained the right to set aside the laws of the states when those laws were regarded in conflict with some Federal provision. More important still were the announcement and successful defense of the principle of implied powers. Though the cases in which the Supreme Court has interfered with the will of Congress are relatively few, the number of state statutes set aside by the court has been large, and an effective supervision has been exercised over state legislation affecting taxation, commerce, and business, and such acts as arbitrarily interfere with rights of person or property.

Within recent years, an extraordinary development of the authority of the Supreme Court has come through the extension of the clause of the Fourteenth Amendment relating to due process of law and the equal protection of the laws. This clause, although originally interpreted strictly by the Supreme Court as intended to apply to the protection of the negro race, was gradually extended to include the protection of all citizens and corporations from any unjust or oppressive act which interfered with life, liberty, or property. The amendment has thus come to be a device by which the court maintains a censorship over state governments as to the justice, fairness, and equity of state legislative acts.

Expansion of Federal Powers by Congressional Legislation and a Subsidy System.-Finally, Congress and the Supreme Court have given, under the commerce clause, an impetus to the growth of nationalism. Commerce, originally interpreted to apply merely to navigable waters over which Congress might legislate, has been extended to the control of the sources of these waters, particularly as affected by irrigation, and to the preservation of forests. The term has also been extended to include a prohibition of the manufacture and sale of certain articles, such as lottery tickets and articles produced by child labor. By the passage of the

Interstate Commerce Act, the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, and the recent Federal Trade Commission Act, along with the decisions of the Supreme Court supporting control of commerce, commercial relations in the United States are in the process of being placed gradually under the Federal government. It seems to be merely a matter of time until the United States will be in a position to establish complete and uniform commercial regulations affecting all business and individuals engaged in commercial transactions involving more than one state. According to the theory of such men as President Roosevelt and Senator Root, the United States Constitution should be expanded through legislation and interpretation as the needs of time demand, and those things should be nationalized in which national control seems necessary. At any rate, it has been determined by continued practice that the Constitution may grow and expand without formal amendment, and that Federal powers may be extended by the process of interpretation to include Federal regulation of matters formerly belonging to the states.

In addition to the Federal laws which center primarily around commerce and business relations among the states, the power of the national government has been strengthened and extended by the passage of acts relative to subjects foreign to action by Congress a decade or two ago. The Federal government, with the exception of time of war, formerly raised its money through tariff and internal duties, but the enactment of the income tax and inheritance tax acts broadened the power of the national government to raise revenue. The control of food and drugs, at one time considered a matter of local control, if not entirely an individual matter, passed to a certain extent into the hands of the central government when the Federal Food and Drug Act, as well as the Meat Inspection Act, went into effect. The Bank Act of 1863, the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 and the Postal Savings Bank Act of 1910, together with the Farm Loan Act of 1916, have resulted in placing the Federal government in control of an extended banking business.

Another type of national legislation is that which aims, by granting subsidies or by rendering other assistance, to stimulate action on the part of the states in handling affairs which heretofore have been regarded only of local concern. Examples of such acts are the Morrill Acts which provide for Agricultural Education and the Vocational Education Acts, as well as the Federal Good Roads and Public Health Acts. The acts which provide for subsidies affect the relation between the nation and the states to a greater extent than is likely to be the case in Federal legislation, which offers no financial aid. Subsidies carry with them requirements and obligations on the part of the state, which accepts assistance while the administration of the particular activity is usually placed, to a certain degree, at least, under the control of the nation. The acts to which reference is here made are examples of national legislation, which within the last few decades and especially the last decade have deviated from the course originally prescribed by the Constitution. They serve to show the general tendency of the national government to extend its power and to cut across powers formerly exercised by the states.1

UNIFORMITY IN STATE LAWS

One of the chief difficulties which confront all federal systems of government is the diversity in laws and their administration, resulting from the fact that many matters of general concern are dealt with by numerous legislatures, courts, and administrative bodies. To obviate this difficulty some federal constitutions grant to the national government the authority to establish uniform codes of laws covering the fundamental relations of general interest. In the United States, where important powers are reserved to the states for the regulation and control of the primary interests of life,

1J. A. Lapp, Important Federal Laws (B. F. Bowen & Co., 1917); Paul H. Douglas, "A System of Federal Grants-in-Aid," Political Science Quarterly, no. 2, pp. 255-271, and no. 4, pp. 522-544.