The Republicans had a majority of 134 in this Congress, although less than half of the vote was cast for Republican Congressmen.1

Although Federal and state laws require that representatives be elected "by districts composed of contiguous and compact territory and containing as nearly as practicable an equal number of inhabitants," gerrymandering is practiced by all parties. For example, Virginia, with a Democratic vote in 1909 of approximately 60 per cent, sent to Congress nine out of ten, or 90 per cent Democratic Congressmen. In 1908 Michigan was 62 per cent Republican, 37 per cent Democratic, but all the Congressmen elected were Republicans.2

But the decline of confidence in representative assemblies is not confined to the United States, where special interests are reputed to exercise a dominant influence and where "pork barrel" and "log-rolling" methods frequently prevail. A similar decline has been noted in the position and prestige of the House of Commons as a legislative body.

DECLINE IN THE POSITION OF HOUSE OF COMMONS

Just as legislative bodies have been losing their place in the confidence of the people of the United States, so a similar change has taken place in England in regard to the prestige of the House of Commons as a lawmaking body.3 The changes which appear to be lessening the influence of the legislative body in England are the placing of increased power in the hands of the executive and the submission of legislative questions directly to the popular vote. And, whereas the representatives in the House of Commons were once the spokesmen of the people, the Ministry now are the responsible agents of the nation, or perhaps more 1 J. R. Commons, Proportional Representation (Thomas Y. Crowell & Co.), PP. 57-58. 2 R. E. Andrews, "The Grip of the Gerrymander," The Independent (May, 1911), vol. lxx, pp. 1002-1006.

R. L. Schuyler, "The Decline of the House of Commons," Columbia University Quarterly, October, 1919.

accurately of the party which they represent. The fate of the Ministry is no longer decided by the House of Commons, but rather the personnel of the latter is determined by the preference shown by the electors in selecting the Prime Minister. According to the opinion of Sir Sidney Low: . . . the House of Commons no longer controls the executive; on the contrary, the executive controls the House of Commons. The theory is that the Ministers must justify each and all of their acts before the representatives of the nation at every stage; if they fail to do so, these representatives will turn them out of office. But in our modern practice the Cabinet is scarcely ever turned out of office by Parliament whatever it does.1

The influences which have aided in bringing about the change in the position of the House of Commons have been attributed to the development of the party system with its strict discipline, to the inferiority of the House of Commons over the press as a means of expressing public opinion, and to the social transformation which has recently taken place in England.

PROPOSED REFORMS

It is obvious that the defects which are causing a decline in the confidence in legislative bodies should be eliminated. In fact, definite efforts are being made to restore the good will of the people toward legislatures. A few of the problems connected therewith, as well as others that arise from the attempt to adjust representative government to meet the complex political conditions of the present time, require some consideration. Among these are the limitation of the scope of legislative power and functions, the abolition of the district system and the adoption of proportional representation, the securing of expert service in lawmaking, and the advisability of changing the present form of legislative organization.

The Limitation of the Scope of Legislative Power and Functions.—That so many results of legislative action have

81.

1 Sidney Low, The Governance of England (G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1914), p.

seemed to be unsatisfactory is due in part to the failure to distinguish the various types of legislative functions and the differences in methods which are necessary in dealing with the diverse powers intrusted to representative bodies. To realize the difficulty it is only necessary to analyze a few of their distinct duties. The chief duty of legislative bodies is to act as organs for the expression of public opinion. Efforts to perform this duty have sometimes been dissipated because of the mass of details regulating administrative departments and because of the amount of time and consideration given to local and private bills. But the practice of placing responsibility for the initiation of legislation in the hands of administrative officers is a tendency which is gaining in favor and is helping to restore emphasis to the primary function of the representative assembly. The change now well under way is described by Mr. Willoughby:

In England this movement has gone so far that it can almost be said that Parliament has ceased to be a legislative body, practically speaking, and has reverted to its original function of serving as an organ of public opinion. All legislation of importance is now drafted by the Ministry in power and is put through that body without change except as the Ministry may acquiesce in such modification. The inability of the House to modify ministerial proposals arises from the fact that the Ministry in power necessarily has a majority in the House, and this majority, under the practice now firmly established, is practically pledged in advance to make its action conform in all respects to such Ministry. The power of the individual member to introduce measures and secure their passage has steadily diminished until it no longer has any significance in determining the character of legislation that shall be enacted.

In the United States we are still in the midst of a similar evolution. More and more the people are looking to the President in the case of the national government, and to the Governors in the governments of the states, to formulate and secure the enactment of all acts of general importance. There can be no doubt, moreover, that this movement is one which has generally commended itself to the populations of both countries.1

1 W. F. Willoughby, The Government of Modern States (The Century Company, 1919), p. 295.

Thus it is the primary function of the legislative assembly to serve as a channel through which the public may bring influence to bear on the formation of government policies as well as on the methods of administration pursued. For the performance of this duty it becomes necessary that heads of departments and executive officers present to the legislative chambers adequate information on the expenditure of public money and on the methods and procedure in administration. Furthermore, no steps can be taken involving new policies or the application of general rules without first securing the consideration and approval of the legislative chambers.

A function no less significant, from the standpoint of American legislatures, is that which has to do with the organization of the administrative branch of the government, the work which shall be performed, and the money which shall be expended thereby. From this standpoint the legislature has been designated as the board of directors of a public corporation, "representing and acting for the citizen stockholders; it is its function to give orders to administrative officers; and, as a correlative and necessary function to take such action as will enable it at all times. to exercise a rigid supervision and control over the latter, with a view to seeing that its orders are properly and efficiently carried out." From the standpoint of the duties of the legislature as a board of directors for the public there is a question whether the function of the chambers should be to determine authoritatively the main features of government organization such as the creation of offices, the determination of the duties connected with them, methods of procedure, and limitations to be placed thereupon, or whether the primary responsibility for both legislation and administration should be placed upon executive officers, with the assemblies acting in an advisory and critical capacity. The latter method is that toward which par

1 W. F. Willoughby, The Government of Modern States (The Century Company, 1919), p. 302.

liamentary governments appear to be progressing, whereas the former is the practice to a large extent prevailing in the Federal and state governments of the United States.

A large part of the time of American legislatures is given to the passing of laws which relate to the details of administration.1 Such laws, for example, as relate to the rules of procedure in courts of justice, the determination of boundaries of school districts, the payment of pensions or private claims, and a host of other matters might well, it is claimed, be provided for by executive departments with the authority to make rules and regulations under a definitely approved system. If the minor matters which are concerned merely with the details of administration and which can be handled better by executive and administrative officers were removed from the consideration of American legislative bodies, much of the business which now engages the attention of legislators would be eliminated and the time could be given profitably to the formulation of public policies. The strictures of J. S. Mill on legislative bodies are as true to-day as when he first contended that a popular assembly is not fitted to administer or to dictate in detail to those who have the charge of administration, and that,

even when honestly meant, the interference is almost always injurious. Every branch of public administration is a skilled business which has its own peculiar principles and traditional rules, many of them not even known in any effectual way, except to those who have at some time had a hand in carrying on the business and none of them likely to be duly appreciated by persons not practically acquainted with the department. The method of confining legislatures to the enactment of laws involving policies and general principles has been accomplished in a more or less effective manner through

1

Much of the work now attempted by the state legislatures is work for which large representative bodies are not fitted. No inconsiderable portion of the output of legislation so-called consists of measures of an administrative or quasijudicial character. Practically all private and local legislation is of this character. Fully half of the time of the legislative committees is devoted to the consideration of such measures."-A. N. Holcombe, State Government in the United States (The Macmillan Co., 1916), pp. 278–279.